ASEAN’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: THE ROAD TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY? by Pedrason, Rodon
RUPRECHT-KARLS-UNIVERSITÄT HEIDELBERG 
INSTITUT FÜR POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFT 
 
ASEAN’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: 
THE ROAD TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN  
DEFENCE COMMUNITY? 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr.rer.pol. 
im Fach Politischenwissenschaft 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Rodon Pedrason 
 
 
 
Eingereicht an der 
Fakultät für Wirtschafts - und Sozialwissenschaften 
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg 
 
 
 
 
Gutachter: 
 
1. Prof. Dr. Aurel Croissant, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, 
Universität Heidelberg 
2. Prof. Dr. Jörn Dosch, Lehrstuhl für Internationale Politik und 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Institut für Politik- und 
Verwaltungswissenschaften, Universität Rostock 
 
 
 
Heidelberg, im Sommersemester 2015 
 i 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the practice of 
ASEAN member states’ defence diplomacy through practical defence 
cooperatives for handling security challenges in Southeast Asia contain the 
characteristics of a defence community which could pave the way for the 
formation of a future Southeast Asian defence community. The security 
challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today lie in creating a 
stable environment. The debate over the concept of security has broadened 
the discourse on regional security cooperation, which drives states to 
engage more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in order to defend better and 
promote their national interests, and particularly in handling problems in 
maintaining a stable peace in the region. 
As the unit of analysis, this study examined the forum of the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and selects six ASEAN member states as the 
loci of the study, namely: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore; Thailand 
and Vietnam. The different forms of government system became the 
reasons for selecting these six countries, i.e. a democratic state such as 
Indonesia, a semi-authoritarian system such as in Malaysia and Singapore, 
a monarchy as in Brunei and Thailand, socialist countries such as Vietnam. 
However, only four out of the six chosen countries were founding members 
of ASEAN.  
This study proposes two central questions. The first question focuses 
on the development of forms of threats found in Southeast Asia today, 
which encourages ASEAN member states to conduct defence diplomacy, 
while the second question focuses on whether the implementation of 
ASEAN defence diplomacy helps to shape an ASEAN defence community. 
In answering those questions, this study is applying qualitative methodology 
to address an explanatory aspect of these questions, and using the theory 
of regionalism through presenting empirical evidence of ASEAN member 
states practical defence diplomacy. It seeks to show how ASEAN member 
states develop their military role in handling new emerging non-traditional 
security threats contain the characteristics of a defence community which 
could pave the way for this regional organisation to turn into a collective 
defence grouping. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE STUDY OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
1. Background 
The Southeast Asia region is an extraordinarily diverse collection of 
states, which vary widely in their population size, their wealth, their political 
systems, and the security challenges they face.1 Nevertheless, there are 
many similarities between the countries of this region. The elements of 
these similarities include: natural or geographical circumstances,  basic 
culture, and the feeling of kinship. Furthermore, the leaders of these 
Southeast Asian countries realise the importance of a partnership for peace, 
progress, and prosperity. There are also some parallels in terms of common 
interests, problems faced, and the importance of cooperation and solidarity 
with their neighbours. Having an understanding of all these factors, the 
leaders in Southeast Asia were encouraged to form an association to 
replace the failures of previous regional organisations. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
established as a regional organisation in 1967.2 It has the reputation of 
being the most successful regional organisation in the developing world, in 
terms of its internal cohesion and international effectiveness.3 ASEAN has 
strengthened its foundation in security cooperation through the declaration 
of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The leaders in 
                                            
1 Tim Huxley, Defence Procurement in Southeast Asia (Phnom Penh: IPF-SSG October 
2008), p. 1 
2  ASEAN’s original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the 
Philippines. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and 
finally, in 1999, Cambodia became the 10th member 
3 Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security (Pacific Affairs, vol. 71, 
no. 2, Summer 1998), p. 195 
 2 
ASEAN realised that future security issues couldn’t be dealt with effectively 
without a sense of common regional interest.4  
The end of the Cold War led to much dynamic debate about the 
concept of security, and changes to  its meaning has arisen during different 
historical periods.  The traditional view of security, with its strong emphasis 
on state security and the use of military force to deal with other countries, 
has expanded to include economic, social and environmental issues under 
the framework of non-traditional security issues. Various efforts need to be 
addressed to manage the new, emerging security challenges in order to 
maintain peace and stability. The debate over the concept of security has 
broadened the discourse on regional security cooperation. This has resulted 
in the member states engaging more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in 
order to better defend and promote their national interest, particularly in the 
handling of problems in maintaining a stable peace in the region. 
The role of the military has also evolved since the end of the Cold 
War. “Due to the impact of the new security challenges, militaries of today 
have had to diversify their primary mission from the traditional focus of war 
fighting to incorporating a range of new and diverse roles, such as 
peacekeeping and disaster relief”.5 To meet this new challenge, ASEAN 
members have developed the role of the state and the military as the main 
players to deal with security matters in “dialogical activity to include practical 
                                            
4 Regional interest is interpreted as the common desire of ASEAN member states to create 
a stable peace and security and to promote peaceful settlement of disputes; see An 
overview of ASEAN, available at www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, accessed 
on 21 October 2014; see Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN’s Quest 
for a Full-Fledged Community (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 1 
5 Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.) From Boots to Brogues, the Rise of Defence 
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no 21, 2011), p.1 
 3 
and actionable response to non-traditional security issues”6 and in greater 
engagement in defence diplomacy efforts. The notion of defence diplomacy 
itself refers to a regional strategic engagement in creating a sustainable, 
cooperative relationship to build trust and to facilitate conflict prevention.7 
This is required to create mutual responsiveness to tackle security  
challenges through the mechanism of regional cooperation for the 
maintenance of peace and stability. 
2. Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia 
The challenges faced by ASEAN range from internal security 
challenges 8  to tension between ASEAN member states, as well as 
challenges from extra-regional powers. Such challenges have never been 
defined solely in terms of military-related security. To meet these challenges, 
ASEAN has redefined its framework of security cooperation. During the 
process of  cooperation, ASEAN experienced two waves of regionalism, 
namely old regionalism and new regionalism.9 The first wave of regionalism, 
the old regionalism, emerged during the Cold War. Even though the word 
‘security’ did not appear explicitly in ASEAN’s declaration, it has been the 
focus of ASEAN since its beginnings. This is in accordance with ASEAN’s 
                                            
6 See Seng Tan, ‘Talking Their Walk’?: The Evolution of Defence Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia (Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 3, 2012), p. 232 
7 KA.Muthana, Military Diplomacy (New Delhi: Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 5. No 1. 
January 2011), p. 1 
8 Rizal Sukma, Southeast Asian Security: An Overview in N.S Sisodia and Sreedha Datta 
(ed.), Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: IDSA Magnum Books 
Pvt Ltd 2008), p. 16 
9 See Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrel (ed.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 38-73; 
Chungyao Yi, Emergence of Regionalism: About State Preference Formation (POLIS 
Working Paper no. 23, January 2007), pp. 3-4; Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN’s New 
Challenges (Pacific Affairs, vol. 70, No. 4, Winter 1997-1998), pp. 555-556 
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objective of preserving regional peace and stability.10 Old regionalism has 
been characterised as a product of the Cold War, as inward-looking, 
exclusive and created by governments for specific security or economic 
purposes. 11  On the contrary, the second wave of e new regionalism 
emerged after the collapse of bipolarity when ASEAN faced unipolarity and 
globalisation, becoming outward-looking 12  and facing growing demands 
from its member states to expand its function into areas other than the 
diplomatic field.13 This new regionalism is a product of the demands of state 
as well as non-state players.14 In this regard, the growing challenge from 
traditional to non-traditional threats has a wide-reaching impact and 
currently requires a regional approach to solving today's security 
challenges. When a national solution is not adequate any more, then 
regional cooperation and a multilateral approach becomes essential.15 Such 
regional cooperation that brings regional governance and participants to 
address security is referred to as new regionalism.16 Further discussion 
about new regionalism is elaborated in Chapter 4. 
For some ASEAN member states, such as Thailand, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, and Malaysia, internal security remains a primary challenge for 
national states. 17   Territorial integrity, economic weaknesses, regime 
insecurity feelings, unstable civil–military relations, ethnic and religious 
                                            
10 Lianita Prawindarti, The ASEAN Security Community: Reconciling Traditional and Non-
Traditional Security Issues (University of Trento, 2005), pp. 3-4 
11 Buszynski (1997-98), Ibid, p. 555 
12 Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 16-19 
13 Buszynski (1997-98), Op.cit, p. 556 
14 Buzan and Weaver (2003), Op.cit, pp. 16-19  
15 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, 
and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (Singapore: RSIS, Asia Security Initiative 
Policy Series, Working Paper no. 7, Sep 2010a), pp. 1-3 
16 Ibid, p. 4 
17 Sheldon W. Simon, ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges (U.S. 
Army War College Publication, 2007), pp. 1-2 
 5 
differences, and separatism have been identified as the main security 
concerns in many Southeast Asian countries.18  There is the realisation that 
internal security has become the most common threat perception in 
Southeast Asia. However, this may vary in terms of each country’s salience 
of internal problems needing to be solved. “For example, Singapore is more 
concerned with the problem of racial harmony than of economic weakness 
and separatism, although from a  military point of view feels some degree of 
threat from Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia is more concerned with the 
problem of territorial integrity, communal violence, terrorism, and political 
stability. The problem of economic weakness and political independence 
has been more pressing in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar than 
any other regional states.”19 
In addition to internal security challenges, there are threats to the 
security and stability in Southeast Asia which come from two sources: 
bilateral tension and tension with extra regional power.20  Firstly, since the 
expansion of ASEAN into 10 states, Southeast Asia has been relatively 
conflict-free21 in recent years. In fact, it has been noted that physical conflict 
amongst states in Southeast Asia is quite unlikely. 22 However, this does not 
mean that Southeast Asian states do not arm themselves without one 
                                            
18 Sukma (2008), Op.cit, p. 16 
19 Ibid, p. 17 
20 Rizal Sukma, Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia: Is there a Role for the 
European Union? (4th Berlin Conference on Asian Security, October 2009), pp. 1-6 
21 However, a border disputes between Thailand and Cambodia exist on the issue of 
ancient Preah Vihear temple, a Hindu masterpiece. Since 2008, the temple has been an 
increasing point of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that appears to be for purely 
domestic political motives; See Aurel Croissant and Paul W. Chamber, A Contested Site of 
Memory: The Preah Vihear Tempel in Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier (ed.), 
Cultures and Globalisation: Heritage, Memory and Identity (London: SAGE Publications, 
2011) 
22 Sudhir Devare, Southeast Asian Security: The Challenges and Regional Stakes, in S 
Sisodia and Sreedha Datta (ed), Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New 
Delhi: IDSA Magnum Books Pvt Ltd 2008), pp. 37-42. Devare and Sukma describe 
traditional security challenges related to geography strategic advantage 
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another in mind; rather, such arms are unlikely to be used in anger.23  
Secondly, during the Cold War era, Southeast Asia relied on the U.S., 
with its ‘hub-and-spoke system’ 24  of bilateral alliances and its forward 
deployed military power to maintain security in the region. However, after 
the Cold War, bilateral relations with the U.S. became more complicated as 
the U.S. government applied certain measurements and political pressure in 
relation to the very sensitive issues of human rights and democratisation. 
Most notably, the emerging power of China and India has changed the 
security dynamic, and especially the current relationship between the U.S., 
China and Japan. Moreover, “a principal challenge facing ASEAN in its 
relationship with an emerging China is the ability to forge a consensus on 
key issues and to promote ASEAN solidarity”.25 Managing uncertainties in 
the future direction of major power relations serves as a major challenge for 
ASEAN.26  
3. Does Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia Matter?  
The development of threats that occurred in Southeast Asia, 
encouraged the governments of ASEAN member states to establish a new 
forum that specifically discusses security issues. A forum for dialogue was 
established with the Defence Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the 
ASEAN member states,  called the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
                                            
23 See Daljit Singh, Southeast Asian Security: An Overview (Singapore, ISEAS 2008), pp.1-
7. In this article, Singh explained about the security outlook and concern amongst ASEAN 
member states.  He noted security outlook from two big perspective such as, political 
outlook and economic outlook;  
24 Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges: 
A Comparative Analysis (Washington DC: Crisis States Working Papers Series no. 52, July 
2009), pp. 3-4 
25 Wiliam T, Tow, Great powers and multilateralism, The politics of security architectures in 
Southeast Asia, in Ralf Emmers (ed.), ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 157 
26 Sukma (2009), Op.cit, p. 6 
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(ADMM). Significantly, at the inaugural meeting of ADMM in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia on 9 May, 2006, a new concept and terminology in ASEAN 
defence cooperation was introduced, namely “defence diplomacy”.  As 
ASEAN secretariat spokesman, M.C. Abad pointed out, "defence diplomacy 
will consolidate the prevailing peace and stability relations in Southeast Asia 
by promoting greater convergence between national security and regional 
security".27 Based on the above statement it appears that there has been a 
shift in ASEAN’s viewpoint and that discussing defence is no longer a 
sensitive issue. Currently, the concept of defence diplomacy has emerged 
as an important tool of state foreign and security policy,28 particularly in 
ASEAN. The past 10 years has seen a series of regional activities in which 
ASEAN member states have used various kinds of defence diplomacy to 
promote their security, as well as their foreign policy.  
 During the Cold War, “defence diplomacy was used to pursue 
geostrategic goals, including strengthening the military capabilities of friends 
and allies against common enemies — both internal and external — and to 
sustain spheres of influence”.29 However, in the post-Cold War period, due 
to the change in threats, the military has been used for peace efforts 
(preventing conflict), providing disaster relief, and “greater engagement in 
the defence diplomacy effort”.30 This has been effective “in promoting good 
and accountable governance”.31 Due to the emergence of non-traditional 
                                            
27 The Jakarta Post, 8 May 2006 
28 Singh and Tan (2011), Op.cit, p. 1  
29 Ian Storey,China’s Bilateral Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Asian Security, vol. 8, 
no.3, 2012), p. 288. This explanation is elaborated by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, 
Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, 
(Adelphi Paper No. 365; Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 2004) 
30Ibid, p.1  
31  Aurel Croissant (et.al), Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), p. 6. Croissant stated that in certain Southeast Asian country such as 
Indonesia, over the past ten years or so the military has been willing to accept its 
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security challenges, the patterns of defence diplomacy have evolved. In the 
Southeast Asia region, governments are aware of the changing nature of 
threats. The threats are “increasingly transnational or trans-boundary, and 
non-military in nature”.32 It is important for regions to work together in order 
to handle the threat collectively to create a more secure and stable region. It 
is in such conditions that the term ‘defence diplomacy’ has emerged. From a 
theoretical perspective, the change of regional inter-state relations and 
ASEAN’s defence diplomacy cooperation in Southeast Asia in addressing 
the changing nature of challenges is referred to as new regionalism. 
In the context of ASEAN, defence diplomacy is a series of military to 
military cooperation in the form of tackling non-traditional security threats. 
This has become an important tool of the states’ foreign and security 
policy. It is conducted through dialogue, regular meetings, officer exchanges 
and field activities that reflect the regional countries’ awareness to address 
regional issues on a regional basis. Defence diplomacy “is a process that 
may involve state officials (politicians, security personnel, and intelligence 
services), as well as non-governmental organisations, think tanks, and civil 
society”. 33 The 1997 economic crisis that hit ASEAN badly marked the shift 
of security challenges from traditional to non-traditional ones. In line with the 
evolvement of security challenges, defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
also evolved from bilateral to multilateral, although for some, issues 
remaining bilateral.34 In the future, ASEAN might face even more severe 
security, societal, environmental, political, as well as economic challenges, 
                                                                                                                          
subordinate to civil power, and reduce military participations in parliament and cabinet 
significantly. 
32 Sing and Tan (2011), Op.cit. p. 16  
33 Ibid, p. 73 
34 Simon W. Sheldon, The Regionalization of Defence in Southeast Asia (The Pacific 
Review, vol. 5, no. 2, 1992), pp.112-124 
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and there are concerns amongst ASEAN leaders 35 that its current working 
mechanism is not adequate to address a new and acute regional problem.  
The practice of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia started long 
before the first inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, 
which specifically addressed security matters, although the term of defence 
diplomacy at that time was known as the defence cooperation activities. The 
first bilateral naval exercise happened between Indonesia and the 
Philippines in 1972, with the code name ‘Corpatphilindo’. It marked the 
practice of defence diplomacy in the region,36 and since then the region has 
played the host to bilateral and multilateral levels in the area of defence and 
military issues.37  A series of meetings which related to the form of defence 
diplomacy at the regional level from 1967 to 2009 produced more than 270 
documents, mainly in the form of Chairman Statements, Declarations, 
Statements, Joint Communiqués, and others (see Figure 1.1). 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
35 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Former Defence Minister of Indonesia in two periods 
in 1999 – 2000 under the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid and in 2004-
2009 under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Jakarta, 13 March 
2013 
36 Tan (2012), Op.cit, p. 235 
37 Singh and See Tan (2001), Op.cit, p. 3 
38  Evan, A Laksmana, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Trends, Prospects and 
Challenges, in Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.), From Boots to Brogues, the Rise 
of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no 21, 2011), p.  86  
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Figure 1.1 
Majority Types of ASEAN Documents (1967-2009) 
 
Source: Evan, A Laksmana, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Trends, Prospects and 
Challenges, in Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (eds), From Boots to Brogues, the 
Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 2011, p. 86 
 
Military officials and civilian officials have also played a role in 
defence diplomacy by producing such documents (as described above) 
through events such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), 
Shangri La Dialogue (SLD) and Jakarta International Defence Dialogue 
(JIDD), which are contingent on the various levels of each delegation. Most 
of the delegations at each event combined civilians and the military, except 
in the field of military exercise, in which purely military personnel featured. 
These events are some of the important regional venues in which ASEAN 
tried to develop ways in which to address regional security issues 
collectively. 
As noted, on the multilateral level from 2000 to 2009, ASEAN, on 
average, conducted “15 formal and informal meetings annually involving 
defence and security officials”.39 With its ‘ASEAN Way’,40 ASEAN defence 
                                            
39 Ibid, p. 81 
40 Scholar such Severino define ASEAN WAY as the principle of ASEAN diplomacy. This is 
a Southeast Asian’s way in dealing with one another as a manifestation of “goodwill and the 
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diplomacy had two different goals: on the one hand, to cooperate and, 
moreover, to solve intrastate problems between ASEAN member states, 
and, on the other hand, to focus on the external powers involved in the 
region’s security issues. However, due to the characteristics of the 
consensus decision-making mechanism, differences were sometimes 
caused and this was frequently exploited by certain countries, such as 
China. ASEAN’s principle of ‘non-interference’ also sometimes posed 
ineffectiveness in a multilateral form of defence diplomacy, since certain key 
states use it to bandwagon with an external power by addressing common 
issues bilaterally. Meanwhile, ASEAN as an association needed its unity to 
get a binding agreement. For example, ASEAN and China failed to bind a 
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea dispute during an ADMM retreat 
in Brunei in 2012, because China avoided having an agreement with 
ASEAN as an organisation,41 but at the same time, certain ASEAN member 
states held talks with China bilaterally to solve the problem.  
The way ASEAN member states conduct defence diplomacy cannot 
be separated from the way in which ASEAN member states  organise their 
foreign policy. Firstly, the characteristics of a consensus decision-making 
mechanism, which sometimes reaches the position of ‘agree to disagree’, 
paves the way for certain ASEAN member states to deal with other 
countries bilaterally and multilaterally. Secondly, relative to the first 
characteristic is the ASEAN commitment to engaging an outside regional 
power. The creation of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus 
                                                                                                                          
slow winning and giving of trust, and the way to arrive arrangements through consultation 
and consensus. It is as part of an institutional culture with the principle of non-interference, 
especially in dealing with intrastate conflicts”. See Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN Way 
and The Rule of Law, available at http://www.asean.org, accessed on 11 July 2013 
41 Interview with I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Director General of Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 20 March 2013 
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dialogue partners (ADMM + 8 external partners)42 showed significantly the 
importance that ASEAN countries assign to engaging external powers.43 
Having such conditions,  it is, therefore, relative to discuss the operation of 
defence diplomacy at a regional level due to the emergence of non-
traditional security issues. Moreover, the natures of ASEAN to prioritize the 
consensus decision-making mechanism has brought about a dilemma on 
how to define the existing defence community in Southeast Asia.  
The effectuation of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is always within 
the framework of regional organisations that have developed in Southeast Asia. 
Again, ASEAN has demonstrated a paradox in which, traditionally, when a 
group of states cooperate with security objectives as their goal, it is not 
uncommon for their collective entity to assume a military form or military alliance 
such as NATO. 44  ASEAN, however, has been a notable exception. The 
development of the formation of regional organisations, e.g. SEATO (South-
East Asian Treaty Organization), ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) and ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting), shows he evolution 
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Through an examination of the security 
cooperation conducted by ASEAN member states within the existing regional 
defence organisation, this study hopes to reveal the defining characteristics of 
the defence community.  
 
                                            
42 ADMM Plus is a “platform for ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners to strengthen 
security and defence cooperation in the region. The member of ADMM Plus are ten ASEAN 
member states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and 
the United States”; see ADMM, available at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-
political- security-community/category/ asean- defence-ministers-meeting-admm, accessed 
on 12 April 2014 
43 Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan, Defence Diplomacy and Southeast Asia, in 
Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.), From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of Defence 
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph No. 21, 2011), p. 10 
44  Pranee Saipiroon Thiparat, ASEAN Security Cooperation: Problems and Prospects 
(Princeton University, PhD Thesis, 1995), pp. 21-22 
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Currently, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy is manifested through a series of 
bilateral and multilateral relations. The emergence of defence diplomacy in 
ASEAN is marked by various security cooperation activities. For instance, the 
exchange of officers to attend the defence university in pursuit of a higher 
education degree.  The different elements of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy 
consist of “Track 1 (leaders, ministers and chiefs of defence forces), Track 2 
(defence colleges, defence ministry-related think tanks/research institutions) 
and increasingly, Track 3 (civil society and non-governmental organisations)”.45  
The promotion of member states security and foreign policy has been clearly 
reflected in the ASEAN-initiated defence forums, such as ADMM and other 
senior military official meetings. ASEAN has practised defence diplomacy in 
such a way that it reflects a real sense of “strategic engagement” between the 
member states. The message sent emitted by this “engagement”  demonstrates 
that diplomacy between ASEAN’s military is not only necessary, but also 
imperative to address the current and future regional security challenges. It also 
reflects that ASEAN has pursued defence diplomacy in operations other than 
war, and as a means to build mutual trust amongstst its  members. 
4. Definit ion of Defence Diplomacy  
The terminology defence diplomacy, defence community and other 
related definitions need to be clarified. For a considerably long period of time, 
the terms defence and diplomacy could not be put together in the same phrase. 
Presently, such terminology has become more familiar and recognised in 
international politics. Defence diplomacy is described by Cottey and Forster as 
“peace time cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure 
                                            
45 Sing & Tan (2011), Op.cit, p. 24. See Tan, S. S, NGOs in conflict management in 
Southeast Asia (International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 1; 2005), pp. 41–55 
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(primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”.46  Anton 
Du Plessis has defined defence diplomacy as “the use of armed forces in 
operations other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to 
achieve national and foreign objectives abroad”.47 In the United Kingdom, the 
expression defence diplomacy is understood “to provide forces to meet the 
varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to dispel hostility… 
thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution”.48  
The understanding of defence diplomacy varies from one region to 
another; although in principle, it is very similar. For example, the 
government of South Africa describes defence diplomacy as a vital function 
of the defence ministry’s component to assist the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in achieving the government’s foreign relations objectives. 49  Anton Du 
Plessis explained further that defence diplomacy is using the means of the 
military means and related institutions, but not the armed forces.  Muthana 
has argued that (defence) diplomacy seeks the maximum national 
advantage without using force and preferably without causing resentment.50 
Comparatively, the government of Spain described defence diplomacy as 
the use of the armed forces capability to support state diplomacy to 
reinforce national interests.51   
 
                                            
46 Cited in Ian Storey (2012), Op.cit, p. 289. In this article, Storey broadens his explanation 
about port calls in international visit for China’s vessel. Such visit is believed as a medium 
that effectively generating goodwill and mutual trust; See also Andrew Cottey, and Anthony 
Forster, Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance 
(Adelphi Paper 365, London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2004). pp. 7, 15 
47  Anton du Plessis, Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with 
Specific Reference to South Africa (Pretoria: 2008 p. 92; see Also K.A.Muthana, Military 
Diplomacy, (New Delhi: Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 5. No 1. January 2011) 
48 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No 1. Defence Diplomacy (London: 
1998) p. 2 
49 Plessis (2008), Op.cit, p. 93 
50 Muthana (2011), Op.cit, p. 1 
51 Spain Ministerio De Defensa, Defence Diplomacy Plan (Spain: January 2012), p. 16 
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In terms of defence diplomacy, the involvement of the military in foreign 
policy is not only limited in peacetime, depending on its objective of involvement. 
Defence diplomacy encompasses a wide range of activities that might, in the past, 
have been described as military cooperation or military assistance,52 for example 
the appointment of defence attaches and assistance in the establishment of a 
defence college. In this regard, the role of the military is a kind of “transition from 
the military to the political domain”.53 “The idea that armed forces and related 
defence infrastructures have the potential to contribute to international security … 
also by helping to promote a more cooperative and stable international 
environment”.54 Military and defence instruments are used as ‘ambassadors’ to 
deter, in a diplomatic way, rather than  in a sombre military mode. Specifically, 
defence diplomacy is defined as military cooperation and assistance which is 
beneficial in the pursuit of  national interest. From these perspectives, it is clear 
that the essence of defence diplomacy has two aspects: ‘the use of military’ and 
‘national interest’. This kind of motive becomes legitimate in the political and 
security domain, as the concept of national interest prevails as the main reason.  
Cottey and Forster stated that the emergence of defence diplomacy has 
penetrated every aspect of military tasks, which previously was not a traditional 
military task. This new role is a result of three important developments. The 
nature of security has evolved from traditional to non-traditional challenges, and 
the tasks of the military are not just purely military-based anymore, but deal with  
areas of peace and promoting good governance, including collaboration with 
allies and potential adversaries.55 
                                            
52 Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, p. 6 
53 Plessis (2008), Op.cit, p. 95; See further Rosecrance R, International Relations: Peace or 
War? (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company 1973), p. 163 
54 Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, p. 77 
55 Cited in Singh and Tan (2011), Op.cit, p. 1. For further explanation of Defence Diplomacy 
see also Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles 
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Accordingly, this study’s working definition of defence diplomacy ensues 
as ‘al l  methods and strategies used by countries that may be in a 
state of competit ion with one another, but they have used a certain 
kind of practice including economic, culture, polit ical cooperation, 
defence cooperation and diplomacy to make friends, hopefully 
cooperate with one another, and, most importantly, to build and 
increase mutual trust ’ .56  In recent years, defence diplomacy has been a 
front line in the defence of national dignity and integrity.57   To clarify the 
meaning, it is worth bearing in mind the words ‘military’ and ‘defence’, which are 
used loosely and can be freely interchanged.58  
In the defence diplomacy process, each country builds interaction aimed 
to satisfy its interest in every field. Therefore, defence diplomacy is a necessity 
and can benefit each country in establishing interactions which include trade, 
economy, and development aimed at strengthening security and preventing 
conflict.59   
Communication between the military is important in the defence 
diplomacy process as bilateral and multilateral collaboration impacts on joint 
training and joint patrols, as well as the procurement of necessities. It is 
therefore logical for each member states to cooperate with each other to 
                                                                                                                          
for Military Cooperation and Assistance (Adelphi Paper 365, London: Oxford University 
Press for IISS, 2004). pp. 6–7 
56 Researcher’s personal definition of defence diplomacy after a discussion with Aurel 
Croissant at Universität Heidelberg, 2015, and See Seng Tan, on 19 August 2013 at RSIS 
Singapore 
57 Indonesian Ministry of Defence released its White Paper in 2008, in which Defence 
Diplomacy is described as an ‘intensive effort’ to prevent war and hostilities manner 
amongst the states, especially in the region of Southeast Asia. Please see, Indonesian 
White Paper, Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan RI 
2008), pp. 68-70 
58 K.A.Muthana, Military Diplomacy, (New Delhi: Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 5. No 1. 
January 2011), p. 2 
59 David Capie, Structure, Shocks, and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s 
Defence Diplomacy, op. cit. 
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improve security to jointly cope with conflicts and threats that may occur. 
Defence diplomacy is especially beneficial between regional countries, who 
working together in trust, are able to face common enemies, particularly in this 
era of globalization where non-traditional threats into the main scourge facing 
each country. The implementation of defence diplomacy involves high-level 
security dialogue between members, the import-export of major weapons and 
participation in peace operations.60 
 There are three characteristics in the objections of defence diplomacy. 
Firstly, defence diplomacy is aimed at confidence building which in turn can 
prevent conflict through reinforced perceptions of common interest with former 
or potential enemies. As such, mutual trust and understanding can be built, and 
a broader area of cooperation can possibly be reached. Secondly, defence 
diplomacy is a process of good governance in which civilians control the 
military.61  In this regard, defence diplomacy can encourage reforms in the 
security and defence sector, which means civilian control of the defence policy 
and the armed forces.62 Thirdly, defence diplomacy is a means of pursuing 
wider foreign and security goals through the support of other countries in the 
area of defence, humanitarian relief, inter-state security problems, and peace 
capacities. This is normally in the form of peacekeeping activities, which include 
political dialogue.63  In the context of humanitarian relief, inter-state security 
problems and the support of peace, and particularly ASEAN, the objective is 
focused on regional cooperation that places these as common security issues.64   
                                            
60 Ibid., p. 4. 
61  Croissant (2013), Op.cit, p. 6-8, Croissant described, that in supporting a good 
governance the military has been willing to accept its subordinate to civil power; see also 
Plessis (2004), Op.cit, p. 97 
62 Spain Ministerio De Defensa (2012), Op.cit, p. 18 
63 Ibid, pp. 18-19; Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, p. 7 
64 Indonesian White Paper (2008), Op.cit, pp. 12-13 
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 Security analysts have identified at least five dimensions of defence 
diplomacy: 65   “1) to strengthen cooperation with former enemies and 
engage potential adversaries to dispel mistrust; 2) defence diplomacy is 
used to advance security-sector reform in foreign militaries, especially in the 
development of democratically armed forces to respect human rights and to 
promote good governance; 3) defence diplomacy has been employed to 
counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 4) defence 
diplomacy is preparing for, and undertaking, Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief operations (HADR); and 5) defence diplomacy is developing 
the capabilities of the military to contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNPKOs)”. Furthermore, defence diplomacy will enhance military 
capacities and mutual trust amongst countries. Further indicators of defence 
diplomacy activities will be elaborated in the subsequent chapters.  
5. Definit ion of Defence Community 
Citing the work of Jared Beck in reviewing Adler and Barnett’s 
articles on security communities, he stated “the nature of a (security) 
community has at least three characteristics: “1) members of a community 
have shared identities, values and meanings; 2) the members of a 
community have direct (face-to-face) encounters with one another; and 3) 
members of a community develop some sense of responsibility toward one 
another in the long run”.66 In line with the current development, challenges 
to a certain region cannot be addressed by a single country alone.  
Julian R. Friedman added that ”in a defence community there is 
mutual interest either in the preservation of aggrandisement in regard to 
                                            
65 Cottey and Forster (2004), Op.cit, pp. 5-8; Storey (2012), Op.cit, pp. 289-290; United 
Kingdom, Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No 1. Defence Diplomacy (London: 1998) 
66 Cited in Jared H. Beck in reviewing Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security 
Communities (United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 29-162 
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territory, population, strategic resources and so forth.”67  Furthermore, a 
defence community is defined or at least commonly regarded as a form of 
international cooperation which by its very nature incorporates a military 
aspect and the existence of common perceptions of threat.68  To ensure the 
smooth and effective incorporation of the military aspect, inter-operability 
has become important.69  Inter-operability in terms of objectives represents 
the strategic and operational levels which are planning coordination, unity of 
effort, joint and integrated approaches, building of confidence amongst 
respective national military organisations and diversity, which can be the 
strength of unification to achieve the goals. Objectives are influenced by two 
means: general means, such as the repetition of training personnel 
experienced in conducting joint operations, division of responsibility and the 
effectiveness of communication or language; and functional means, such as 
the leveraging of equipment technology, integrating elements of 
organisation, understanding the rules of engagement, understanding 
specific tasks and the completeness of information.70  
From the perspective of defence being representative amongst 
ASEAN member states, “community itself means that we do have a 
mechanism as an ASEAN fellow in the international association; however, in 
some cases, certain countries in ASEAN are free to have their own defence 
cooperation with a foreign country outside ASEAN”.71  
                                            
67 Julian R. Friedman (et.al), Alliances in International Politics (Michigan: Allyn and Bacon, 
Inc., 1970), p. 175 
68 Thiparat (1995), Op.cit, pp. 38-39 
69 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces available 
at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed on 1 
January 2015  
70 These statements based on empirical analysis on defence cooperation to achieve the 
objective of exercise and training  
71  Interview with Yudi Abrimantyo, Chief Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence, Jakarta  21st March 2013 
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In this regard, the “concept of a Southeast Asian defence community” 
was represented in the Bali agreement II (Bali Concord II). This reflected the 
need for norms and principles in governing politics and security in the 
region. This document stated the desire to shift and accelerate regional 
integration and identity-building.72  At the same time, the European Defence 
Community Treaty preamble stated that to maintain peace and to ensure 
the defence of Western Europe through close relationships with 
organisations that possess the same purpose is considered as complete 
integration with the military requirements of human and material elements 
and was determined in this way to ensure the development of their military 
power.73  
In the history of forming a regional organisation in Southeast Asia, 
there was a collective defence organisation with operating principles similar 
to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).74 As a matter of 
fact, from the beginning of ASEAN, establishments have consistently 
rejected a military pact and will never be in a military pact, despite an 
integrated effort to address security issues in Southeast Asia, i.e. the 
eradication of piracy in territorial waters. Thus, in defining defence 
community characteristics through the practice of ASEAN defence 
cooperation, it should meet the conditions of the existing joint operations 
and inter-operability components, such as the standardisation of major 
weaponry systems.75  
                                            
72 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, p. 94  
73 European Defence Community Treaty, p. 167 
74 Text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (International Organization, vol. 8, 
no. 4, Nov 1964), pp.617-621 
75 Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Nicasia Picciano, Effectiveness Within NATO’s Multicultural 
Military Operations in Cees M. Coops and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch (ed.), Cutlural 
Challenges in Military Operations (NATO Defence College, Rome, October 2007), pp. 11-
13; see also Tim Huxley, ASEAN Defence Policies and Expenditures in Richard Solkolsky, 
 21 
In recent years, ASEAN has come up with a concept or spirit of 
transferring the challenges into a ‘venue of cooperation’ — not just a ‘venue 
of conflict’. 76   The leaders of the ASEAN states pledged to transform 
‘troubled’ Southeast Asia into a ‘united’ region.77 Thus, the very idea of 
ASEAN’s ‘defence community’ implies the need for some form of trilateral or 
multilateral military arrangement within the groupi.78   
In the context of ASEAN, the defence community is not just narrow-
minded as many experts suggest. It has a broad perspective on the 
common issues. Each defence community in the region is closely attached 
to the existence of ASEAN as a regional organisation. Indeed, the distinctive 
interlocking pattern of it has been described as an ASEAN "defence spider 
web".79  It is believed that the signs and characters of ASEAN’s "defence 
community" exist, are relevant, and are able to address uncertainty and 
change in politics, the economy and culture, which are all very closely 
related to the existence of ASEAN.  In short, the existence of defence 
community characteristics in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy can 
be identif ied through the effectiveness of intra-ASEAN member 
states’ defence cooperation,  the efforts of unif ication and the 
integration of mil i tary forces, together with the components of 
inter-operabil i ty which are planned and executed accordingly in 
tackling the threat.  
                                                                                                                          
Angel Rabasa and C. Richard Neu (ed.), The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy 
Toward China (RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 46-47 
76 This point of view is abstracted from the experienced and deep observation of Chief 
Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, during his continuous 
presence in various defence activities amongst ASEAN states 
77 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, p. 94 
78 Acharya (1991), Op.cit, p.159 
79 Ibid, p.160. Indonesian Vice President Try Sutrisno delivered this statement, during his 
position as Commander in Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces. See also Strait Times 
(Weekly Overseas Edition), 9 December 1989 
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6. Statement of Problems 
As has been discussed above, the defining principle of ASEAN 
diplomacy is prioritising tactics through consultation and consensus, and 
with the principle of non-interference. It causes ASEAN member states to 
conduct international relations with ambiguity and sound ineffective in 
solving regional security problems. These conditions motivate this thesis to 
observe the significant mechanism of ASEAN’s regional defence diplomacy. 
The involvement of external powers in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy also 
prompted a debate to investigate its influence on the assumption of an 
existing defence community in Southeast Asia.  A call from the former 
Foreign Minister of Malaysia stated that the countries of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) were to form a ‘defence community’ in May 1989,80 
acknowledging ASEAN’s constant rejection of the idea of a military pact. 
This certainly represents a striking departure from the long-standing position 
of ASEAN countries which favour strictly bilateral arrangements in the 
sphere of military cooperation.81 It is against such a background that the 
idea of transforming ASEAN into one single community came into being.82 
Regional security challenges remain and, therefore, continued efforts 
should be made to address them. These challenges are addressed at 
ASEAN’s Defence Ministers’ Meetings where they exchange ideas regularly 
                                            
80 Ibid p.159. Acharya described that the concept was presented in Omar’s speech at a 
conference held in Singapore, upon the minister being asked at the conference by Acharya 
to provide some specifics as to what the concept of  ‘defence community’ means, or how it 
would be operationalized. The minister merely noted that it would go beyond existing 
bilateral cooperation and might possibly involve cooperation on arms manufacturing 
81 A brief explanation of ASEAN Defence Cooperation can be reviewed from Bantarto 
Bandoro, ASEAN Defence Cooperation: Current Trends and Future Developments 
(Southeast Asia Security Public Lecture Series III, Brunei Darussalam, Sultan Haji 
Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 2009). The paper was 
prepared for public lecture in Brunei Darussalam, July 2009 
82 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, p. 2 
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on how  regional challenges have to be tackled on a regional basis.83 The 
creation of ADMM should not be seen in isolation from the way in which 
ASEAN addressed its immediate strategic environment.84 The first ADMM in 
Kuala Lumpur conveyed ASEAN’s decision to build closer military ties 
amongst ASEAN militaries, which reflects the fact that regional defence 
matters are no longer a sensitive issue to be discussed openly.85 
This thesis will analyse ASEAN’s defence diplomacy which through 
defence and security cooperation addresses regional challenges, and in this 
way be able to identify the characteristics of the defence community. Thus, 
the objectives of this thesis are as follows:  
The first objective is to identify the implementation of defence 
diplomacy in ASEAN. How has the military played a role in diplomacy? How 
has coordination and cooperation been used between ASEAN’s member 
states to discuss security matters? The analysis will be conducted through 
ADMM and ADMM-Plus meetings on regional security. 
The second objective is to analyse the existing characteristics or 
elements of the defence community, and whether the venues that had been 
used for defence diplomacy can channel a pathway towards a Southeast 
Asia defence community.  
This thesis assesses the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
(ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) by 
their practical cooperation. The venues for defence dialogue used by 
defence leaders of ASEAN to discuss security issues demonstrate ASEAN’s 
defence regionalism. Such defence regionalism has laid strong grounds for 
                                            
83 Furthermore Bandoro (2009), Op.cit  
84 Ibid 
85 Lianita Prawindarti, The First ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting: An Early Test for the 
ASEAN Security Community? (Singapore: IDSS Commentaries No. 3, 2006), pp. 1-2 
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ASEAN as a defence community. The establishment of ADMM and ADMM-
Plus has set  a medium to bridge both dialogue and practical cooperation 
amongst ASEAN member states and external powers. Moreover, the 
purpose of ADMM-Plus is “to enhance defence cooperation across the 
whole spectrum of security issues”. 86  Various activities of defence 
diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus will be elaborated 
further in Chapter 5 as an illustration of how wide the range of defence 
cooperation is within the context of these forums. 
This thesis aims to address the following questions: 1) How does 
ASEAN’s defence diplomacy address security challenges? 2) Does the 
implementation of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy help to shape an ASEAN 
defence community? The answers to these questions provide an 
understanding of the role played by the ASEAN militaries in defence 
diplomacy, aside from their traditional tasks. These questions are important 
because the term ‘defence diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia has only just 
emerged in the past few years and, more particularly, the idea of a defence 
community did not exist in the concept of the establishment of ASEAN. 
Hence, this research is interesting and hopes to present a new perspective 
in relation to defence cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
This thesis attempts to further study whether there are indicators 
multilateral defence diplomacy within ASEAN, in which the militaries play a 
role in foreign policy, and which contain the characteristics of a defence 
community. The thesis is limited to examining only the role of intra-ASEAN 
militaries in defence diplomacy, particularly defence cooperation activities 
within the framework of ADMM and ADMM-Plus. This thesis further 
                                            
86 Brendan Taylor, The Rise of Asian Defence Diplomacy: Convergence of Divergence in 
Sino Australia Security Relations? (CICIR, 2012). Taylor describes his views that the rise of 
multilateral defence diplomacy in Asia is an important new phenomenon, in addition to the 
form of many Asian and Southeast Asian defence and security dialogues. 
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discusses two areas of practical cooperation under the auspices of ADMM-
Plus, the mechanism of peacekeeping operations and maritime security 
cooperation, as case studies.  This focus intends to assist readers in 
understanding the extent to which ASEAN’s security and military officials 
have pursued regional interest87 and have been committed to building long-
lasting trust and regional stability. This thesis is not intended to test any 
theories. However, a new regionalism approach will be applied for the 
analytical framework, and some findings of this research may have 
theoretical implications. In the future, other researchers might use some of 
its data for such purposes.88 
7. Research Design 
 In order to be able to study the different aspects of defence diplomacy, 
such as the players, the venues and the pattern of security cooperation, the 
study needs a methodology that enables it to test theoretical argument. The 
methodology used in this study will be elaborated in Chapter 3.  
This study will explore defence diplomacy as an independent variable. 
It will answer research questions by examining the defence diplomacy fora 
that had been used by ASEAN from 2000–2012. This study will focus on the 
role of military and security officials in the practice of ASEAN defence 
diplomacy by detecting whether the mechanism of defence diplomacy  justifies 
the formation of an ASEAN defence community.  This independent variable 
serves to provide insight into how the practices of defence diplomacy have 
paved the way for the creation of future defence communities.  
                                            
87 See footnote no-4, p. 2  
88  Derek Layder, New Strategies in Social Research: An Introduction and Guide 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 5. According to Layder, not all research falls neatly into 
one category [theory testing] or the other [theory building], as at different stages and 
degrees each involves the other and degrees each involves the process 
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Since the Southeast Asia defence community is viewed as a dependent 
variable, this thesis attempts to prove that the defence diplomacy reveals 
elements needed to form an ASEAN defence community. A hypothesis will be 
assessed to gain a better understanding of this study, namely, the practice of 
defence cooperation for handling security challenges in Southeast Asia is the 
implementation of a defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus which contains the characteristics of a defence community that 
could pave the way for the formation of a future Southeast Asian defence 
community. 
The focus of this research is from 2000 to 2012.  The sources for this 
research are divided into primary and secondary data. The primary sources 
consist of formal and informal interviews. supplemented by questionnaires, 
personal communication and documentary material (government reports, 
official statements, speeches, declarations, treaties, policy papers, statistical 
data, and internet resources). A series of interviews carried out with 
government officials from the ministry of defence, armed forces HQ, 
policymakers, prominent scholars, officials from designated ASEAN states, 
and officials from the ASEAN secretariat. The respondents were decision 
makers, politicians, military officials and intellectuals from countries such as 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Four of 
these  six countries were founding members of ASEAN, and believed that 
the research data available in the six countries is appropriate and more than 
adequate. The interviews were conducted in person, i.e. face-to-face 
interviews, and via electronic mail. All of the interviews were recorded.  
Secondary sources include books, research publications from 
academics, journals, articles, conference proceedings, newspapers, 
magazines, manuscripts, and other personal documents. The secondary 
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data was collected from the Universität Heidelberg Library, KITLV Leiden, 
RSIS Singapore and CSIS Jakarta, as well as relevant information from the 
Indonesian National Defence Forces archives. 
8. Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. After an introductory 
chapter, Chapter 2 follows with reviews of literature related to the study of 
Southeast Asia’s defence community and the ASEAN community. It 
conducts a theoretical overview. Chapter 3 explains the research 
methodology. Chapter 4 traces the historical evidence of the establishment 
of regional organisations that indicate whether the elements of a defence 
community ever existed in Southeast Asia, as well as the development of 
regionalism in the region. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the regional mechanism 
in handling security challenges in the region, through the practical 
cooperation of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, i.e. the Maritime Security 
Cooperation, specifically the Malacca Strait Patrol, and the Peacekeeping 
Centre Network. Also discussed are the efforts of integrating military forces 
and practical inter-operability as a requirement of a defence community. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the findings of this thesis, and discusses the 
future possibilities of the Southeast Asian defence community as a strategic 
imperative for ASEAN to address the region’s future challenges. 
Chapter Two 
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
DEFENCE COMMUNITY AND THE ASEAN COMMUNITY  
 
1. Introduction 
The main goal of the establishment of ASEAN, as noted on ASEAN’s 
own website, is “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship between countries 
of the region”.1  
It is to create a stable peace for the long term in the region, either 
through economic, technological and socio-cultural cooperation or through 
cooperation in politics and security. According to Frances Stewart, there are 
two alternatives that may be taken by an organization to be able to evolve 
and develop. The first alternative is to focus on the field of security and the 
second alternative is to focus on the economy. 2 The creation of a stable 
security and economy will directly impact on the stability in an organisation. 
The stable conditions of an organisation would be very conducive for 
development, in terms of developing a community. In the context of ASEAN 
member states’ defence diplomacy, the focus is on developing defence 
cooperation between ASEAN member states, and the establishment of 
equilibrium in the interaction with regional external powers in order to tackle 
regional security challenges.  
 The principles of cooperation in ASEAN were then inserted into the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord, also known as the ASEAN Concord I (Bali 
Concord I), on 24 February 1976, while the procedure and steps to create a 
                                            
1 www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, accessed on 21 October 2014 
2 Frances Stewart, Development and Security in Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving 
(ed.), Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity (New York: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 43-46 
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stable peace through the peaceful settlement of disputes were later 
formalised in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).3 
On 7 October, 2003, through the declaration of the ASEAN Concord 
II (Bali Concord II), which was produced at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, 
the leaders of ASEAN member states agreed on gradually establishing the 
ASEAN Community, which consists of three pillars of cooperation, mutually 
binding and strengthening to achieve a common goal to ensure that 
sustainable peace, stability and prosperity are equitable in Southeast Asia.  
The establishment of the ASEAN, however, was not simply altruistic, 
namely to promote peace and stability in the region through abiding respect 
for justice and the rule of law in the relationship amongst countries of the 
region, and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.4 
Instead, it is also driven by political and security considerations, especially 
as ASEAN was formed shortly after Indonesia ended the policy of 
konfrontasi, a low-level military conflict against the Federation of Malaysia.  
In addition, all these ASEAN member states had one thing in 
common: they were facing both the internal and external threats of 
Communism. Believing that Communism only thrived in economically poor 
countries, one of the main goals of ASEAN, as enshrined in the Bangkok 
Declaration, is to accelerate economic growth, social development, and 
cultural development in the region - policies that were believed to be able to 
counter the Communists’ threats effectively.  
In a sense, ASEAN was formed as a means to reassure Indonesia 
and other members that they had agreed to settle various issues peacefully 
                                            
3  An overview of ASEAN, available at www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview, 
accessed on 21 October 2014 
4 Ibid. 
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and not through armed conflict. ASEAN was thus established as a trust-
building project, to create a sense of security amongst member states.5 
Even though there are three main pillars of the ASEAN Community, 
namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC), for the purpose of this thesis, this chapter focuses on the political 
and security aspect of ASEAN, notably on defence diplomacy conducted by 
ASEAN member states that contains the elements of defence community.  
In the process of the establishment of the ASEAN Community through the 
APSC pillar, various defence cooperation between ASEAN member states 
occurred which shows the progress of the ASEAN community while 
containing elements of a defence community. Therefore, the focus of this 
chapter is to discuss literature on Defence Diplomacy and the ASEAN 
Community. 
In order to do so, this chapter will first discuss regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, where the emergence of non-traditional security threats had 
actually brought the region together. This is followed by analysis of a 
security community and defence diplomacy per se. This chapter concludes 
with an examination of the Asean Security Community and the importance 
of Defence Diplomacy in achieving such community. 
2.     Regionalism in Southeast Asia’s Defence Diplomacy  
 Mely Caballero suggests that the emergence of non-traditional security 
threats, defined as non-military in nature, has expanding rapidly in recent 
years as a result of globalisation. Unlike traditional security threats, non-
                                            
5 Stated in the document of ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967), 
available at http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-
1967/, accessed on 21 October 2014 
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traditional security threats cannot be solved entirely by one nation on its 
own. Instead, regional and multilateral cooperation is required to deal with 
the non-traditional security threats6 due to extensive impacts of the non-
traditional security threats. Cabellero pointed out that such non-traditional 
threats can break-through diplomatic barriers, and encourage regional 
integrity, as the policymakers in Southeast Asia portray the emerging 
threats as jeopardizing their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Furthermore, Caballero stated that the involvement of regional governance 
in Southeast Asia had the purpose of improving the management of the new 
security environment as a form of regionalism in Southeast Asia. More 
specifically she referred to it as 'new regionalism'.7 
 Joseph Nye suggested that states in a particular region all have the 
same responsibility to maintain regional stability and security. Moreover, he 
pointed out two major classes of regionalist activity: microeconomic 
organisations involving formal economic integration, and macro-regional 
political organisations concerned with controlling conflict.8 In the context of 
ADMM, ASEAN members feel it’s imperative to create what Juwono 
Sudarsono, Indonesia’s former minister of defence, called “strategic space” 
and to reduce ‘technology disparity’.9  
 According to Sudarsono, such terms came into being because of the 
reality that foreign affairs can gradually develop convey their respective 
political, defence and economic interests. In short, the framework of ADMM 
                                            
6 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community (Singapore: RSIS, Asia Security Initiative Policy 
Series, Working Paper no. 7, Sep 2010a), p. 1 
7 Ibid, p. 2 
8  Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations 
(Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1971) 
9  Interviewed with Juwono Sudarsono, former Defence Minister of the Republic of 
Indonesia, in Jakarta, on 19 March 2013 
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is designed to facilitate and manage a transnational character of specific 
security problems in Southeast Asia. This is where one sees the dynamics 
of Southeast Asia international relations. 
At the same time, the degree to which regionalism occurs is 
dependent upon the amount of region that is felt amongst the regional 
powers.10  Väyrynen discussed in detail that the character and function of 
regions have encompassed the level of analysis that is global, regional and 
national. 11  The idea of regionalism as a political solution for regional 
problems has been a prominent discussion during the 20th century, and 
became a phenomenon in  international relations after  World War 2.  
In a historical context, the period of the 1980s was the resurrection of 
the discourse on regionalism. Following the end of the Cold War, a new 
school of regional analysts, such as Hettne, Yi and Väyrynen,12 started to 
label this phenomenon as a new regionalism, as compared to one that took 
place in an earlier period. 
The concept of regionalism itself is heavily debated amongst 
international relations theorists, notably the realists, institutionalists, and 
constructivists, who have a different understanding of regional security, 
                                            
10  Furthermore Craig A. Snyder, Regional Security and Regional Conflict (Geelong: 
Australia, SIPS, 2007), pp. 2-7; Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, The New 
Regionalism Approach (Politea, vol.17, no.3, 1998), pp. 6-21; Björn Hettne and Fredrik 
Söderbaum, Theorising the Rise of Regionness in Shaun Breslin et.al (ed.), New 
Regionalism in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases (London: Routledge, 
2002) 
11 Raimo Väyrynen, Regionalism: Old and New (International Studies Review, vol.5, no.1, 
Mar 2003), p. 28 
12 See Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrel (ed.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Raimo 
Väyrynen, Regionalism: Old and New (International Studies Review, vol.5, no.1, Mar 2003); 
Chungyao Yi, Emergence of Regionalism: About State Preference Formation (University of 
Leeds, POLIS Working Paper np. 23, Jan 2007); Björn Hettne and András Inotai, The New 
Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security (Tokyo: 
UNU/WIDER, 1994) 
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namely on how to create conducive conditions for regional security.13 From 
a realist perspective, cooperation amongst countries in the region is difficult 
because of the lack of mutual trust. Regional cooperation does happen due 
to common interests, but is very difficult to sustain due states’ calculations 
of self-interest.14  From this perspective, the integration of the region will 
never be realised. Military cooperation is most likely to occur in the region to 
deal with the common enemy from outside the region and once the enemy 
is gone, the relations amongst states in the region will be altered, causing 
fear and suspicions, leading to war in the long run.15  
From an institutionalist perspective, however, regional institutions will 
facilitate the establishment of regional cooperation and international anarchy, 
and help to eliminate the interests of countries to create a regional 
security.16  This is, of course, contrary to the realist’s perspective which 
doubts the loss of anarchistic attitude, and spawned a research agreement. 
Hedley Bull believes that the "law of cooperation" can occur if the system of 
contingency and equivalence is put in place.17 Contingency is defined as a 
reward for the efforts of countries willing to cooperate and the provision of 
penalties for those who refuse to do so.  
Helen Milner further notes that a balanced reward is needed for 
intertwined relations between the countries who get rewarded. 18                 
In contemporary development, rewards obtained from the results of those 
                                            
13 Snyder (2007), Op.cit. p. 4 
14  Ibid p. 4; See Further John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions.” International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/95), pp. 4-49 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.,” 
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56 
16 Furthermore Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemon: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
17 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977), p. 67 
18 see Hellen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation Amongst Nations: Strengths and 
Weaknesses ((World Politics, vol. 44, 1992), pp. 446-496 
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areas of cooperation can be shared between economic progress, such as 
within the European Union, or regional stability, such as with ASEAN. The 
main difference between these two objectives is the most important factor 
that determines the difference in regional security. The realist view is that 
the military is the most important factor for safety. On the contrary, the 
institutionalists say that not only the military, but also politics and society, 
might constitute an important aspect of regional security.19 
Unlike the realist or institutionalist schools, the constructivists argue 
that regional security can be constructed through social interaction that will 
establish common identity and interests amongst states. Alex Wendt states 
that this condition can be realised if it meets the three main basic 
foundations, namely: sharing of knowledge, sharing of material resources, 
and practicality.20 These would form an effective regional security system – 
in essence, a common identity as a region. 
Andrew Hurrel in Regionalism in World Politics contended that 
regionalism can be defined as state-led political projects, which aim at 
promoting intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional level.21  The 
Southeast Asia defence community can also be viewed from such a 
perspective. Regionalism is a top-down process in intergovernmental policy 
collaboration at the regional level. Then again, Björn Hettne explained in his 
work The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and 
International Security that the ‘new’ regionalism differs from the ‘old’ 
                                            
19 Snyder (2007), Op.cit, p. 5 
20  Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics (International Security, vol. 20, 
1995), pp. 71-73; see also Snyder (2007), Ibid 
21 Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew 
Hurrel (ed.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39-40 
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regionalism.22 Furthermore, Hettne argues that the “difference between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ forms of regional security analysis is that in the past the region was 
not an actor itself, only a ‘level’ or ‘space’ of action”.23  It is through the 
development of its regionality that a region moves from being a passive part of 
the structure to its own right.24  
Since the mid-1950s, at the time of the SEATO formation, we have 
seen the regionalisation of defence relations in Southeast Asia. The 
evolution of defence cooperation involving ASEAN countries and their 
dialogue partner countries has been impressive, with the formation of the 
ADMM and ADMMPlus a defence ministerial arrangement. They are the 
beneficiaries of more established dialogue processes. Despite these 
developments, the aim of defence regionalism in Southeast Asia has 
remained modest. While ‘action-oriented’ cooperation in various non-
conventional security areas has been incorporated into its agenda, 
Southeast Asian defence regionalism persists largely as an exercise in 
informal confidence building, with, at best, limited and incidental forays into 
preventive diplomacy. 
The late 1980s and the 1990s experienced the emergence of new 
regionalism. APEC, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and currently the mechanism 
of ADMM and ADMM-Plus provide an excellent example of this new type of 
regionalism. Although the earlier literature on regionalism tends to treat a 
region as a more or less autonomous sub-system of the broader international 
system, the growing literature on new regionalism emphasises the 
                                            
22  Björn Hettne and András Inotai, The New Regionalism: Implications for Global 
Development and International Security (Tokyo: UNU/WIDER, 1994), pp. 1-2 
23  Björn Hettne, Development, Security and World Order: A Regionalist Approach 
(European Journal of Development Research, vol. 9, no. 1, 1997), p. 97 
24 Snyder (2007), Op.cit, p. 6; see also Hettne and Söderbaum (1998), p. 8 
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relationship between regionalism and the extra-regional environment.25 In this 
regard, the studies of new regionalism considered new aspects, particularly 
those focused on conditions related to what increasingly came to be called 
globalisation.26  Björn Hettne suggested that regionalisation is an integral part 
of globalisation and a political reaction against the process.27 He argues 
further that regionalism has been characterised as a halfway house at a time 
when a single nation is no longer viable and the world is not ready to become 
one. According to this definition, regionalism as a bridge could be even 
beneficial for global cooperation.28 As has been explained before, regionalism 
is a state-led political project, by definition, and the government is the 
principal architect of regionalism. Furthermore, national players may, in fact, 
perceive regionalism as a defence mechanism against the competitive 
pressure arising from the globalisation process.29  Hettne and Söderbaum 
insisted upon a ‘new regionalism theory’ built around the core concept of 
regionness, ranging from the regional space, regional complex, regional 
society, and regional community to the regional state.30  This thesis will show 
that a Southeast Asia defence community will reflect the sense of a regional 
society, regional complexity, and regional interest, all of which are the core 
elements of new regionalism, as proposed by Hettne and Söderbaum.  
                                            
25 Fredrik Söderbaum, Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism, in Fredrik Söderbaum 
and Timothy M. Shaw (ed.), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 4 
26 Björn Hettne, Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism (Sweden: New Political Economy, 2006),    
p. 547 
27 Ibid 
28 Hettne and Inotai (1994), Op.cit, p. Vi; see furthermore in Harlan Cleveland, Reflections 
on the Pacific Community (Department of State Bulletin, vol. 48, no. 1243, Apr 1963), p. 
614  
29 Furthermore, Theodore Palagidis and Harry Papsotitoru, Globalization or Regionalism? 
States, Markets, and the Structure of International Trade (Review of International Studies, 
no. 28, 2002), pp.  519-535 
30 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, Theorising the Rise of Regionness (Sweden: 
Güteborg University, New Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 3, Dec 2002), p. 2 
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3. Defining A Security Community  
Since its inception, ASEAN member states have been committed to 
settle disputes amongst its members in a peaceful and cooperative manner. 
As Acharya said, ASEAN’s concept of regional order has centred on the 
creation of a Southeast Asian security community, which is defined in the 
Deutschian sense as a group of states whose members share “dependable 
expectations of peaceful change” in their mutual relations and rule out the 
use of force as a means of problem solving.31 However, Acharya took a 
position that was very different from that of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues 
in 1957,32 because he was trying to explain that the security community 
could be established amongst countries that do not embrace liberal 
democracy.  
Acharya argued further that the ASEAN Security Community “needs 
to be not only strengthened and secured against a host of potential inter-
member conflicts, but also broadened by bringing into its fold the Indochina 
states and developing a modus vivendi for regional reconciliation between 
the Communist and non-Communist segments of Southeast Asia”.33 His 
position seems appropriate; if not, it is impossible to adopt the concept of a 
security community for regions outside Western Europe and North America 
whose countries are not applying the principles of liberal democracy, 
                                            
31 Amitav Acharya,The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or 
“Defence Community”? (Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2, Summer 1991), p.1; see further Karl 
W. Deutsch (et.al), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957) 
32 See Acharya’s explanation on collective identity of Southeast Asia in Amitav Acharya, 
Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia in Emmanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 
198-227: see also Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: 
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London, Routledge 2001) 
33 Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro (ed.), ASEAN’s Quest for a Full Fledge 
Community (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 11; see also Amitav Acharya, The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’? (Pacific Affairs, 
vol. 64, issue. 2, Summer 1991) 
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although the draft of the ASEAN Charter also started talking about 
democracy and human rights.  
Acharya also differentiate the idea of the security community from the 
idea of the defence community.34 Defence community “implies an alliance 
relationship which is usually conceived and directed against a pre-
recognised and commonly perceived external threat”.35 At the same time. a 
security community identifies no such threat and does not have the function 
“of organising joint defence” against an external threat. 36  A security 
community, must be based on a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term 
convergence of interests amongst the players in the avoidance of war.37 
Moreover, a security community, within a conceptual framework, is that a 
dependable expectation of peaceful change would be a prerequisite for a 
security community to exist. Such expectations, however, will not become a  
reality unless two or more states are integrated to the extent that there is an 
overall sense of community. This, in turn, creates the assurance that they 
will settle their differences in a peaceful manner.38  
While the Deutschian notion of security communities may have an 
explanatory appeal in Europe and in North America, other scholars in the 
field are challenging the applicability of the Deutschian framework for 
security communities in the developing countries.39 Amitav Acharya, for 
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example, proposes an alternative security community framework applicable 
to developing countries. Examining the prospects of building a security 
community in Southeast Asia, Acharya identifies the following basic 
requirements: 1) a total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects 
for such conflict within a region; 2) an absence of a competitive military 
build-up or arms race involving the regional players; 3) the existence of 
formal or informal institutions and practices; and 4) the existence of a high 
degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition for 
a peaceful relationship.40 
Karl Deutsch defines integration in relation to the concept of ‘a 
security community’. A security community is a group of people which is 
integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of 
that community will not fight one another physically, but rather resolve 
disputes between them in other ways.41 A security community points to a 
group of states which has developed a long-term habit of peaceful 
interactions and has ruled out the use of force as a means to solve conflicts 
amongst members of the group. The concept also refers to a group of states 
that has achieved this condition as a result of the flow of communication and 
the habit of cooperation, 42  where members share the “expectation of 
peaceful change” and rule out “the use of force as a means of problem 
solving”.43 States that belong to a security community come to see their 
security as being fundamentally linked to other states and their destiny 
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bound by the common norms, history, political experience, and regional 
location. 44  A security community exists when states reach the level of 
confidence wherein security can only be attained if they cooperate with one 
another. In the case of ASEAN, it is a regional grouping that has renounced 
the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts.45 
Deutsch observed that there are two forms of security community: 
amalgamated and pluralistic. Deutsch argues that it is the building of a 
security community that can eliminate “war and expectation of war” within 
the boundaries of participating nation states.46 An amalgamated security 
community is when there is a merger of two or more units that have been 
independent into a larger unit, with one type of common government after 
the amalgamation. He cites the United States as an example of an 
amalgamated security community. He also provided the following conditions 
for the formation of an amalgamated security community: 1) the mutual 
compatibility of values; 2) a distinctive way of life; 3) the expectations of joint 
rewards timed so as to come before the impositions of burdens from the 
amalgamation; 4) a marked increase in political and administrative 
capabilities of at least some participant units; 5) superior economic growth 
on the part of some participating units, and the development of so-called 
core areas around which comparatively weaker areas are grouped; 6) an 
unbroken link of social communication, both geographically between 
territories and between social strata; 7) a broadening of the political elite;   
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8) the mobility of persons, at least amongst the politically relevant strata; 
and 9) a municipality of communications and transactions.47  
A pluralistic security community is the alternative, maintaining the 
legal independence of separate governments. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the security arrangement between the United 
States and Canada are two notable examples of this kind of security 
community. Countries in a pluralistic security community have the suitability 
of core values in the thrust of the joint institutions, and a shared 
responsibility to build a common identity and loyalty, a sense of 'we feelings', 
and integration to the point where they have dependable expectations of 
peaceful change. In other words, a pluralistic security community is formed 
when countries become integrated to the point where they have a sense of 
community, which, in turn, creates an assurance that they will resolve their 
differences outside of war. Deutsch identifies the following conditions for the 
formation of a pluralistic security community:  1) the compatibility of values 
amongst decision makers; 2) the mutual predictability of behaviour amongst 
decision makers of units to be integrated; and 3) the mutual responsiveness 
of government to actions and communications of other governments.48   
Many scholars and practitioners49 believe that the formation of a 
security community is the answer to tackling international issues and would 
be able to prevent the occurrence of war amongst states, but also make the 
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prospect of war amongst nations utterly impossible. This notion actually has 
two central points. Firstly, interaction and socialisation will enable states to 
manage anarchical situations and even escape from security dilemmas. 
Secondly, this concept offers a theoretical and analytical framework that 
helps the contribution of international institutions, including regional 
institutions, towards peace and stability.50 
Puchala argued that the conception of a security community optically 
discerns international cognations as a process of social learning and identity 
formation, driven by transactions, and socialisation.51 It recognises change 
as being a fundamentally peaceful process, with its sources lying on the 
perceptions and identifications amongst actors.52  Such processes could 
expound why states develop more preponderant mutual independence and 
responsiveness, that is, to develop the ‘we feelings’ and ultimately come to 
forsake the utilisation of force to settle quandaries amongst them. 
International cognations could in addition be reconceptualised as a ‘world 
society’ of political communities, consisting of social groups, a process of 
political communication, machinery of enforcement, and popular habits of 
compliance. 
Acharya stated that ASEAN has the potential to be a security 
community in Southeast Asia, and it is recognised by academics and 
decision makers both within and outside the region. One is a study in which 
ASEAN is considered a pluralistic security community, where each member 
retains its sovereignty.53 Sheldon Simon defined the understanding that 
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ASEAN becomes more of a security community based on the fact that none 
of its members use armed force or perceive the need for use of military 
force in resolving conflicts in the region. 54  Michael Leifer agreed that 
ASEAN is a security community for its ability to prevent conflicts of intra-
mural or the possibility of an escalation of armed confrontation to be a 
political community.55  
Accordingly, Samad and Mohammad also regard ASEAN as a 
‘security community’ in the sense that “no member would seriously consider 
to use force against another to settle disputes”.56 Just like Acharya, however, 
they contradict themselves when they highlight the absence of a common 
threat with the presence of actual and potential conflicts in the region. They 
describe ASEAN as a community that “has not reached the stage of a 
security community”, in a Deutschian sense, although ASEAN has come a 
long way in reducing tensions between its members.57 In fact, the absence 
of war amongst ASEAN member countries since the organisation was 
founded in 1967 is the biggest achievement of ASEAN in regulating the 
interaction of peace in the region. The absence of war or organised violence 
did not, however, imply an absence of differences, disputes or conflicts of 
interest amongst the players.58 
Acharya applied a constructive theory in his book Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia, wherein the idea of security was kept 
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alive mostly in the work of a handful of scholars working on regional security 
organisations.59 Since the end of the Cold War, it can be said that ASEAN is 
one of the regional organisations, amongst other regional organisations, 
concerned about security issues. Constructivism, as an approach, is most often 
applied by experts to assess the security community. Acharya concludes that 
the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
contained the elements of a security regime. However, in its development, a 
security community is more appropriate in describing the security system in 
Southeast Asia.60 
In this context, according to Wulan and Bandoro, constructivists’ 
influence on shaping the new discourse on security communities can be found 
in three areas. 61  The first area is the social construction of a security 
community, the second area concerns the norms, and the third is the impact of 
material forces. According to constructivism, a security community is socially 
constructed, and, as well as interstate cooperation, should be understood as a 
social process that can ultimately prevent a war as a result of the interaction, 
socialisation, norm setting, and identity building of the players. In the security 
community, the norms are important, even though these norms are also 
present in the form of understanding in other international relations theories, 
but in the view of constructivism, such norms are even deeper. Norms regulate 
state interest and constitute state identities, including the development of 
collective identities. In the third area, it provides an opportunity for researchers 
to better understand the impact of material forces on shaping international 
politics. Neo-realism and most liberal theories accept state interest to be 
shaped by material forces and concerns, such as power and wealth.  
                                            
59 Ibid, pp. 3-4 
60 Ibid, p. 11 
61 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), Op.cit, pp. 7-8 
 45 
According to constructivism, while material forces remain important, 
inter-subjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities, play a 
determining, rather than secondary role in foreign policy interactions.62 By 
focusing on the constitutive effects of norms, constructivism has thus 
restored some of the original insights of an integration theory regarding the 
impact of socialisation on creating collective interests and identities. Norms 
play a crucial role in the socialisation process, leading to peaceful conduct 
amongst states, which forms the core of security communities. Thus, 
constructivism provides important insights into the role of cultural norms and 
the emergence of ‘we feelings’, which has been identified by Deutsch as a 
crucial feature of security communities.63  
Furthermore, Acharya does not stand alone in his works. Another scholar, 
Caballero-Anthony, in analysing ASEAN cooperation, also defined ASEAN as a 
security community.64  In the concept of a security community delivered by 
Caballero, the current trend of growing cooperation in Southeast Asia has 
resulted in the expansion of economic cooperation which also encompasses 
security cooperation as a form of greater capacity in addressing new security 
issues.65 Cabellero considers that the ASEAN security community has moved 
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beyond a 'nascent' security community to become a 'soft' security community.66 
Acharya was supported by constructivist adherents Alice D. Ba and Sorpong 
Peou.67 Alternatively, a realist theory loyalist, such as Nicholas Khoo, would 
have opposed Acharya.68 Both the supporters and critics of Acharya all attempt 
to analyse the development of ASEAN cooperation.  
4. The Construction of ASEAN Community 
Wulan and Bandoro stated that the underlying idea of community is to 
establish norms, principles and expectations that facilitate cooperation towards 
solving problems of common concern in a way that meets the expectations of the 
members of the community.69 Literature of international relations’ studies refer to 
the concept of security communities as a form of security arrangement. Bruce 
Cronin puts the concept of security communities along with seven possible types 
of security arrangements,70 namely: 1) the international state of nature; 2) the 
balance of power system; 3) the pluralistic security community; 4) the collective 
security system; 5) the concert system; 6) the common security association; and 
7) the amalgamated security community.71  Cronin added that there are four 
characteristics that distinguish one type of community from others. They are 
constitutive rules, patterns of behaviour, types of institutions, and common identity.  
Moreover, Cronin added that the type of security arrangement, such as the 
international state of nature, would constitute transnational political communities.  
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Cronin proposed that in a world of independent sovereign states, it is 
difficult to conceive of a community beyond the protective walls of national 
borders.72  As mentioned previously, the terminology of community is very 
rare or even very difficult to find in the international relations field as either a 
theoretical concept or a descriptive phrase. The word cooperation is used 
more often than community. Realists tend to see alliances as the primary 
form of cooperation, while institutionalists examine regimes and other types 
of institutions. However, none of them see a foundation for cohesive 
communities amongst sovereign states.73 States are seen as entities that 
can share interest, but not share identities. 
Gusfield identifies two dimensions of communities, namely territorial 
and relational communities. Of the relational dimension, the community is 
concerned with the nature and relationships within the community, and 
some communities do not even have territorial boundaries, such as the 
community of scientists working in the same field or having specificity, which 
has contacts and in which relationships are of a very high quality, but they 
can live in separate locations, or even possibly be scattered throughout the 
world. Other communities can be interpreted mainly according to territory. 
However, in many cases, proximity and shared territory cannot by 
themselves constitute a community, because relational dimensions are 
essential.74  
Thus, the community is determined not only by the region, but also 
by relation. If the members of the community meet one another in terms of 
interaction, i.e. face to face, then that community is real or authentic. 
However, a community can also be something that is 'imagined', because its 
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members do not interact as described previously.  Rather, its members 
have a mental image of the closeness between them. According to 
Anderson, in the political context, this type of community can be interpreted 
as “an imagined political community” (that is) imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign.75 Anderson added that a nation is thought of as a 
community, because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that has made it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, but being willing to die for such limited imaginings”.76 Moreover, 
the political community is not only limited to the territories that make up the 
nations, but it is much wider at regional and international levels. This is what 
is referred to as an 'imagined security community', which is believed by the 
supporters of the community approach in understanding international 
politics. In this regard, if there is a sense of community, there will be 
freedom and security. The community will live on their own, where people 
are free to share and advance and secure enough to get along or unite, 
which is known as the spirit of community. McMillan and Chavis interpret the 
sense of community as “a feeling that its members have a sense of 
belonging, a sense of where the members matter to one another and to the 
group, and a shared belief that the needs of its members can be met 
through their commitment to be together”.77 
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According to Lewis, the process of the formation of the ASEAN 
community is a process of regional integration politically.78 He stated that 
there are several theories being advanced as to the purposes or goals of 
integration, the structure of the integrated community, the conditions likely to 
help or hurt the development of that community, and the best way to 
examine this process of development. Integration studies are concerned 
with how and why states voluntarily merge or interact with others. Within the 
field, though, it is difficult to even reach agreement on a definition. Some 
theorists focus on the integrative process, and others on the end result. 
Most writers on the integration theory would probably agree, though, that 
international political integration is the process by which two or more states 
form a new entity, possibly a political community.79 
 Lewis, by citing De Vree, further stated that integration is a process, 
whereby political players in several distinct national settings are persuaded 
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states.80 The end result of a process of political integration 
is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.81 As 
has been mentioned above, integration can be defined as the process of the 
formation and development of institutions through which certain values are 
authoritatively allocated for a certain group of political players or units. 
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 For Ernst Haas, the study of regional integration is concerned with 
explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, and how and 
why they mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours in order to lose the 
factual attributes of sovereignty.82 Leon Lindberg also defines integration as 
a process; in specific terms, political integration is: 1) the process whereby 
nations forego the desire and the ability to conduct foreign and key domestic 
policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint 
decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; 
and 2) the process whereby political players in several distinct settings are 
persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new 
centre.83 
 Thus, by integration, we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 
sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and 
widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of 
peaceful change amongst its population. By a sense of community, we 
mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an 
agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must 
and can be resolved by a process of ‘peaceful change’. By peaceful change 
we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised 
procedures, without resorting to large-scale physical force. 84  In short, 
according to Deutsch, the countries that are members of the security 
community have created not only an order that is stable (a stable order), but, 
in fact, also a peace that is stable (a stable peace).85   
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According to Bellamy, a community can be defined as a human 
collection formed by shared norms and understanding amongst its members. 
There are three characteristics to the formation of a community.86 The first 
characteristic is the existence of a collective identity formed by shared 
values and meanings. These are the key to what is called transnational 
understanding, meaning that members of the communities have, amongst 
other things, a common understanding about certain norms. A common 
understanding would then serve as a basis for common actions and 
common feelings. The second characteristic is that there should be direct 
interactions amongst members of the community. This will enable members 
of the community to follow recent developments from either inside or outside 
the community through constant dialogue. A practice of reciprocity is the 
third characteristic. This indicates, not only a sense of long-term interest 
between the groups within the community, but also an obligation towards, 
and responsibility for, the members of the community.87  
The second and third points above show that, in a community, that it 
is still the behaviour of the members that is based on self-interest. Tonnies 
distinguishes between society (Gesellschaft) and community 
(Gemeinschaft), where the Gesellschaft acknowledges the existence of self-
interest and Gemeinschaft rejects the idea. 88  Tonnies’ assumption has 
given an unfavourable impression, as if the player in a community does not 
have or act on behalf of their own interests. In fact, even though the players 
will identify themselves and achieve interests and  belief in the social 
structure of the group, they will still have different interests, which can lead 
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to competitive behaviour, and competition can lead to conflict. Thus, the 
best way to distinguish between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is not 
through the presence or absence of self-interest, but rather through the 
degree of its reciprocity, which in Gemeinschaft concerns long-term 
interests, and in Gesellschaft which is very short-term in nature.  Therefore, 
it is important to understand that in the community there is definitely 
competition due to the pursuit of interests on the basis of different motives. 
However, in the interests of rivalry or differences, they are no longer afraid 
of the use of force or military means to resolve disputes between them. 
These three characteristics of communities exist at local, domestic and 
international level. Thus, if it is associated with “dependable expectations of 
peaceful change”, the community members did not expect and were not 
prepared to use force that is organised as a way to resolve the conflict 
between community members.89 
The process of building a community, while referring to some 
previous theoretical background, emphasises the need of cooperation 
between even conflicting states. It means that the members of the 
community will no longer see the enmity nature of their relationship as it was 
in the past. This is the essence of what David Mitrany referred to as 
functional theory. 90  Collaboration in one functional field can lead to 
collaboration in other related fields. Mitrany identifies this concept as 
ramification.91  In such a condition, for example, the cooperation in the 
defence industry can pave the way to cooperate in a defence alliance, etc. 
Thus, when the members of the community are confronting traditional and 
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non-traditional security challenges, they act in concert to produce an 
acceptable solution to the regional security problems they face.  
 There have been efforts to understand the existence of a community 
on an international level. These efforts show that political security is deeply 
rooted, and that the countries occupying a habitat in the international 
community can develop a peaceful character. This is not the vision of  
constructivists in international relations. 92  Policymakers have begun to 
merge security and community in its new form. They identify the existence 
of shared values as a source for closer security cooperation, and vice versa, 
anticipating that the security cooperation will deepen the values that are 
shared, and transnational linkages. Through a merger between security and 
community, certain countries revise the concept of security and power.  
 Those states revising the concept of security include the community's 
ability to maintain the values and the presence of expected behaviour 
against external threats, and excite new countries with the idea of national 
security and the development of the economy. Thus, as the meaning and 
purpose of the power begins to change, the meaning and purpose of 
security also changes. If in the past, security meant military security alone, 
countries now identify security issues as also including economic, 
environmental and social prosperity, and have put aside their fears of a 
possible military threat from other countries in the community.93 
5. The Signif icance of Study 
 The concept of a defence community was first introduced by Richard 
Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, and then elaborated by Karl Deutsch in 
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the late 1950s.94 These two scholars studied the phenomenon that occurred 
in the North Atlantic, namely the formation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, through the ‘Treaty of Rome’, which was the forerunner of the 
European Community (and has now evolved into the European Union). 
In European history, the search for a sense of security or the effort to 
avoid war was established in the early modern centuries, including through 
‘The Peace of Westphalia’ on 24 October, 1648, which provides a 
benchmark in international relations on the basis of the concept of state 
sovereignty.  Westphalian sovereignty is a concept of nation states, based 
on the principles of territory and non-interference, which exclude the 
external players from domestic authority structures. 95  ASEAN member 
states apply the principles of state sovereignty, treat all states as being 
equal, and have the fundamental right of political self-determination to 
secure its interest. When ASEAN member states engage in defence 
diplomacy, it is  a cross-border activity. ASEAN member states show its 
respect for the principle of sovereignty as envisioned by the Westphalian 
Treaty. The European Community, on the contrary, does not perceive the 
principle of sovereignty as a constraining factor in its diplomatic activities. 
This means that members of the community can always ignore the 
Westphalian system in their diplomatic activities. However, it is not to say 
that the form of defence diplomacy and the assumption of an existing 
defence community in ASEAN are adherent to the Westphalian system. 
                                            
94 Karl Deutsch (et.al), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International in the 
Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press 1957). In the 
explanation of Richards Van Wagenen’s works; see also Donald J. Puchala, International 
Political Today (New York: Dodd Mead 1971), p. 165 
95 Benno G. Teschke, Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations 
from Absolutism to Capitalism (European Journal of IR, 2002), pp. 5-7 
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 As Acharya said,96 the establishment of ASEAN was never intended 
to be a military alliance, however, the idea that ASEAN member states 
should develop some form of broader military role is nothing new in 
Southeast Asia. There are some interesting examples. In 1970, the then-
Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, General Maraden Panggabean, 
constituted that Indonesia would be ready to provide military assistance to 
its ASEAN partners facing a security threat. In 1976, Indonesia was again 
reported to be encouraging the creation of a ‘Joint Defence Council’ 
between the ASEAN countries. In the same year, several ASEAN states 
were proposing a type of bilateral agreement related to border security 
issues and intelligence exchanges in anticipation of Communist insurgency 
at home.97 In times of conflict in Indochina, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, also suggested the establishment of an ASEAN 
‘Joint Command’ to facilitate a common response to the possibility of 
seepage from the conflict.98 However, the decision maker for the ASEAN 
member states supported none of these proposals.99 This was because the 
concept of a defence community required the absence of internal conflicts in 
ASEAN.  Acharya and Tan challenged the realist view on the absence of 
security problems in Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN context, since 1967, 
there has been no wars between any ASEAN member states. There was 
one minor incident - a small  skirmish in the Thailand–Vietnam or Thailand–
Cambodia border area. 
                                            
96 Acharya (1991), Op.cit, p. 160 
97 Amitav Acharya, Regional Military Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 
Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, 
no. 1, February 1992), pp. 7-21 
98 Acharya (1991), Op.cit, p. 161. See also Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast 
Asia (New York, Praeger 1975) 
99 Ibid 
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A defence community is a form of collective defence aimed at dealing 
with an external threat. A defence community may be incorporated within a 
larger security community and it is always multilateral. The idea of a security 
community, which was delivered at the 36th AMM and officially incorporated 
in Bali Concord II, is different from other concepts of security arrangements 
because it is more inward-oriented and focuses on the ability and the 
mechanism of intra-ASEAN dispute settlement, in which the use of threats 
and force would not be an option to solve conflict. Potential conflicts, 
however, will continue to exist in the region due to differing interests, 
perspectives, and the social and political backgrounds of ASEAN state 
members.  
The ASEAN Security Community is a long-term project that is 
intended to provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future 
condition for which all member states should strive.100  In the process of 
establishing an ASEAN security community, various defence cooperation 
mechanisms of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy may contain elements of a 
defence community. This could pave the way for the prospect of a 
Southeast Asia’s defence community.  
6. Summary 
A review of the literature reveals that there has been direct research 
by scholars and writers on the issue of security communities. However, 
direct research on finding of a defence community, especially in Southeast 
Asia, has not been found at all. Departing from different theories about the 
application of military cooperation amongst ASEAN member states could be 
a motivating factor for the continuance of this research. The lack of 
                                            
100 Wulan and Bandoro (2007), pp. 2-3 
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adequate sources of literature that discusses the signs of the existence of 
defence community has become an important point of the research.   
Literature reviews largely refer to the practical preparation of the 
ASEAN member states to establish the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN 
community building process, based on the concept of operations contained 
in the APSC Blueprint, is through various defence cooperation called  
defence diplomacy. Examining various defence cooperation within the 
umbrella of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting forum, as a means for 
the ASEAN member states to build the ASEAN community, is expected to 
find the characteristics of the defence community, and at the same time can 
prove the hypothesis that was built in this study. 
There are several opportunities to prove the hypothesis, research 
question and research objective by tracking the formation of a security 
community that will be elaborated further in subsequent chapters. Some 
earlier studies have been linked to various defence cooperation with the 
theory of a security community, and it appears that the presence of these 
characteristics of the defence community has been neglected in many of 
these studies. The gaps found in various research papers on defence 
cooperation of the ASEAN member states, in relation to the existence of a 
defence community, is the core of this study.  
 
Chapter Three 
METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Introduction 
As previously noted, the aim of this research is to explore the 
phenomenon of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia and its development 
through defence cooperation, which affects its military involvement in other 
tasks, in addition to the military’s traditional tasks. This chapter is divided 
into four main parts. The first part explains the research method applied in 
this study, namely, qualitative method. The second part describes ADMM 
and ADMM-Plus as the unit of analysis, as well as certain ASEAN member 
states as the focus of the study, while the third part describes the data-
gathering techniques employed in this study. The final part discusses the 
techniques and procedures of the data analysis.   
2. Qualitative Research 
Bogdan and Biklen describe qualitative research as follows: "Reality 
is a multi-layered, interactive and a shared social experience interpreted by 
individuals".1 Whereas in studying reality as a social construction, individual 
or group, interesting or give meaning to a reality is by constructing it. 
Qualitative research is more concerned in terms of ‘the process’ rather than 
‘the results’ because the relationship between the parts to be examined is 
obvious when observed in the mechanism of the process.  
Furthermore, Creswell describes that in qualitative research, 
researchers use the process rather than a preconceived result, with the 
focus on the process of data collection and analysis in an effort to build 
                                            
1 Robert C. Bogdan and Sari K. Biklen, Qualitative Research for Education (Boston, MA: 
Allyn and Bacon 2nd ed, 1982), p. 16 
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abstractions, concepts, hypotheses and theories in more detail.2  Moreover, 
as Glesne explains, the role of field research through direct interaction with 
the respondents is crucial in order to obtain a comprehensive explanation 
and interpretation.3 
There are several reasons why a qualitative method is applied in this 
study. First, besides the reasons stated in the previous paragraph, qualitative 
methods are believed to provide space for the researcher to develop an 
understanding of the meaning, process and context of the unit of analysis.4 
Second, this study intends to explore the phenomenon of defence diplomacy in 
the ADMM working mechanism, and qualitative methods provide flexibility for 
researchers to study these phenomena in depth and detail. 5 Third, qualitative 
methods are generally applied in the study of political science, especially in the 
context of micro-level analysis. It is expected, therefore, that by applying 
qualitative methods the researcher can detect, capture and elaborate on the 
experiences observed and outline them academically. As this thesis is to 
examine how the member states of ASEAN conduct defence diplomacy and 
whether it is appropriate to believe that such defence diplomacy activities have 
some elements of a defence community, qualitative research is suitable for 
application in this research. 
 
 
                                            
2 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1994), p. 145 
3 Corinne Glesne, Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction (New York: Longman 
White Plains, 1999), p. 5. There are several considerations that the reason he used 
qualitative research methods in this study. Qualitative methods believed to give space for 
the researcher to develop an understanding of the meaning, process and context of the unit 
of analysis examined 
4 Furthermore, see Fiona Devine, Qualitative Analysis, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker 
(ed.), Theory and Methods in Political Science (New York: Palgrave 2002), pp. 197-215 
5 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2002), p. 14 
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Yin explains that qualitative research is highly relevant to different 
disciplines and professions.6 He further argues that qualitative research has five 
distinctive features which are complementary to other expert views, such as 
Fiona Devine’s.7 “Qualitative research is studying the meaning of people’s lives, 
under real-world conditions; representing the views and perspectives of the 
people (in this context, the perspective of defence diplomacy players); covering 
contextual conditions within which people live; contributing insights into existing 
or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behaviour; and 
striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single 
source alone”.8 
Thus, qualitative methods describe a process of investigation in 
understanding a social or human problem, based on the development of a 
complex holistic picture, formed with a view to a resource report in detail 
and in a reasonable situation.9 In citing Creswell’s explanation, a qualitative 
method has at least five approaches, namely, narrative, phenomenological, 
grounded theory, ethnographical and case study.10 Creswell defines the 
case study as a method which explores one or more cases within a 
bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time 
through detailed and in-depth data collection by involving multiple sources 
of information.11 Case studies in social research explain certain phenomena 
that relate to people, groups, organisations, communities, large towns or 
                                            
6 Robert K. Yin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish (New York: The Guilford Press, 
2011), p. 7-10  
7 See Fiona Devine, Qualitative Analysis, in David Marsh and Gerry stoker (ed.), Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (New York: Palgrave 2002) 
8 Yin (2011), Op.cit, p. 10 
9 Creswell (1994), Op.cit, p. 4 
10 Furthermore see John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing 
Amongst Five Approaches (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2007), pp. 76-81 
11 Ibid, p. 73; see also Robert E. Stake, Qualitative Case Studies, in Norman K. Denzin and 
Yvonnas S. Lincoln (ed.) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE, 2005), pp. 445-448 
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even countries.12 Furthermore, Swarnborn explains there are two types of 
strategy in case studies for studying social phenomena: extensive and 
intensive strategies. In an extensive strategy, we need to collect relevant 
evidence of a large number of instances of a phenomenon, while in an 
intensive strategy, the researcher focuses on only one specific instance of 
the phenomenon to be studied.13 In effect, compared with other approaches, 
the case study method is the standard method in social science. 
Moreover, Yin stated that case study research is used when a 
researcher focuses on answering “how” and “why” questions, and when 
they want to cover contextual conditions and believe the behaviour of those 
involved in the study are relevant to the phenomenon under study. 14 
Furthermore, Gerring explains when the strategy of a study is “exploratory” 
rather than “confirmatory”, when a study focuses more on “causal 
mechanisms” than “causal effects” and when a study has “useful variance” 
which is available for only a single unit or a small number of units, so that 
basically, the same case is studied several times.15 
In the context of this study, case study research is selected for the 
following reasons. As mentioned earlier, this study attempts to explore 
defence diplomacy activities within the auspice of the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
Plus (ADMM-Plus) working mechanisms in Southeast Asia. Therefore, this 
                                            
12 Peter Swarnborn, Case Study Research: What, Why and How (SAGE Publications, 
2010), p. 1 
13 Ibid; see further John Gerring, What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? (The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, 2004), pp. 351-354 
14 See Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, 2009), pp. 10-11; see also Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, Qualitative Case 
Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers (Canada: 
The Qualitative Report, vol. 13, no. 4, Dec 2008), pp. 545-546 
15 Cited in Sukmajati PhD Thesis (2011), Op.cit, p. 66; Also see John Gerring, What is a 
Case Study and What is It Good for? (American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 2, 
May 2004), p. 352 
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study attempts to answer how these forums are organised and why they are 
organised the way they are. In this context, this study also intends to 
conduct explanation rather than confirmation analysis. Moreover, this study 
focuses on causal mechanism rather than causal effects.16  
3. Case Selection  
Many experts 17  and officials 18  say that classifying ASEAN as a 
defence community or military alliance in Southeast Asia through defence 
diplomacy activities is not possible, since ASEAN was not formed to 
establish a military alliance. Moreover, proving the existence of a process 
that helps shape a defence community in Southeast Asia requires the 
collection of vast and diverse data on all defence diplomacy activities. If all 
data is collected, the research will be too wide and unfocused. Indeed, there 
are only six areas of practical cooperation that are currently described as 
phenomena in the defence mechanism of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, 
consequently only two types of practical defence cooperation will be 
assessed to prove that ASEAN’s current defence diplomacy meets the 
criteria of defence community elements. Other practical defence 
cooperation strategies are out of the scope of this thesis. 
It is important to understand the phenomenon of how the actual 
mechanism of defence diplomacy, that is associated with defence 
community elements, took place in Southeast Asia. In order to narrow the 
                                            
16 Sukmajati PhD Thesis (2011), Ibid, p. 67 
17 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Kajian Mengenai Komunitas ASEAN: Suatu Kerangka Analisis in Ratna 
Shofi Inayati et.al, Menuju Komunitas ASEAN 2015: Dari State Oriented ke People Oriented 
(Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, LIPI 2007), p. 46; Rodolfo C. Severino, Towards an 
ASEAN Security Community (Singapore, ISEAS, Trends in Southeast Asia Series, no. 8, 
2004), p. 2; Amitav Acharya, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security 
Community” or “Defence Community”? (Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no, 2, Summer 1991), p. 159 
18 See Chapter-6, footnote no 66, The view of the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, the 
expression of the Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei and Director of Policy Office, 
Singapore 
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field of research and make it more focused in the issue of defence 
community elements, Bandoro and Emmers suggested focusing on certain 
areas of cooperation within the auspices of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus 
by tracing the process and using interview data. 19 Subsequently, the new 
regionalism approach and, at the same time, the regional mechanism in 
handling security issues can be defined more clearly, proving the presence 
of a defence community in Southeast Asia. 
Although this study focuses on the areas of cooperation of the 
ASEAN member countries in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus events, 
specifically, the cooperation in peacekeeping operations and maritime 
security, it takes a great deal of data to obtain comprehensive information. 
For the purpose of analysis, this study applies a multi-strategy analysis.20 
By using a multi-strategy approach, this study focuses on two areas of 
cooperation within the ADMM and ADMM-Plus events, to avoid over-
treating or repeatedly studying the same point several times, namely 
maritime strategy and peacekeeping operations. These two areas of 
cooperation are currently a focus of cooperation in Southeast Asia, and 
accordingly the research process in these areas will provide a more 
representative research opportunity. This kind of approach allows a 
reasonable balance of exploration and comprehension of the dynamic 
changes in military politics and their consequences. As Huxley stated, there 
is a lack of inter-operability in ASEAN defence ties. 21  To prove how 
                                            
19 Series of discussion with Bantarto Bandoro, Professor and Senior Lecturer at Indonesia 
Defense University in 2013; Interview with Ralf Emmers, at RSIS, Singapore, 20 August 2013 
20 Furthermore Derek Layder, New Strategies in Social Research: An Introduction Guide 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) 
21 Tim Huxley, ASEAN Defence Policies and Expenditures in Richard Solkolsky, Angel 
Rabasa and C. Richard Neu (ed.), The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward 
China (RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 46-47; see also Amitav Acharya, Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order 
(London, Routledge 2001), Op.cit, p. 151; see also the importance of inter-operability for 
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important inter-operability is and how it became the centre of verification for 
the existence of the elements of a defence community within the ASEAN 
defence cooperation will be further explained in the sequence chapters.  
This study selects Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam as research countries, with research conducted mainly in 
Jakarta-Indonesia. The reasons for selecting these six ASEAN countries as 
the study sites are due to several factors, including the limited research time 
and the readiness of government officials to be interviewed in the proposed 
timeframe of the interview. Four out of the six chosen countries were 
founding members of ASEAN, excluding Brunei and Vietnam, and 
consequently access to defence cooperation data and the involvement of 
the defence ministry of these countries was more easily obtained. The 
different forms of government systems, for example, the democratic state of 
Indonesia, the semi-authoritarian systems of Malaysia and Singapore, the 
monarchies of Brunei and Thailand, the socialistic regime of Vietnam, are 
reasons which prove the diversity of the official response of each country at 
the time of receiving the request for an interview. The different forms of 
government system of each country is demonstrated by the answers 
received from a letter requesting an interview with targeted government 
officials, as well as the government officials’ treatment of the researcher at 
the time of the interview. The six countries also have a different defence 
policy to ensure its national defence in terms of government policies of each 
country in the field of defence cooperation. For instance, Singapore and 
Malaysia have had FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) as a means 
of defence cooperation with Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia 
                                                                                                                          
NATO, even though the military alliance organization has been established since 1949,  
NATO’s interoperability policy defines the term as the ability for Allies to act together 
coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic 
objectives, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112.htm?    
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while Brunei, as a small country in terms of total area, entrusts its defence 
matters to Malaysia. Thus, each country has visibly different defensive 
orientations.  
Collecting data from official statements by designated respondents 
from six countries is considered to be representative of the defence policy of 
the ASEAN countries as a whole. With regard to the time frame of the study, 
data was collected from 2000 to 2012 with consideration that this period of 
time is sufficient to gain comprehensive data. This was mostly conducted in 
Indonesia.  
4. Data-Gathering Techniques  
This study combines three data-gathering techniques, namely, in-
depth interviews, direct observation and documentary analysis. Each of 
these data-gathering techniques will be explained in the following sub-
sections. These three techniques are popular for conducting academic 
research, since they are comprehensive methods of collecting the required 
information in a qualitative study. To process the data that has been 
collected, the researcher used a method of triangulation, generally 
considered as a process of using multiple sources to clarify meaning in 
order to verify information. 22  Direct observation and documentary analysis 
are treated as supporting or complementary data-gathering techniques. 
English language conference papers, books, journals and periodical articles, 
newspapers, press releases, etc. were examined to determine perceptions 
of security, to follow the mechanism of the defence community in Southeast 
Asia’s defence diplomacy activities and to analyse factors influencing peace 
and stability in the region. Thus, in order to produce insightful findings, all 
                                            
22 See Robert E. Stake, Qualitative Research: Studying How Things Work (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 2010), pp. 88-95 
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three techniques were applied in this study, in which the in-depth interviews 
serve as the primary data-gathering technique while other techniques serve 
as secondary data-gathering techniques. 
4.1.  In-Depth Interviews    
 The in-depth interviews were carried out as confidential and secure 
conversations to explore deeply each respondent's point of view, feelings 
and perspectives individually, or sometimes in pairs, to provide a more 
immersive experience. 23 In conducting the in-depth interviews, respondents 
were divided into one of three categories. However, sometimes an 
interviewee had a dual status, that of being a bureaucrat, while at the same 
time also being a high-ranking military figure. Such interviews were targeted 
at the person from a particular group with sufficient knowledge and 
information on a specific topic. To validate the usefulness of the data, it was 
then cross-referenced by asking the opinion of other officials in each 
ministry of defence of the researched countries. 24 
During the field research in these six designated countries, 
approximately 34 respondents were interviewed. The list of respondents 
(interviewees) and the interview guide are included in Appendix-1 and 
Appendix-2, respectively. The interviews were carried out with mostly 
prominent officials in the researched countries, such as the former Vice-
President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Deputy Defence Minister of 
Brunei, the Commander-in-Chief of the Brunei Armed Forces, the Chief of 
Staff of the Indonesian Navy, the Director of the Strategic Defence of 
                                            
23 Glesne (1999), Op.cit, p. 67 
24 Furthermore on various advantages of the specialized interviews, see David Silverman, 
Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction (London: 
SAGE Publications, 1993), pp. 159-160; See also Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, 
Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in Political Science (New York & London: 
Longman, 1986), pp. 132-138 
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Malaysia and so on. Interviews with experts from Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand also were conducted in order to gain a more comprehensive 
insight into the topic from the viewpoint of the military, bureaucrats and 
intellectuals. Most of these individuals have been directly involved in the 
activities of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, or have closely studied 
matters of defence diplomacy.25 In these cases, the in-depth interviews 
were focused on their experiences and the information obtained from their 
vantage-point of which they had been categorised.  
During nearly seven months of field study, the researcher managed 
to visit the six designated countries and interviewed officials in order to 
collect as much useful information as possible and to obtain the personal 
views of the respondents. The first field research was conducted between 
July and September 2013 and the second field research was conducted 
between July and September 2014. All the designated countries were 
visited on the first field research trip, while, during the second field research 
trip only Indonesia was visited to complete the data collection. In addition, 
prior to research in the field, the researcher had sent the ‘Terms of 
Reference’, (included in appendix-2), as a formal procedure to targeted 
respondents through the office of the Indonesian Defence Attaché that was 
accredited to the designated countries. This is not to say, however, that 
there were no obstacles; for example, there were several respondents who 
were suspicious about the topic and declined permission for the interviews 
to be recorded. Facing these problems, the researcher used all means 
available to take notes and to record all conversations. To deal with these 
issues, the researcher uses a purposeful sampling strategy (a snowball or 
                                            
25 The profiles of these respondents can be found in Appendix 1 
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chain strategy) 26  in understanding and interpreting research problems. 
Consequently, by using this strategy, the number of respondents was  
extended, based on the recommendations of other respondents, and which 
covered missing information that could not be noted during interviews with 
certain respondents who prohibited the electronic recording of interviews. 
The results of recorded interviews with each respondent are provided in the 
form of a CD-ROM.  
With regard to the interview process, the average duration for each 
interview was 60 to 90 minutes. Even though each respondent had been 
given information through the ‘Terms of Reference’ that had been sent 
previously, either through the defence attaché’s office or via email, at the 
beginning of each interview the respondents were provided with a general 
introduction to the study.27 In this short introduction, the respondents were 
informed about the main purposes of the study and the information needed 
for the thesis. Because the research topic involves sensitive issues in ASEAN, 
the initial brief explanation had to be given to respondents to convince them 
that any information obtained from the interviews would remain confidential 
and used only for academic purposes.  
In most interviews, the respondents who were identified as intellectuals 
preferred informal discussion, while the bureaucrats and military officials 
preferred the interview to be conducted in more formal circumstances. Most of 
the interviews were carried out in private, except with the military officials in 
Vietnam when the interviews were conducted in groups. The questions 
                                            
26  See further Creswell (2007), Op.cit, p. 126-129; Creswell suggested applying a 
purposeful sampling strategy. This strategy is useful “because it can purposefully inform an 
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study” 
27 Buttolph Johnson, Richard A. Joslyn and H.T. Reynolds, Political Science Research 
Methods (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), p. 219; Johnson names the general introduction 
for respondent as ‘informed consent’ 
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prepared before the interviews were used flexibly, and encouraged the 
respondent to talk freely. In the context of this study, a set of questions was 
prepared in the interview guide prior to the interviews. As explained by Patton, 
“the standardized open-ended interview consists of a set of questions carefully 
worded and arranged with the intention of taking each of the respondents 
through the same sequence and asking each of the respondents the same 
questions with essentially the same words”.28 However, once the interviews had 
started, the questions could be expanded to explore related topics of the thesis.  
In addition, during the field research, many respondents in the 
designated countries were valuable to this study, not just because of their 
previous experiences but also due to their voluntarily helpfulness in introducing 
the researcher to other respondents that they thought might help in giving 
opinions which were relevant to the study. For instance, a respondent from 
RSIS, Singapore, introduced the researcher to another expert who is currently 
writing articles about Southeast Asian defence cooperation. On another 
occasion, the researcher was introduced to a military official in Indonesia. From 
this discussion, the researcher asked about and gathered a wide range of 
information from the personal experiences of a respondent who was involved at 
staff level in an Expert Working Group of ADMM, and who now serves as the 
Director of International Relations in the Ministry of Defence. In such 
discussions or interviews, the researcher was able to explore the respondent’s 
feelings about the so-called defence diplomacy mechanism in certain areas of 
cooperation within ADMM and ADMM-Plus. At the same time, the researcher 
could ask the respondent’s opinions on how he perceived other officers’ feelings 
and behaviour as they took part in the defence diplomacy mechanism in 
Southeast Asia. 
                                            
28 Patton (2002), Op.cit, pp. 343-344 
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These kinds of personal views and experiences were important, as 
the researcher obtained much information, in terms of the sense of 
community, from the respondent mentioned. Moreover, from that interview, 
the researcher also had the opportunity to observe and explore more 
comprehensively the process in the area of cooperation that had been 
organised and carried out. It is important to mention that the interviews were 
tape-recorded to avoid any errors in what the respondents actually said, 
since the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the same manner 
as the interview guide stipulated. During the interview process, the 
respondents were given an opportunity to provide their own opinions. At the 
same time, to record the information as comprehensively as possible, extra 
notes were taken as well. 
As noted earlier, opportunities for interviewing a high-ranking military 
official were sometimes difficult to obtain. This may have been due to the 
fact that most official information or documents in the military being 
classified as “confidential” so they cannot be revealed to the public, or due 
to the restrictions of the official’s schedule at the proposed time of the 
interview. Prior to the interview sessions with high-ranking military officials, 
the researcher got formal confirmation from their office, either by email or 
phone communication, to determine the availability of each respondent. 
Even when interviews were carried out, unfortunately it sometimes 
happened that the information obtained from the high-ranking military 
officials was not very different from the formal institutional statement that 
can easily be found in a variety of mass media. To overcome this problem, 
the researcher looked for subordinate officials to elaborate on the 
information and convinced them that their answers would be kept 
confidential and would not in any way endanger them or their institutions, 
because the study was for academic purposes. 
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4.2.  Direct Observation    
Direct observations were carried out mainly in the Indonesian 
National Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre (INDF PKC), in Sentul, 
Indonesia. The decision to conduct direct observation in the INDF PKC was 
based on the consideration that this centre for the preparation of Indonesian 
peacekeepers is the largest and the most comprehensive peacekeeping 
centre model in Asia Pacific today. The Centre regularly carries out 
peacekeeping exercises, seminars, workshops, education and host 
international peacekeeping events that are attended by international and 
regional military personnel.  
 The researcher visited INDF PKC, for field research purposes, on two 
occasions in July and August 2014. Besides that, an intensive direct 
observation was carried out initially between 2007 and 2010 during the 
researcher’s time as an operational staff member in INDF PKC. During 
direct observation, the researcher closely observed the preparation phase of 
the Indonesian Peacekeepers for missions in the Middle East and Western 
Sahara. The researcher also sat in international classes for peacekeepers 
and observed the atmosphere. On these occasions, both in the field and in 
the classroom, the researcher carefully observed the attitudes of military 
personnel from various countries, especially from ASEAN member states. 
For example, whether there were indications of any sense of equality, 
dominance or solidarity and solidity between them, or conflicting attitudes 
which might have arisen behind the scenes. This atmosphere could not be 
found during formal interviews or through documents, and the researcher 
tried to understand and capture the sense of mutual trust, mutual 
understanding and the maturation of inter-operability readiness of the 
regional military personnel.  
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4.3.  Documentary Analysis    
Analysis of documents is one of the data-gathering methods used in 
this study. This method, according to Patton, can provide additional as well as 
initial information, which can be explored further through in-depth interviews 
and direct observation.29 The advantages of implementing document analysis 
is to assist researchers to avoid misspellings that might arise from the 
interview, as well as assisting them in understanding the details of activities, 
and especially in the focus of a research topic that can be developed in an 
interview session.30 In the context of this study, documentary analysis was 
carried out in order to find patterns of defence cooperation, its process and 
event phases to find the elements that may be contained within a defence 
community. In practice, documentary analyses were conducted before, during 
and after the field research.  
Documentary analysis was applied in this study in order to collect 
information on the proliferation of defence diplomacy terminology in relation to 
Southeast Asia defence. This first step was conducted before the field 
research, guiding the researcher to find a fundamental reason for the 
necessity of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia. This is where the role of 
documentary analysis becomes important: to understand the direction of the 
organisation of defence diplomacy in the region. Likewise, during the field 
research, as mentioned before, the results of analysing documents were very 
helpful in making the interview sessions more focused, both for in-depth 
interviews and direct observation. The importance of the role of documentary 
analysis is very significant and supports other methods during this research 
process. 
                                            
29 Patton (2002), Op.cit, p. 295 
30 Further see Yin (2009), Op.cit, pp. 101-106 
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5.  Data Analysis 
In interpreting data, this study takes into account the importance of 
consistency found in some samples, as well as the accuracy of the information 
contained on the social phenomena on the studied object. 31 The process of 
data collection, data analysis and report writing are not distinct steps in the 
process; they are interrelated and often continued simultaneously in a research 
project.32  Creswell points out that the early stage of the analytical process 
involves the researcher organising the data into folders with index cards,  then  
converting the data into textual data for the appropriate folders. The next 
procedures are managing the data, reading and memoing data, describing, 
classifying, interpreting and presenting data. 33  These procedures must be 
conducted in sequence and reiterated.  
In the context of this study, all the information collected from the 
interviews, or information that was recorded in non-textual form was converted 
into textual data or transcribed. The researcher categorised the data into the 
following: information on defence cooperation as a defence diplomacy; the 
organisational structure of defence cooperation; the development of defence 
cooperation which shows defence regionalism; and related defence cooperation 
which forms part of the elements of a defence community. As mentioned 
previously, all data needed to be carefully read to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding. Cross-referencing and double-checking data using triangulation 
was carried out to ensure accuracy and validity. 34 
                                            
31 Silverman (1993), Op.cit, p. 145 and 149 
32 Creswell (2007), Op.cit, p. 150 
33 Ibid, pp. 150-151; see also Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data 
Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1984), pp. 21-
23; David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and 
Interaction (London: SAGE Publications, 1993), pp. 240-241 
34 Silverman (1993), Op.cit, pp. 156-160 
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The process of ensuring accuracy and validity requires multiple forms 
of evidence to support each aspect. From the evidence found, an 
interpretation was carried out to match that evidence with the other aspect. 
35 In this instant, the interpretation and argument must have a correlation 
with the logical framework. If these are both coherent, then connections are 
made. Otherwise, if the interpretation and argument had no correlation with 
the logical framework, they were treated and re-evaluated. Moreover, if 
interpretation and arguments sounded plausible, then interpretations and 
arguments were made. On the other hand, if they seemed implausible, 
these tentative interpretations and arguments were treated and re-
evaluated.36 
In developing interpretations and arguments, this study applies both 
deductive and inductive analysis. As Mannheim and Rich explain, inductive 
analysis refers to an analytical process in which theories are built from 
empirical events, and deductive analysis refers to an analytical process in 
which theories are used to explain real-world events. 37  In developing 
inductive analysis, this study uses simple patterns of information from 
narrative text in interpretation and argument; more specifically, the 
information was gained from interviews, since the interpretation in this thesis 
is based on empirical data. Meanwhile, in developing deductive analysis, 
this study applies the logical framework of a defence community formation 
to explain the phenomenon of defence diplomacy activities in Southeast 
Asia. In general, to understand the elements of a defence community in 
                                            
35  In developing interpretations and arguments, this study applies two data analysis 
techniques namely the conceptual coherence and plausibility. See Matthew B. Miles and A. 
Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods (Beverly 
Hills: SAGE Publications, 1984), pp. 215-130 
36 Sukmajati (2011), p. 76 
37 Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in 
Political Science (New York & London: Longman, 1986), pp. 17-20  
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ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, it is necessary to understand the 
requirements of a defence community as discussed in Chapter 1, and the 
theory of new regionalism that was proposed by Hettne.38 
6. Summary 
In order to find the elements of a defence community, this study 
applies qualitative research, which relies on interviews as the primary 
source. This study focuses on ASEAN’s defence cooperation on ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus as its units of analysis and determined six countries in 
Southeast Asia as the loci of the study. In collecting information on how and 
why ADMM and ADMM-Plus were organised, this study applies a 
triangulation method by combining documentary analysis, in-depth 
interviews and direct observation techniques.  Finally, this study applied all 
data analysis techniques that have been discussed above in order to gain 
valid findings.  
 
                                            
38 Further see Björn Hettne, The New Regionalism: A Prologue, in Björn Hettne (ed.), The 
New Regionalism and the Future of Security Development (London: Macmillan, vol. 4, 
2000); see also Björn Hettne, Development, Security and World Order: A Regionalist 
Approach (European Journal of Development Research, vol. 9, 1997), pp. 83-106 
Chapter Four 
THE HISTORICAL EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE 
ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONALISM 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Before further discussing the empirical analysis of defence 
cooperation in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to trace the historical 
evidence of collective defence organisations that once existed in this region, 
which are believed to contain the elements of a defence community. This 
chapter attempts to analyse how defence cooperation has been 
instrumental in helping to address regional security issues. This chapter 
does not intend to examine why organisations such as ASEAN are currently 
not a form of defence community, but aims to prove that in the process of 
achieving the ASEAN community through the development of defence 
cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, there is an 
element of a defence community. 
 The characteristics of a collective defence organisation are very 
similar to the characteristics of a defence community or military alliance. 
With reference to the theory of regionalism, the researcher believes that it 
can be used to find elements of a defence community in the defence 
cooperation that has been operationalised by ASEAN countries presently in 
the region. It is noted that military cooperation between ASEAN member 
states is aimed at tackling regional security problems. Currently, the concept 
of a defence community in the region has not been clearly defined, but it is 
not impossible that a defence community really exists in Southeast Asia.   
The chapter begins with a further discussion on the regionalism 
theory which is the basis for an assessment of defence cooperation in 
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Southeast Asia with the aim that the development of ASEAN defence 
cooperation can be assessed. The form of regional organisation in the 
region has evolved since the early 1950s within the context of a changing 
regional security environment. Assessing the evolution of a regional 
organisation is expected to paint a portrait of the development of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia from old regionalism to new regionalism, in 
which this theory will be applied as a basic theory for the whole research.  
By first discussing the creation of the SEATO as part of the United 
States Cold War containment policy and other organisations in the region, 
followed by analysis of the characteristics of a defence community 
associated with the evolution of regionalism, a connection is expected 
between the activities of a defence cooperation and regionalism theory. This 
theory is used to prove the existence of defence community characteristics 
in defence cooperation in Southeast Asia (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 
The Existence of Inter-Operabil i ty Component 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s own figure 
Note: The above figure shows the establishment of various regional organisations that 
illustrate the evolution of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In this context, it is necessary to 
prove the existence of inter-operability components in the activities of ASEAN’s defence 
diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM and ADMM-Plus as the evidence of characteristics 
of a defence community in Southeast Asia. 
 
 
 
DEFENCE  
COMMUNITY  
THEORY  OF 
REGIONALISM 
INTER 
OPERABILITY 
DEFENCE 
DIPLOMACY 
 78 
ASEAN member states translate one of the basic principles of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by stating that each member state has the 
right to be free from external interference, subversion or coercion in the form 
of strengthening defence cooperation among member states.1 “The basic 
idea is for ASEAN to be able to respond collectively and promptly to intra-
state conflict and security challenges, from within as well as from outside 
the region, based on the understanding that a community will provide bigger 
assurance that the conflict will be solved in a peaceful manner”.2 It is within 
such a context that ASEAN, through the form of defence cooperation, can 
handle the challenges appropriately.  
2. The Development of Regionalism  
ASEAN is an example of regional cooperation which represents two 
waves of regionalism. This organisation was founded during the Cold War, 
during the first wave of regionalism when its original members attempted to 
reduce the negative impact of the Cold War to regional stability, as well as to 
avoid war between themselves by its basic principle of non-interference and 
peaceful settlement of disputes.3 In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN leaders 
prompted a new discourse on the view of security challenges which 
incorporated military and non-military threats into its agenda.4 The emergence 
of new challenges in the form of non-traditional security threats had wide-
reaching effects and were transnational in scope. Mitigating such threats 
through national solutions is often inadequate and needs the cooperation of 
                                            
1 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, available at www.asean.org 
2  Alexandra Retno Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN’s Quest for a Full-Fledged 
Community (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 3 
3 Lianita Prawindarti, The ASEAN Security Community: Reconciling Traditional and Non-
Traditional Security Issues (University of Trento, 2005), p. 7 
4  Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Former Defence Minister of Indonesia Jakarta,          
13 March 2013 
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regional governance and multilateral cooperation.5 “This trend to strengthen 
cooperation has resulted in the expansion of its mandate beyond economic 
cooperation to also encompass security cooperation”.6 The involvement of 
regional governance to tackle this new challenge led to the development of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia and is referred to as new regionalism. New 
regionalism is not an option but a necessity in addressing non-traditional 
security threats in the region which are multiple in nature and threaten the 
safety of the population, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, so that 
military involvement in addressing non-traditional security threats becomes 
essential.7 Consequently, military security cooperation is one of the effective 
aspects of regionalism among developing world countries.  
Analysing regional security cooperation cannot be separated from the 
analysis of the development of regionalism and its perpetuation aspects. 
Theories regarding regionalism are helpful in analysing the sustainability of a 
region. It is through historical explanation that the development of regionalism 
can be traced back and explains why a region still exists and determines what 
possible efforts should be made to perpetuate it.  
A region or area is defined as a group of states in proximity to each 
other within a particular geographic area.8 Nevertheless, geographic proximity 
is not enough to unite a country in some areas. Hettne and Söderbaum argue 
that geographic proximity must be supported by a similarity of cultural values, 
                                            
5 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community (Singapore: RSIS, Asia Security Initiative Policy 
Series, Working Paper no. 7, Sep 2010a), p. 1 
6 Ibid, p. 4 
7 Ibid, p. 2 
8 Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), p. 228; 
see also Craig A. Snyder, Regional Security and Regional Conflict paper presented to 48th 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (Chicago, IL: March 2007), p. 2 
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social bonds and the same historical legacy.9 Meanwhile, Jervis argues that a 
region “can be defined as groups of interconnected states where a change in 
any relationship within the group will influence the others, and that the region 
as a whole develops characteristics and behaviours that are distinct from 
those of the individual states”.10 
In this way, the requirement for the formation of a region can be met 
geographically and structurally. With this logic, any regions of the world can 
be a group of countries that declare themselves belong to the same region. 
However, not all regions have the intensity of interaction or the same 
progress between one area and another. Bennett argues that the concept of 
‘Anglospehere’ is an example of a region that is not bound by geographic 
proximity. It is a kind of ‘network civilization without a corresponding political 
forum’, in which its boundaries are by their very nature vague.11  
Based on the new regionalism approach, 12  the development of 
regionalism depends on three things, namely: 1) the support of the major 
powers in the region (regional great powers); 2) the level of interaction 
between countries in the region; and 3) mutual trust between countries in the 
region. It explains why one region may be lagging behind another due to 
power problems in the country and the desire to form a region. It could be that 
an area of integration cannot be created because integration in the region is 
not desired or pursued by the greater powers.  
                                            
9  Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, Theorizing the Rise of Regionness (London: 
Routledge. 2002), p. 39 
10 Cited in Snyder (2007), Op.cit, p. 2; see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity In 
Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 6 
11 See James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nation Will 
Lead the Way in the Twenty-first Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc, 2004) 
12  Björn Hettne, The New Regionalism: A Prologue in Björn Hettne. (ed.), The New 
Regionalism and the Future of Security Development (London: Macmillan, vol. 4, 2000) 
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The new regionalism in ASEAN has been determined by a set of 
structural changes in the international system where it is closely attached to 
the global structural transformation, namely from a bilateral form to 
multilateral ones, from a bipolar world (major power rivalry) to multipolar 
ones. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the collapse of the 
bipolar system paved the way for all major powers to come into the same 
arena to discuss security issues. In facing such a situation, ASEAN member 
states adopted a strategy to build equilibrium between the great powers and 
themselves.13  Buzynski points out that, “As an institution, ASEAN acted as 
a diplomatic vehicle for the coordination of regional positions”.14 Since the 
end of the Cold War, new expectations have stimulated the demand for an 
extension of ASEAN functions into areas other than the diplomatic field.15 
Following such demands, the goal to develop a coherent region will not 
come into reality unless the ASEAN member states integrate with an overall 
sense of community. 
Moreover, the pressures that ASEAN faces today could be depicted 
as a clash between the old and the new regionalism.16 “There are three 
differences between the ‘Old and New Regionalism’. First, the old 
regionalism has been characterized as the product of the Cold War during a 
bipolar era which was inward looking and exclusive, whereas the new 
regionalism taking shape in a multipolar world order, is outward looking and 
non-exclusive. Second, the government created the old regionalism from 
                                            
13 Muthiah Alagappa, Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: 
Going Beyond ZOPFAN (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/4, 1991), pp. 269-305. See 
also Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003). See also Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of 
Regional Security (Pacific Affairs, vol. 71 no. 2, 1998), pp. 195-214 
14 Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN: A Changing Regional (Asia Survey, vol. 27, no. 7, Jul 1997), p. 765 
15 Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN’s New Challenges (Pacific Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 1997-
1998), pp. 556 
16 Ibid, p. 555 
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the outside (from above), meanwhile the new regionalism is more 
spontaneous, from within and from below, in which the constituent states 
themselves are the main players. Third, the old regionalism was created for 
specific economic objectives, whereas the new regionalism is more 
comprehensive, and multidimensional in processing”.17 
Thus, the old regionalism usually refers to the Cold War product, 
whereas the new regionalism emerges as the second wave of regional 
cooperation. It implies a stronger emphasis on political dimensions, in a 
situation where ‘national’ economics is outgrowing their national politics. As 
Fawcett points out, regionalism can be defined as state-led political projects, 
which aim to promote intergovernmental policy collaboration at the regional 
level.18  It is the top-down processes in which governments deliberately 
attempt to enhance cooperation primarily through the creation of regional 
institutions.19  
By examining the development of regionalism and defence diplomacy 
operational mechanisms that occur today in the region, this research tries to 
identify and trace the characteristics of a defence community that may exist 
in Southeast Asia. By using the new regionalism approach, a common 
ground is anticipated between the need for defence diplomacy and the 
                                            
17 Björn Hettne and András Inotai, The New Regionalism: Implications for Global 
Development and International Security (UNU/WIDER, 1994), pp. 1-2; Leszek Buszynski, 
ASEAN’s New Challenges (Pacific Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 1997-1998), p. 1 
18 Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew 
Hurrell (ed.) Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39-40; Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, 
Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and World Order, in Andrew Gamble 
and Anthony Payne (ed.) Regionalism and World Order (New York, St. Martin's Press, 
1996), pp. 2-3; Shaun Breslin, Richard A. Higgott, and Ben Rosamond, Regions in 
Comparative Perspective, in Shaun Breslie (et.al), New Regionalisms in the Global Political 
Economy: Theories and Cases (London, Routledge, 2002), pp.13-14 
19 T. J. Pempel, Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness in T. J. Pempel 
(ed) Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
2005), pp. 6 and 19 
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elements of a defence community in political and defence cooperation in 
Southeast Asia.  
3. Historical Evidence of Collective Defence in Regional 
Organisations in Southeast Asia 
Examining the existence of a regional organisation creation cannot 
be separated from efforts to trace the influence of superpowers in the 
formation of these organisations, as well as any defence community that 
has historically existed in Southeast Asia. The roots of regional 
organisations in Southeast Asia began in the early 1950s with the United 
States’ efforts to create a defensive military group aimed at containing 
Communism in East Asia and increasing regional stability. Even before the 
establishment of ASEAN in August 1967, the regions tended towards 
cooperation and regional affiliation. The countries of Southeast Asia 
attempted a number of different regional groupings, each with slightly 
different membership, objectives, motivations and length of existence. 
Various regional organisations were established in Southeast Asia, 
including SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASEAN itself. Every organisation 
had its own reasons in the process of its formation, as well as factors that 
caused malfunctioning. Major powers like the United States, involved in the 
formation of a regional organisation, had different interests from the 
Southeast Asian countries that were members of those organisations. The 
United States, as mentioned above, was involved in defence relations with 
the Philippines and Thailand under the SEATO arrangement, whereas  
England retained its military personnel in Malaysia and Singapore, and 
China developed its power with its interest in the region.20 Southeast Asian 
                                            
20 Jason D. Lewis, The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a 
Security Community (Ph.D Dissertation, December 1999), p. 50 
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countries which at that time had just a few years of independence were 
looking for a forum that could represent the form of their political orientation 
based on the national interests of each country through regional integration. 
3.1. The Creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) 
From the late 1940s to the early 1950s, many regional conferences 
were held to examine various possible forms of regional organisation. One 
reason for holding such conferences was a common concern for the 
problem of Indonesian independence, beginning with an Asian conference 
in New Delhi in 1949, followed by a proposal from the Philippine President 
Quirino, for the creation of a Southeast Asian Union to provide an anti-
communist alliance that did not get a serious response from attendees. 
However, it can be said that the idea was a corner stone for the 
establishment of a regional organisation in the Southeast Asian region.  
The proposal initiated by the Philippine President was followed by a 
meeting of Asian and Africa countries in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. This 
was a meeting of the South-South states that had just gained independence, 
with a view to speeding up the process of decolonisation and to protect their 
newly acquired independence. Although no formal organisation was created 
until the creation of SEATO, such conferences were able to generate 
feelings of solidarity and common identity among South-South countries. 
Through the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), 
SEATO was established on 8th September, 1954. The influence of the U.S. 
in creating this defence organisation was very pronounced since its creation 
was part of the U.S. strategy at the time to contain presumed communist 
expansion around the globe and to provide a collective security 
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arrangement in the region.21 The design of SEATO was similar to that of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As suggested by Halle, NATO 
had been organised to contain the Communist empire in the Baltic, while 
SEATO had been created to block further communist expansion in Asia.22 
The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty clearly indicated the 
three operating principles of SEATO: 1) to provide a military or defence 
shield for the area; 2) to prevent and counter subversive activities; and 3) to 
assist the Asian partners in their social, economic and cultural development. 
To advance in these areas, three bodies were devised: a diplomatic 
apparatus, a military apparatus and the Secretariat General. The governing 
body of SEATO was the Council of Ministers, composed of the foreign 
ministers of the member countries. They were to determine policies and 
review the progress of its activities at its annual meetings.23 
The member countries of SEATO were defined in Article VIII; “the 
general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the 
Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including 
the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes’ north latitude”.24 Referring 
to this geographical area, the countries covered include all Southeast Asian 
states. However, only two Southeast Asia countries joined the organisation: 
the Philippines and Thailand, whereas other countries were reluctant to join 
in an organisation known as an alliance. The reason they refused to join a 
defence alliance such SEATO was due to its initiative coming from a 
                                            
21 See Jason D. Lewis, The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of 
a Security Community (PhD Dissertation, December 1999), pp. 48-49; See also Louis J, 
Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 338 
22 Louis J, Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 338 
23  Further see Text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (International 
Organization, vol. 8, no. 4, Nov 1964), pp.617-621; see also Jason D. Lewis, The 
Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a Security Community (PhD 
Dissertation, December 1999), p. 55 
24 The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, p. 619 
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Western country, an initiative seen as contrary to the spirit of the 1949 Asian 
conference to accelerate the process of decolonisation. 
The existence of two Southeast Asian states in SEATO certainly 
could not be representative of the political orientation of Southeast Asian 
countries. As a consequence, however, it led to the birth of new ideas and 
new proposals from leaders of other Southeast Asian countries. 
3.2. The Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA) 
The foundation of ASA in 1961 presented examples of how the policy 
makers in Southeast Asia related to the American foreign policy objective of 
containing China. Although the existence of ASA was comparatively short, 
from July 1961 through August 1967, it provides an excellent opportunity to 
understand how a defence community pattern existed in Southeast Asia.25 
The formation of ASA originated from a proposal presented by the 
Philippines President, Carlos Garcia, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
Tuanku Abdul Rahman, in early 1959. They drafted a proposal called the 
Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET). This made 
sense, considering the three member states of ASA, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Thailand, were the three countries with the highest economic 
growth in Southeast Asia in 1960. Together, they produced half the world’s 
tin, rubber and coconut oil.26 
Although the purpose of the establishment of the ASA was for 
economic cooperation, the leaders of Malaysia and the Philippines failed to 
persuade other Southeast Asian countries to join. However, the main 
                                            
25  Furthermore Vincent K. Pollard, ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian 
Regionalism (University of California Press; Asian Survey, vol. 10, no. 3, March 1970), pp. 
244-255 
26 Ibid, p. 245 
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purpose of the establishment of the ASA can be inferred from the remark of 
Thailand’s Defence Minister on the eve of the signing of the ASA 
declaration: “while the ASA states of the organization, this stage or level of 
cooperation should quickly be replaced by or subordinated to a coordination 
of military policies”.27  
Nevertheless, the dysfunction of ASA was not merely caused by the 
sceptical view of Southeast Asian countries to join the organisation, 
because they considered ASA to be a form of Western bloc, as its 
members–Malaysia, The Philippine and Thailand–belonged to a Western 
Alliance. In fact, the ASA foreign ministers were aware that their pro-
Western alignment would lessen the chance of the organisation’s expansion. 
This view was strengthened by an American political observer, Judd, who 
saw ASA as politically subordinate to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.28 
Moreover, a conflict of interest between the Philippines and Malaysia also 
contributed significantly to the end of ASA. The Philippines government 
assumed that the case of Sabah ownership was still unresolved and, on 22 
June, 1962, the Government of the Philippines officially submitted to the 
British government a formal claim to Sabah.29 As a result, the denial of 
Malaysia rights over Sabah by the Philippine caused ASA’s totally paralysis 
in 1963 and opened an opportunity for the establishment of a new regional 
organisation. 
 
                                            
27 Ibid; see also Hugo Durant, ASA: Prospects and Results (Eastern World, vol. XVII, 
August 1963), p. 12 
28 Pollard (1970), Ibid, p. 246; see also Edgar Ansel Mowrer, New Asian Agreement Will 
Help Stop Reds in Extension of Remarks of Walter H. Judd (Congressional Record, 87th 
Congressional 1st Session), p. A6518, was retrieved from American Library on 9 September 
2014, available at www.archive.org 
29 Lewis (1999), Op.cit, p. 59  
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3.3. The Formation of Malaysia, the Phil ippines and Indonesia 
(MAPHILINDO) 
After the failure of ASA, another regional organisation was 
established, called MAPHILINDO, comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. While ASA’s primary aim was to form an economic framework for 
cooperation, the objective of MAPHILINDO was to create cooperation in the 
fields of economy, culture and social science. 30  Discussion on 
MAPHILINDO appeared at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three 
member countries in June, 1963. The establishment of MAPHILINDO by 
these countries can be described as defining Southeast Asian regionalism 
on the basis of ethnic identity.31  The name MAPHILINDO is derived from 
the first letters of each member. For the first time, Indonesia under the 
Sukarno administration was willing to join a regional organisation. 
Previously, Indonesia declined the invitation to the proposed regional group 
and was of the opinion that it would be best to strengthen ties with countries 
of the Southeast Asian region only through bilateral cooperation. Moreover, 
“without Indonesian participation, any effort at regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia would at best be a limited achievement”.32  
However, unifying regional politics through economic, cultural and 
social science rarely runs smoothly. Once again, conflict within the 
organisation, which prioritised national rather than regional interests, caused 
the failure of MAPHILINDO as a means of unifying the region. The first 
conflict was Indonesian opposition to the creation of a New Federation of 
                                            
30 See further Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia 
(New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1982) 
31 Lewis (1999), Op.cit, p. 62 
32 Bernard K. Gordon, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: ASA’s Political History in Robert O. 
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Malaysia.33 In this case, the United States favoured the creation of a new 
federation by President Sukarno of Indonesia as a form of neo-colonialism 
interest in the region.34 Opposition not only came from Indonesia, but from the 
Philippines. Both Indonesia and the Philippines were trying to work in tandem 
to prevent the formation of a new Federation of Malaysia. Moreover, 
Indonesia took a step further by declaring a policy of confrontation against 
Malaysia. According to Armstrong, the strongest argument against the 
Federation of Malaysia was based on the need of the two countries to protect 
themselves against an impending Chinese Communist surge into Southeast 
Asia and wanting to control a disputed area (North Borneo) for its natural 
resources, as well as territorial aggrandisement.35 
The second argument against the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia was related to the Philippines’ claim to part of Sabah. Settlement of 
this claim involved British intervention on the side of Malaysia and the United 
States on the side of the Philippines. Although the dialogue between 
representatives of the British and the United States was already underway on 
the claim, and the UN study team had not completed their research reports 
on self-determination of the population of Sabah, the government of the 
Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated on 16th September 1963. Of course, 
this action provoked reactions from Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia 
                                            
33 Lewis (1999), Op.cit, p. 63 
34 Ferdinand Littua, The Philippines and Southeast Asia 1954-1972 (Geneva: Imprimerie 
Pfirter Freres, 1977), p. 51 
35  Peter M. Lodge, The United States Role in the Creation and Development of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nation (PhD Dissertation, December 2008), p. 109; see 
also John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia (Athens,OH; Ohio University 
Press, 1974), pp. 122, 166;  Hamilton Fish Armstrong, The Trouble Birth of Malaysia 
(Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, no. 4, July 1963), pp. 676-677 
 90 
refused to recognise the new Federation and declared a confrontation, while 
the Philippines recalled its ambassador from Kuala Lumpur.36 
Once again, a newly formed regional organisation of Southeast Asia 
failed to perform their function because of a rupture in diplomatic relations 
between its members. However,  MAPHILINDO’s failure to function as a means 
of unifying the countries in Southeast Asia was, in fact, also due to the issue of 
racial profiling. The emphasis on racial profiling in the formation of 
MAPHILINDO can be inferred from the Philippines’ President Macapagal’s 
statement, “the first step toward the realization of his lifelong dream of reuniting 
the Malay nation… triplets long separated by colonial foster parents, now at 
least about to rediscover their common origin and shape their common 
destiny”.37 As a region that is highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnic, cultural 
and natural resources, the concept espousing a racial group became ineffective, 
because the countries that were not racially Malaysia refused to join. According 
to the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, the existence of 
MAPHILINDO was jeopardising the political stability in the region by being 
based on racial unity.38  
As with its predecessor organisations, one of the factors of 
MAPHILINDO’s failure was due to conflicts of interest between members. 
However, there were interesting aspects that were successfully triggered by the 
presence of MAPHILINDO, namely, the emergence of consciousness in 
Southeast Asian leaders on the need for equality in relations between states. 
The integrity of an organisation would only be realised if differences, as well as 
diverse interests, can be placed after common interests through mutual trust 
and mutual understanding. MAPHILINDO was never actually disbanded, and by 
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realising the concept of togetherness, as well as prioritising regional rather than 
national interests, became the spirit of the formation of ASEAN in August 1967. 
3.4. The Formation of ASEAN 
The US involvement in the establishment of the ASEAN was 
pronounced along with the worsening security situation in South Vietnam in 
1960. The weakening of the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, who 
was little more than a puppet of U.S. imperialism, caused great concern in 
the American government that if Diem’s regime fell into Communist hands, 
then all of Southeast Asia would be lost to the free world system.39 Diem’s 
oppressive strategies, including attacks on students and Buddhist monks, 
created a worse situation in South Vietnam. The U.S. representative urged 
Diem to ease his repressive tactics; however, he ignored this advice and the 
worsening situation in South Vietnam lead to a coup against him on 2 
November, 1963.40 The instability in Saigon drove the U.S. Government to 
take further steps to avoid South Vietnam becoming a Communist state.41 
During this time, the U.S. again began to push the concept of regional 
organisations in Southeast Asia to protect their interests in the region, by 
encouraging the leaders of Southeast Asian countries to form a new 
organisation to replace the paralysed ASA and MAPHILINDO. 
The failures of SEATO, ASA and MAPHILINDO and, after the end of 
the confrontation, the ensuing tension between the countries, encouraged the 
leaders of the countries in Southeast Asia to form a new association. The 
Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand signed a document for the formation of the Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bangkok, Thailand.42 On 8th August, 1967, the 
Association was established with the aim to promote economic, cultural, 
technical and political cooperation and advancement of Southeast Asian 
nations. Reconciliation brokered by Thailand between the three member 
countries of MAPHILINDO had raised awareness among the founding 
fathers of ASEAN that regional cooperation was essential or the region’s 
future would remain uncertain.43 A key factor behind the creation of ASEAN 
was the willingness of member states to act collectively to be independent 
from former colonial powers. 
The rise of China and efforts to avoid the dependence of security on 
the U.S. and Japan, led to renewed interest in Southeast Asian 
regionalism,44 and the desire for regional neutrality to remove Southeast 
Asia from Cold War military action.45 If a new regional organisation could 
alleviate political tensions between member states, each could concentrate 
their energies on economic development, which in turn would reduce the 
attractiveness of Communism to the local populations.46 The foundation 
already established by ASA, combined with new political and security 
relations, soon helped lead to the creation of the ASEAN. 47 
Despite ASEAN’s establishment to prioritise economic growth, socio-
cultural and development in the region of Southeast Asia, ASEAN member 
states should try to protect mutual interests and create regional solidarity, as 
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well as promote regional peace and stability.48 As contained in the text of 
the Declaration of ASEAN, the member states understand that the problem 
of insecurity in the region is political instability and underdeveloped 
economies, as well as security concerns of external intervention.49 Only with 
the success of overcoming these problems can lasting security be realised 
in the region. 
Addressing these issues, there needs to be an acceleration of 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
through joint endeavour and the promotion of regional peace and stability 
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationships 
between the countries of the region.50 Accordingly, the basic principle of 
political stability, which can ensure the regional security of ASEAN, is the 
existence of stable and significant economic development. However, 
ASEAN almost suffered the same fate as other regional organisations 
previously created. The Philippines’ effort to reassert its intention to pursue 
its claim on Sabah in 1968 threatened the existence of ASEAN. Only with 
the intention to preserve the integrity of the organisation in order to create 
lasting security in the region, by subordinating their national interests to 
cooperation, can ASEAN survive. 
Nevertheless, the United States policy through the Nixon Doctrine in 
1969, which intended to limit its commitment in the region, provided insight 
to the leaders of Southeast Asian countries that the stability of the region 
depended entirely on their own efforts. Since the announcement of the 
Nixon doctrine, ASEAN changed their orientation; from prioritising its 
economic growth to more concern about security. At the 1971 Ministerial 
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Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN member states declared the 
principles of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for the 
region. The declaration of ZOPFAN, followed by the signing of the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976 and the Treaty of Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995 provided ASEAN with 
mechanisms to help manage regional security.51 These mechanisms are 
desirable objectives for ASEAN’s role as a forum for inter-member conflict-
prevention and resolution.52 In essence, despite ASEAN member states 
placing economic progress as their main priority, ASEAN member states 
could not isolate their economic drive from the political issues of war and 
peace that major power politics introduced in the region at the time.53 
Furthermore, the declaration of ZOPFAN showed that the Southeast 
Asian region was no longer considered a contested area for the influence of 
a major power, and in this way this neutralisation represented a programme 
to ensure stability and maintain peace in the region to ASEAN member 
states. by improving the welfare of their people.54 Therefore, ZOPFAN, TAC 
and SEANWFZ was opened up to be accessed by certain states. However, 
without endorsement from the three major powers at the time – the U.S., 
China and the Soviet Union - the concept of ZOPFAN lay idle for many 
years.  
ASEAN expansion began when Brunei joined as a sixth member on 
8th January, 1984, not long after Brunei gained independence. ASEAN 
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member states amounted to a total of ten consecutive states after the 
integration of Vietnam on 28th July, 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23rd July, 
1997 and Cambodia on 30th April, 1999. During the enlargement of ASEAN, 
many regional cooperatives within the framework of ASEAN were formed, 
especially with regard to economic development, such as the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. 
However, no single organisation was built for the specific purpose of 
addressing security issues, in terms of the leading sector of these regional 
organisations not being the Ministry of Defence, until the formation of 
ADMM in 2006. 
3.5. The Emergence of ADMM 
One of the significant developments of regional organisations to be 
studied was the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
(ADMM). The proposal for the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in the 
2003 Bali Concord II declaration was initially the origin of ADMM’s creation. 
Shortly after this, the proposal changed into a Plan of Action which was 
adopted at the 10th ASEAN Summit, held in Vientiane on 29 November, 
2004, which stipulates that ASEAN shall work towards the convening of an 
annual ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting. The inaugural meeting of the 
ADMM was held in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May, 2006.55 The formation of the 
ADMM was based on the initiative of ASEAN member states with the aim of 
gaining ‘strategic space’ and to reduce ‘technology disparity’ for ASEAN 
member states. 56 In this context, all ASEAN member states have a forum or 
means for dialogue to convey their political interest, defence and economy 
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issues, as well as a forum for dialogue to create a sense of understanding 
and transparency in relation to military cooperation. 
The ADMM should not be seen in isolation from the way ASEAN, as 
a regional entity, perceives developments in its immediate strategic 
environment.57 It is suggested that ADMM should be an integral part of the 
regional organisation of ASEAN, specifically tackling the issue of security. 
As Bandoro said, “Because ADMM is established to reflect the need for 
ASEAN Defence Ministers to address comprehensively regional security 
problems, the ministers agreed that the specific objectives of the ADMM 
would be (a) to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and 
cooperation in defence and security; (b) to give guidance to existing senior 
defence and military officials through dialogue and cooperation in the field of 
defence and security within ASEAN, and between ASEAN dialogue 
partners; (c) to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater 
understanding of defence and security challenges, as well as the 
enhancement of transparency and openness; and (d) to contribute to the 
establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as stipulated in the 
Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the Vientiane Action 
Programme on the ASC”.58 
After its inauguration, the ADMM began to consider broadening its 
dialogue partnership with other regional states. An outward-looking 
orientation is shown in 2007 in ADMM concepts that set a wider meeting with 
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outside regional dialogue partners.59 In October 2010, the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) was inaugurated at a meeting in 
Hanoi. This ADMM-Plus consisted of ASEAN Defence Ministers joining their 
eight external power counterparts from Australia, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States. 
Observing the development of the ADMM, there are fundamental 
differences in the process of its formation compared to previous regional 
organisations. The establishment of previous regional organisations was based 
on initiatives and encouragement from countries outside the region who had 
vested interests, whereas the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus was 
purely on the initiatives of ASEAN. The concept paper adopted at the inaugural 
ADMM “views the establishment of the ADMM as complementing other regional 
efforts to facilitate the interactions between the region’s defence and military 
officials in promoting security dialogue and cooperation”. 60 It also served as the 
main driving force for defence dialogue and cooperation within the ASEAN 
member states through consultation, coordination and report. 
There are three important factors in the second meeting of Defence 
Ministers of Southeast Asian countries that produced documents called the 
ADMM Joint Declaration. “First, a framework for institutionalization the form 
for dialogue and consultation to enhance mutual understanding and 
dialogue, either within the member states of ASEAN or extra-regional 
powers. The second framework, as stated in the ADMM Three-Year Work 
Programme, deals with practical defence cooperation between ASEAN 
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militaries. The third framework focuses on ASEAN’s Defence Ministers to 
engage countries outside ASEAN in a dialogue process, but at a pace 
comfortable with ASEAN countries”. 61  However, “it would have invited 
comparisons with the discredited great power security guarantees of the 
Cold War era, represented by the increasingly defunct SEATO”.62  
Like ASEAN as a whole, the ADMM has acknowledged the external 
environment and has actively engaged friends and dialogue partners from 
outside the region. By connecting with the external environment, the ADMM  
allows ASEAN “to draw on the varied perspectives and resources of a wide 
range of non-ASEAN countries in addressing the security challenges of the 
region”. 63  Such steps had an added-value in the process of ASEAN 
regionalism with the outward-looking mechanism to engage actively with 
external partners. “A combination of cohesiveness amongst ASEAN 
countries and active external engagement will enhance ASEAN’s resilience 
and enable ASEAN to position itself to influence the development of 
constructive relationships between the major powers”.64  This is a necessary 
step if ASEAN is to have a sustained regional peace, stability and security.  
In building peace in the region, especially in the face of non-
traditional threats, the legality of the ADMM as the ASEAN Defence 
Community is a program under the framework of regional defence 
community. The legality of the programme of security activities that are in 
the initiatives on establishing the ASEAN Defence Interaction Programme 
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and the ADMM Logistics Support Framework were also adopted by the 7th 
ADMM in 2013. Implementation of these initiatives is currently underway. 
Another important new ADMM initiative is the establishment of a Direct 
Communications Link, which was adopted by the 8th ADMM in 2014. 
Departing from legality, the ADMM at a regional level,  can be understood 
by simply analyzing the four countries of the six founding countries and 10 
ASEAN member states. This study did not look at each state as an player 
that stands alone, but the selection of four countries as representatives of 
ADMM as a skeleton defense ASEAN community. These four countries 
have the capacity of the countries that have contributed and policies that 
also affect the passage of the ADMM. In other words, the data obtained 
through these four countries has already been proven sufficient and does 
not reduce the substance of the study. 
In its implementation, the ADMM is running on the policy that every 
country is devoted to regional interests within the framework of the ADMM. 
Although the analysis of four countries in the ADMM,  the focus of this 
research looks at the ADMM as the contribution of ASEAN member 
countries that do not stand in isolation but collectively in regard to  regional 
peace. This discussion is found in Chapter 1. 
4. The Characteristics of a Defence Community in a 
Southeast Asian Defence Cooperation 
As noted in the new regionalism approach, a community is not only 
dependent on geographic proximity, but the level of interaction between 
countries is also crucial.65 In a defence community, cooperation in arms 
manufacturing to obtain a standardisation of armament is the best way to 
achieve the requisite characteristic of a defence community. Although there 
is no single accepted definition of a defence community, it is at least 
commonly regarded as a form of international cooperation, which by its very 
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nature incorporates a military aspect.66 The characteristics of a defence 
community are established by agreement by its members that the 
community will build an organisation with activities directed to dealing with 
defence issues which cannot be addressed by a single country alone, even 
though the formation of a defence community does not have to be under an 
agreement that is legally binding.67 In principle, the main instrument of a 
defence community is one in which countries seek cooperation from others 
in order to preserve, enlarge or create a position of strength, either for 
diplomacy or war. Thus, the state enters into a defence community to 
pursue goals which they cannot achieve in the absence of a cooperative 
effort with other countries.68 Moreover, as Osgood observes, “every state 
must have an alliance policy even if its purpose is only to avoid alliance”.69 
In fact, bilateral military arrangements among the ASEAN member states 
have reached a stage which can no longer be ignored when evaluating the 
purpose and role of ASEAN as a regional group.70  
 In the context of Southeast Asia, political and security relations 
between the member states of ASEAN in recent years have seen a rapid 
expansion of bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation between and 
among ASEAN member states evolving from intelligence exchanges to joint 
operations against insurgents on common borders and regular intelligence 
exchanges between high-level military and security officials. 71 In the field of 
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operations, ASEAN member states have conducted exchanges of senior 
level officers for education, training, joint contingency planning for mutual 
assistance against external threats, provision of field training facilities, joint 
maritime surveillance and patrols, cooperative arms transfers and, most 
importantly a range of military exercises to develop common operating 
procedures and simulate joint action against common threats. 72 
Indeed, such ASEAN defence cooperation is particularly aimed not 
only at managing commonly perceived regional threats and challenges, but 
also as an instrument to build cooperation beyond confidence building 
measures. Moreover, as clearly stated by the Chief of Malaysia’s Defence 
Force, General Hashim Mohammed Ali, “the main aims of ASEAN defence 
and security cooperation is to reduce conflict and to facilitate confidence 
building measures”.73 However, examining the existence of elements of a 
defence community or a collective defence organisation in Southeast Asia 
needs close scrutiny. Existing defence cooperation must meet the 
incorporation of military force and the elements of inter-operability which is a 
prerequisite for any elements or prospect of a defence community in the 
defence cooperation among ASEAN member states. Repetition of military 
exercises has also opened an opportunity for all personnel to gain skills and 
understanding in performing inter-operability and integration between armed 
forces, and this in turn will develop defence links within ASEAN naturally. 
The above activities serve as a defence diplomacy effort within ASEAN and 
the development of intra-ASEAN defence ties will increase familiarity and 
understanding among the ASEAN member states. Such conditions can 
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generate ASEAN credibility and increase its capability to guarantee its own 
security.  
There are several requirements of inter-operability to identify the 
existence of defence community elements in the ASEAN member states’ 
defence cooperation, namely through its technical (standardisation of 
equipment, armaments and system), procedural (including doctrines and 
procedures) and human (including terminology and training) dimensions.74 
Furthermore, the standardisation of military equipment, through 
modernisation of military equipment and local defence industry products, will 
increase the capability of personnel and meet the same standards of skill. 
Although “there was agreement among the member states in the formative 
years of ASEAN on the undesirability of a military pact, military cooperation 
was not completely ruled out as a future option”.75  
The following section briefly discusses defence procurement for the 
modernisation of military equipment in ASEAN member states. Both issues, 
modernisation of military equipment and inter-operability, are discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
5. The Reasons for Defence Procurement  
The increase of Southeast Asia’s real defence spending is in line with 
the region’s robust economic growth. A certain amount of budget was used 
for the modernisation of military equipment with sophisticated technology. 
As Chang states, “the reasons behind Asia’s military build-up are varied and 
often intertwined with strategic considerations and domestic ones. The first 
reason is concerns in countries where militaries have intervened in politics, 
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domestic political calculations for civilian politicians use larger defence 
budgets to buy military quiescence. The second reason deals with military 
expenditures that are directed to support and favour domestic companies or 
industries or to provide local employment. The third reason is a growing 
appreciation among national leaders of how military power can contribute to 
humanitarian relief efforts”. 76  These reasons are in line with the 
developments of ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, with the purpose of 
overcoming various kinds of threats, through military exercises, sharing 
experiences and knowledge between armed forces personnel, where having 
sophisticated weapon technology is necessary. 
 Furthermore, a limited meeting of defence officials in Southeast Asia 
agreed that the consideration to change its current weaponry system or to 
modernise it should fulfil three conditions: 1) if obliged by constitution; 2) in 
accordance with international standards, in terms of its operational systems; 
and 3) to meet a clausal transfer of technology in a procurement 
Memorandum of Understanding,77 as has been mentioned by Mahadzir, a 
defence expert, “the development of the local industry and transfer of 
technology as part of the purchase of military equipment, with ASEAN 
countries looking to develop their manufacturing capability and their skilled 
workforce capability”.78 
Within the framework of ADMM, industrial efforts for defence industry 
cooperation between ASEAN countries, which is called the ASEAN Defence 
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Industry Collaboration (ADIC), led to an initiative which was signed in May 
2011 at the Fifth ADMM in Jakarta. “Military cooperation in the region has 
been on the rise”, not only between nations in Southeast Asia but also 
between Southeast Asian nations and extra-regional countries, particularly 
the United States and Australia. 79  Defence cooperation with industrial 
partners outside the region is increasing. Such efforts centre upon, as a 
whole, future military sales to such countries which “will involve industrial 
cooperation requirements rather than just being performed as a pure 
sale”.80  
Indonesia and Vietnam, for instance, are working on joint shipbuilding 
with Damen Schelde -a Dutch naval shipbuilding company- “for their 
respective warship procurements; similarly, Indonesia is pursuing the same 
course of shipbuilding by its purchase of submarines from South Korea and 
on the aviation side, its purchase of C-295 turboprop freighters from Airbus 
Military which includes final assembly in Indonesia”. 81 At the same time, the 
Malaysian Army, “Malaysia’s Defence Technology and Turkey’s FNSS 
Defence Systems are currently working together on the eight-wheel drive 
AV-8 Armoured Fighting Vehicle, the prototype being currently on trial in 
Malaysia with local production of 257 wheeled armoured vehicles under the 
agreement which were signed in 2011”.82 
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These conditions should be met by ASEAN member states in 
modernising its main weaponry systems to reach their goal in covering 
crucial issues such as lack of a common doctrine and language, 
standardisation of equipment and common logistical support 
infrastructure.83 The issue of democratisation has become very salient in 
Southeast Asia, at least after the 1997 crisis. Each level of society in 
ASEAN member states demands an openness and transparency in defence 
budgeting. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the military was a dominant 
party in certain Southeast Asia countries, and procurement systems were 
mostly a neglected public concern of weaponry utility. Times have changed 
for the military and a strong demand for controlling military procurement by 
society through parliament has become a necessity. 
On one hand, the military is a tangible domain, which needs new and 
sophisticated weaponry systems.84 Required weaponry can only be bought 
if it had been approved by the parliament. The military needs to bridge this 
gap (of required approval), as it cannot buy any weapon without approval 
from society. Terms of standardisation of weaponry operational systems are 
needed in every defence cooperation or exercise. Each ASEAN country has 
different sources of weapon suppliers, making inter-operability problematic. 
In doing so, standardisation has become a crucial condition with the aim 
that every soldier can work well with soldiers of neighbouring countries, with 
equal arms and the same advanced technologies. On the other hand, as 
has been argued by many scholars that inter-operability of military capability, 
in times of crisis, is one of ASEAN’s military problems. Such problems 
                                            
83 Amitav Acharya, Regional Military Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 
Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (SAGE Publication, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 29, no. 1), p. 15 
84 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relations, Indonesia Ministry of 
Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
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would be eliminated if every ASEAN member state had the same standard 
weaponry system, even if the weapons were purchased from different 
countries with different technologies. 
6. Summary  
From the description above, we can see that bilateral relations 
between ASEAN member states have developed into multilateral relations 
and the common understanding of the need for a secure and stable region. 
At the beginning of the establishment of ASEAN, many experts held the 
sceptical view that it  would suffer the same fate as other regional 
organisations and would not function as expected. This scepticism was also 
based on the fact that a collective defence organisation had been previously 
formed, even though not all Southeast Asian countries were willing to 
become members of such an organisation. In addition, the unresolved 
territorial disputes between the members of that collective defence 
organisation became a contributing factor to the failure of the organisation to 
be able to function optimally.  
History has proven that, with the current developments, ASEAN is 
able to stand strong as a means to unite the nations of Southeast Asia in 
the political field. In line with the development of a strategic security 
environment, the demands of creativity in addressing the strategic 
challenges has encouraged the leaders of ASEAN member states to 
establish new mechanisms, especially in the field of defence, so that they 
have more specific means to address the changing form of security 
challenges. ASEAN member states developed their defence cooperation 
under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, and showed their 
coordination and cooperation in addressing the security issues.  
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In assessing the existence of ASEAN defence community elements 
in Southeast Asia’s defence diplomacy, these can only be examined 
through the effective employment of inter-operability components such as 
standardisation, training and direct interaction between players in practical 
defence cooperation. ASEAN member states, in this case, developed their 
own concept of intra-ASEAN regional cooperation to achieve the same 
standard of armaments in terms of quality and technology, and from their 
own production which is a credit to smooth inter-operability. Nevertheless, 
the defence community characteristics that are allegedly contained in the 
defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia will only be identified if the 
inter-operability requirements are met.  
Moreover, ASEAN member states have developed forms of 
cooperation with the establishment of certain agencies such as the ADIC 
that deal directly with military industrial enterprises, as well as at the 
operational level through the provision of training facilities. In cooperation 
with the ASEAN defence industry, the military plays a central role through 
direct cooperation in building a major military weaponry system that fosters 
mutual trust. Such cooperation and mechanisms are exactly the goal of this 
research, to assess how the defence cooperation has operated between 
ASEAN member states to address security issues contained in the elements 
of defence community. 
 
Chapter Five 
REGIONAL MECHANISMS IN HANDLING SECURITY ISSUES 
 
1. Introduction 
After discussing the ever-present collective defence organisation in 
Southeast Asia, Chapter 5 thoroughly investigates the regional mechanisms 
in terms of the regional infrastructure in addressing security issues in 
Southeast Asia. This chapter relies on primary and secondary data that was 
gathered during the field study. Empirical and descriptive analysis supported 
by empirical evidence is used to strengthen certain facts that were found, to 
give a clearer explanation of how states address security issues in the 
region. In studying defence diplomacy practice in the region, the 
requirements of inter-operability will be assessed through various forms of 
defence cooperation to search for the elements or characteristics of a 
defence community. Various defence cooperatives within the auspices of 
ADMM as a regional mechanism in addressing evolving threats in the region 
will be discussed individually. 
This chapter begins by discussing the existence of common 
perceptions of threat in Southeast Asia amongst ASEAN leaders. A 
common understanding of threats in the region encourages ASEAN leaders 
to have the same perspective in addressing common threats and the 
commitment to act, ensuring the sustainability of the region.1 Subsequently, 
this chapter discusses the working mechanism of the ADMM and the units 
or entities, as well as military procurement trends over the last decade 
within the framework of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus. 
                                            
1 Björn Hettne, Development, Security and World Order: A Regionalist Approach (European 
Journal of Development Research, vol. 9), pp. 83-106; see also Craig A. Snyder, Regional 
Security and Regional Conflict paper presented to 48th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association (Chicago, IL: March 2007), pp. 6-8 
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2. Common Perceptions of Threat in ASEAN  
The security challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today 
are being shaped by global, regional (Asia-Pacific) and domestic trends. 
The Defence Ministers of ASEAN member states have the same view of the 
development of global and regional problems at this time, i.e. security 
issues in the South China and East China Seas, maritime security, natural 
disasters, terrorism and epidemic disease which have impacted security in 
many regions, including Southeast Asia. 2  Cooperation in the areas of 
security and the military is indispensable when threats come  from both 
within and outside the region. The evolution of threats has forced the 
governments of ASEAN member states to adjust their policy in conducting 
defence cooperation to what is now called defence diplomacy. The 
mechanism of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is a mixture of 
multilateral and bilateral. Both forms of diplomacy are conducted at the 
same time. 3   
Since its first summit in 1967, ASEAN’s member states have 
conducted a series of bilateral security cooperation,4 as well as with certain 
external powers, such as naval patrols along the borders, joint naval 
exercises and the exchange of intelligence data. These measures are 
intended for ASEAN to develop not only trust, but also a common 
mechanism to address common security problems and regional security. It 
is through this pattern of security cooperation that ASEAN attempts to build 
its strength in facing regional problems and maintaining regional stability.   
                                            
2 Report of Indonesia Defence Ministry to the President of Indonesia, regarding ADMM 
Retreat, in Myanmar, November 2014 
3 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence, Jakarta ,16 September 2013 
4 Bantarto Bandoro, The Prospect of ASEAN Military Cooperation: Implication for Regional 
Security in Hung Mao Tien and Tun Jen Cheng, The Security Environment in The Asia-
Pacific (New York; Institute for National Policy Research, 2000), pp. 192 
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At this point, regional stability means that ASEAN has the independence to 
conduct security cooperation at all levels by mobilising its own mechanisms 
in facing security challenges. The government of ASEAN member states, 
through ASEAN Defence Ministers, have reached an agreement to increase 
cooperation in the field of defence both within ASEAN and others, including 
external dialogue partners, to further effective means of ASEAN defence 
cooperation such as ADMM and ADMM-Plus.5 The increased cooperation is 
directed towards practical cooperation as a concrete contribution to the 
pillars for the creation of the ASEAN Community. 
Due to economic growth after the monetary crises of 1997-1998, the 
militaries of ASEAN member states in the region have become self-sufficient. 
Diversity of training, staff exchanges and joint exercises have also enhanced 
mutual understanding. On one hand, it means the prospect of using force within 
ASEAN is greatly diminished. 6  On the other hand, the degree of military 
cooperation for the effectiveness of operational theatre in terms of inter-
operability has also increased.  Arms procurement followed by military 
cooperation in the form of bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, shape regional 
stability. In fact, ASEAN military cooperation has been in existence since the 
beginning of the seventies and it reflects the elements of the defence 
community currently displayed by ASEAN, although some of the military officials 
of ASEAN member states declined to say that it existed as a defence 
community.7 They have gone as far as to suggest that such security cooperation 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, Philippines and 
Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore, Singapore and Thailand, and Thailand and 
                                            
5 Report of Indonesia Defence Ministry to the President of Indonesia, regarding ADMM 
Retreat, in Myanmar, November 2014 
6 Lewis (1999), Op.cit. pp. 136-139 
7 This is a view from some interviewees such as Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral 
Marsetio, also the expression of Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Dato’ Paduka 
Mustappa, and Director of Policy Office, Singapore BG. Cheng  
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Indonesia is what Indonesia's armed forces commander, General Try Sutrisno, 
has aptly referred to as a ‘defence spider web' in ASEAN.8 Defence cooperation, 
as an implementation of defence diplomacy between ASEAN member states is 
present and manifests itself in the form of dialogue and military exercises.  
Ever since its inception in 1967, ASEAN cooperation and collective 
actions have intended to achieve what many called the ‘regional mission’ of 
ASEAN.9 The dramatic changes to the challenge in its strategic environment 
motivated ASEAN to develop more systematic cooperation in the military field. 
It is through the military field that ASEAN promotes its cohesiveness and 
increases its credibility. The primary objective of the ASEAN defence 
cooperation is to develop a common understanding and position on how to 
contain internal and external security challenges in a way which reflects the 
awareness of ASEAN that regional security problems need to be addressed 
through collective efforts.10  
ASEAN has continued to assess the fundamental changes to its 
strategic environment in its political, security and economic fields. Moreover, it 
continues to develop common perceptions of new threats and challenges, both 
globally and regionally, and to determine their impact on the region. Whether 
internally or with others, ASEAN military cooperation does not conflict with the 
stated objectives of ASEAN as a collective entity. ASEAN has its own 
mechanism to facilitate such cooperation,11 which forms the basis for, and 
                                            
8 Cited in Amitav Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation Amongst The ASEAN States: 
Bilateral or Alliance? (CISS, Occasion Paper, no. 14 May 1990), p. 1 
9 Bantarto Bandoro (2000), Op.cit, pp.189-190 
10 Rizal Sukma, The ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC): Opportunities for 
the R2P in Southeast Asia (The Pacific Review, vol. 25, no. 1, March 2012), pp. 136-139 
11 Bandoro (2000), Ibid, p. 192; see also the mechanisms and guidance of the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM); the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN PMC); and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
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supports the role of, ASEAN military cooperation in enhancing regional security 
and stability.  
3. Polit ical Efforts and Defence Cooperation Mechanisms in 
Tackling Challenges 
In discussing the ASEAN defence community, one first needs an 
assessment of the plan and the process of establishing the ASEAN 
community which was geared towards the establishment of the ADMM and 
the ADMM-Plus. In mid-June 2003, at the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Indonesia submitted a proposal on the 
establishment of the ASEAN Community, with the motivation that the 
ASEAN Community is a community that specifically relies on the peace 
process in resolving disputes that may occur between members of ASEAN, 
and with the bottom-line that security in the community cannot be separated, 
as was envisioned at the Bali Summit I, into national and regional 
resilience.12 
Starting from the declarations of the Bali Agreement II (Bali Concord 
II), which was signed by the heads of government of the ten ASEAN 
member states at the ASEAN Summit in Bali on 7 October 2003, this 
marked the process of the establishment of an ASEAN community 
comprising of the ASEAN Security Community (which is refined into the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community), the ASEAN Economic Community 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. At the same place, 27 years 
previously, the Bali Agreement I (Bali Concord I) had been declared and 
signed by the founders of ASEAN.13 Both the Bali Summits I and II had the 
                                            
12 C.P.F. Luhulima, Dinamika Asia Tenggara menuju 2015/The Dynamics of Southeast 
Asia Towards 2015 (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2011), p. 69 
13 Ibid, pp. 67-68 
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same goals of fostering peace, creating prosperity and building a regional 
identity.  
Since ASEAN’s inception, the concept of unified resilience between 
economic development and security has been a major consideration in the 
interaction between Southeast Asian nations.14 This concept or doctrine of 
national and regional resilience underlines that each member state's 
economic development is the basic foundation for achieving stability and, in 
turn, stability is the key to the success of sustainable economic 
development. National and regional resilience covers the whole spectrum of 
life of each member country to eliminate the discomfort of threats and 
challenges from the outside or from within the country,15 such as separatist 
movements, feuds between multiple ethnic groups, inter-religious and inter-
racial conflicts, as well as security threats and conventional challenges to its 
own member states. To address the entire spectrum of new challenges that 
has been identified previously, ASEAN has decided to build the ASEAN 
community with  three pillars: ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC).  
ASEAN membership has expanded from five countries to ten. This 
strengthened ASEAN member states cooperation to face these new 
challenges. The scope of ASEAN cooperation had also been expanded by 
inviting other Asian countries and outside regional powers to respond to the 
                                            
14 It is stated implicitly in the aims and purposes of ASEAN declaration that the salient point 
of the establishment of ASEAN is to promote regional peace and stability through “joint 
endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for 
a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations”; see An overview of 
ASEAN establishment, available at. www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview 
15 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Kerjasama Politik dan Keamanan ASEAN in C.P.F. Luhulima 
(et.al), Seperempat Abad ASEAN, Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, Departemen Luar Negeri 
RI (Jakarta: 1994), pp. 26 and 46  
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pressure of deepening interdependence, and expands as a result of the 
development of information and communication technology.16 ASEAN has 
directed its political goals for the establishment of an ASEAN Community, 
and the most significant pillar to be investigated to find the elements of a 
defence community is the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). 
Thus, amongst the three pillars of the ASEAN community, the APSC will be 
explained further in the next section with the aim to finding answers to the 
research questions.  
3.1. The Roadmap for an ASEAN Community  
In the opinion of Tomotaka Shoji, the evolution of APSC discussions is 
still underway and the cooperative framework has yet to be fully formed.17 
However, intensive discussions by the leaders of Southeast Asia during the 
period 2003-2006 had at least opened up a new optimism that the plan to 
establish APSC in 2015 could be realised. Although, during the study, through 
the researcher’s various interviews, a more pessimistic tone often appeared with 
doubts as to the readiness of ASEAN member states to achieve the target of 
establishing the APSC, such as had been proclaimed by ASEAN.18 Undeniably, 
the idea of the formation of APSC in 2003 began at the time of the Bali Concord 
II, followed by the Vientiane Action Plan 2004 (VAP), the ASEAN Charter in 
2009 which put forward the policy challenges that must be overcome in order to 
establish the APSC, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, all of which 
were crucial steps in the process of the formation of the APSC. 
                                            
16 Ibid 
17  Tomotaka Shoji, ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative for Peace and Stability 
(National Institute for Defence Security Studies Reports, 2008), available at 
<http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2008/bulletin_e2008_1_.pdf> 
18 Interview with Yuri O. Thamrin, Director General of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for Asia Pacific, Jakarta, 31 March 2013; interview with Ngurah Swajaya, Indonesia 
Ambassador to ASEAN, Jakarta, 28 March 2013: interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, 
Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013 
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Although the term APSC has been used since the ZOPFAN and the 
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia was 
launched, the use of such term is not evenly distributed internationally.   As one 
of the pillars of the ASEAN Community by 2020, the establishment of the 
APSC was initially started at the Bali Concord II in 2003 through enhancing 
political and security cooperation at a higher level. It was first known as the 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and was renamed the APSC in the ASEAN 
Charter in 2007. The concept of APSC refers to the UN Charter and the 
principles of international law. Through this APSC pillar, the regional 
association of Southeast Asia at once developed political cooperation, 
strengthening security through the establishment and enforcement of norms, 
preventing the outbreak of conflict, developing methods of conflict resolution 
and post-conflict peace building. The APSC serves as the umbrella for bringing 
ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane.19 Through the 
ASEAN charter, the government of ASEAN member states agreed to 
accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 in order to 
retain its significance and have an enduring quality.20  
The APSC blueprint envisages ASEAN as a rule-based community of 
shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient group “with 
shared responsibility for comprehensive security as well as a dynamic and 
outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent 
world”.21 The APSC is a framework based on the idea of a comprehensive 
                                            
19  Rizal Sukma, The ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC): Opportunities and 
Constraints for the R2P in Southeast Asia (The Pacific Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 2012), p. 136 
20Almagul Aisarieva, ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and the ASEAN Political-Security Community  (Ristumeikan Asia Pacific University, June 2013), p. 
49; see also ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, available at www.asean.org, accessed 
in June 2013; The Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015 was 
signed in 2007, available at http://www.aseansec.org/19260.htm accessed in June 2013 
21 ASEAN Political - Security Community Blueprint, available at http://www.aseansec.org/5187-
18.pdf; see also Aisarieva (2013), Ibid, pp. 48-49 
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approach to “security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful 
conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building”. 22  A framework of this 
nature represents one of the ultimate goals of ASEAN, which has achieved a 
record of political cooperation since its inauguration.23  
As aforementioned, the establishment of APSC was proposed by 
Indonesia and was responded to by a variety of attitudes from ASEAN 
member states. Despite ASEAN members’ states being generally 
supportive of the APSC concept, much scepticism and discussion arose at 
the beginning. It was in the specific details and actual modalities of the 
APSC that objections and obstacles arose. The most highly discussed 
points in the concept were the “Peace Keeping Force, ASEAN Maritime 
Forum, ASEAN Maritime Safety and Surveillance Unit, and ASEAN Non-
Aggression Treaty”24, since Indonesia had not adequately explained the 
concept which was not clear.25  However, in the finally approved draft, 
mechanisms such as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, the 
ASEAN Extradition Treaty and the ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism were accepted from the original Indonesian draft. 26  As the 
Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar stated, “Our focus for the 
ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring society and 
human security”.27  
                                            
22 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, available at www.asean.org, accessed in June 
2013, p. 6 
23 Tomotaka Shoji, ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative for Peace and Stability (National 
Institute for Defence Studies Security Reports), available at 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2008/bulletin_e2008_1_pdf. pp. 17-18 
24 The Jakarta Post, 11 December, 2003, http://www.thejakartapost.com/; see also Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 264 
25The Jakarta Post, 11 December, 2003: http://www.thejakartapost.com/ 
26 ASEAN Security Plan of Action, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16826.htm, accessed in 
June 2013 
27 The Business Times, 6 October, 2003: http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/; see also Aisarieva 
(2013), Op.cit, p. 54  
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APSC’s mission is “to hold political and security cooperation to a 
higher level”,28 so that member states maintain peace between themselves 
and with other countries. In line with this commitment, ASEAN member 
states  maintain a common commitment to seek to resolve disputes 
between themselves peacefully, in addition to realising that there is a 
fundamental connection between their securities. This association is also 
bound together by geographic location, common vision and objectives. 
Foreign policy and the defence of each member country is formulated and 
implemented by themselves. However,  foreign and defence policies are still 
being created in the context of ASEAN. Thus, ASEAN as a whole adheres 
to the principles of national and regional resilience that has political aspects 
of economic, social and cultural harmony with the ASEAN Vision 2020. 
Meanwhile, ASEAN member states also adhere to their rights to 
defend their existence, free from external interference in each other's 
internal affairs, and a principle that this should reflect ASEAN's 
determination to move forward with a step that can be accepted by all 
member states or, "at a pace comfortable to all".29 The ASEAN community 
now had to be realised in 2015. The problem is that this statement did not 
match the target establishment of an ASEAN Community in 2020 and was 
moved forward to 2015,30 as proclaimed in Cebu, Philippines in January 
2007. Some member states obviously had difficulty in adhering to this 
milestone. The ASEAN’s security concept had been reformulated to include 
economic and financial factors into the concept of national and regional 
resilience. Security of ASEAN member states can only develop on the basis 
                                            
28 Sukma (2012), Op.cit, p. 136 
29 Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 16-17 
30 Interview with Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013; 
Interview with Yuri O. Thamrin, Directorate General for Asia Pacific, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 21 March 2013 
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of financial development and a strong economy, while economic and 
financial life can only flourish if security can be guaranteed.31 To support the 
implementation of the concept of economic power that goes along with 
stability, the ASEAN member states established new institutions adapted to 
the new goals because the ASEAN Secretariat alone is no longer sufficient 
and its function is limited to the administrative field. The Secretary cannot 
take the initiative and cannot take decisions without the approval of Foreign 
Ministers. 
As mentioned before, amongst three pillars of the ASEAN 
Community is the APSC with its objective to heighten political and security 
cooperation. The Bali Concord II is believed to be the future direction of 
ASEAN security cooperation, which is based on existing instruments such 
as the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), SEANWFZ 
(Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) and TAC (Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation).32 The contents of the Bali Concord II make it clear that the 
APSC concept is the culmination of security cooperation fostered by ASEAN 
since its inception. It lists by name the various treaties and declarations 
concluded by ASEAN in the past and the statement in the preamble states 
that ASEAN member states, “are determined to ensure their stability and 
security from external interference in any form or manner”.33  
This was followed by the adoption of Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) in 
Vientiane at the Tenth ASEAN Summit in 2004. In this action plan, ASEAN 
member states included the initiation of “preparatory activities to develop an 
ASEAN Charter” as a goal in the VAP, which was formalised into a mandate 
                                            
31 Luhulima (2011),Op.cit. p. 76 
32 Aisarieva (2012), Op.cit, p. 55; see also Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in 
Southeast Asia (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2009), p. 105 
33 Aisarieva (2012), Op.cit, p. 57  
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in 2005.34 It encourages ASEAN to be prepared in term of structure and 
process to meet the APSC Plan of Action to achieve the establishment of an 
ASEAN Community, as well as being more responsive, more powerful and 
able to cope with various challenges, both in terms of coordination and 
efficiency. Therefore, the VAP began with items related to the APSC, to 
“implement the proposed APSC by growing a democratic, tolerant, 
participatory and transparent community”.35 Moreover, the APSC will be 
pursued along five strategic thrusts, namely, political development, shaping 
and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-
conflict peace-building, the implementation of which shall focus on actions 
that are conceivably achievable by 2020.36 Realising the importance of 
accelerating the establishment of the ASEAN Community will reinforce 
ASEAN’s centrality and its role on the driving seat and encourage the 
government of ASEAN member states to accelerate the establishment of 
the ASEAN Community by 2015. 37 
Then, at the 11th ASEAN Summit, on the 12-14 December, 2005 in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, with the theme, “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”, 
the leaders of ASEAN member states produced the ASEAN Charter as a firm 
foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community. 38  At this summit, the ten 
leaders of ASEAN member states appointed an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) 
to guide the development of the ASEAN Charter as a step towards the 
                                            
34  Ibid; see also Wilfrido V. Villacota, Strengthening the Foundation for an ASEAN 
Community in Lee Yoong Yoong (ed.), ASEAN Matters: Reflecting on ASEAN (Singapore: 
World Scientific Printers, 2011), p. 306 
35  Donald. K. Emmerson, Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia: 
Analysing ASEAN (Japanese Journal of Political Science vol. 6, no 2, 2005), pp. 165-185 
36 Furthermore Vientiane Action Program: http://www.aseansec.org/ADS-2004 
37  Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ 
RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf 
38 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, available at www.asean.org, 
accessed in July 2013 
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development of the ASEAN Community. The EPG had been undertaking private 
and public consultation with a view to presenting some recommendations to the 
leaders of ASEAN member states at the ASEAN summit one year later in Cebu, 
the Philippines, in December 2006.39 Two years later, the charter was adopted 
and officially came into force on 15 December 2008, and a gathering of the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark 
this very historic occasion for ASEAN. ASEAN will henceforth operate under a 
new legal framework to establish a number of new structures to boost its 
community-building process.40 The charter was aimed at transforming ASEAN 
from a non-binding political association to an international organisation with a 
legal disposition and a rule-based organisation with an effective and efficient 
organisational structure.41  
The charter codifies ASEAN norms rules and values, sets clear 
targets and presents accountability and compliance, and also establishes 
the association as a legal entity with a juridical disposition,. With these 
means, as well as by the associations’ very existence, “the ASEAN system 
has enabled ASEAN to keep the peace in the region, promote regional 
stability and play a constructive role in a world out of proportion to its military 
might or economic weight.”.42 The ASEAN Charter is expected to be a 
positive development, which could move ASEAN ahead in terms of security 
as well. 
 
 
                                            
39 Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN Charter: An opportunity not to be missed (UNISCI 
Discussion Paper, no. 12, October 2006), p. 164 
40 Ibid 
41  Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: 
Routledge, 2009), p. 267 
42 Severino (2005), Op.cit, pp. 7-29; Severino (2006), Op.cit, p. 165 
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Although one of the objectives of the charter is a regional economic 
integration arrangement, it does not mean its purpose is solely a matter of 
economics. It has other targets for cooperation on transnational issues and 
problems and the strengthening of regional institutions, although the 
economic goal is worthy of debate. The following statement describes it: 
“The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which the 
association’s members adhere. The charter would envision the 
arrangements for further integration”.43  
3.2. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the 
Framework of ADMM  
As the highest level of ministerial defence and security consultative 
and cooperative mechanism within ASEAN, the annual ADMM enables the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers to discuss and exchange views on current 
defence and security issues and challenges faced in the region. In this 
ADMM, ten Defence Ministers from Southeast Asian countries, which are 
bound in the TAC as a base, agreed that the values of ASEAN would be the 
codes for the norm. These became the codes of practice or the codes of 
conduct for the ADMM itself.44 Cooperation domains, or ADMM domains, 
discuss cooperation in the field of defence as their core. This forum 
discusses defence cooperation within the scope of ASEAN. In doing so, the 
implementation includes exchanges of views on regional and global security 
developments that affect ASEAN or Southeast Asia and it further discusses 
areas of cooperation more specifically in defence matters. ADMM is a 
mechanism for ten ASEAN member states in the scope of a multilateral 
framework.  
                                            
43 Severino (2005), Ibid, p. 7 
44 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry 
of Defence, Jakarta,16 September 2013 
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In effect, the ADMM was one of the results which arose in 2006 from 
the movement to form the APSC. The ADMM is aimed at increasing the 
synergies amongst Southeast Asian military forces. In fact, for years, 
military-to-military cooperative activities were conducted at various levels, 
including on a bilateral basis, but were lacking in significant coordination. 
Although the ADMM forum is a result of the planned formation of the APSC, 
discussion of ADMM in this section aims to prove that in the process of 
establishing a security community, there is a mechanism of a defence 
community. The APSC’s Plan of Action “set working towards convening an 
annual ADMM as one of its objectives, with the aim of enhancing 
confidence-building measures to prevent conflict”.45  
The concept paper at the inaugural ADMM in 2006 views the 
establishment of the ADMM as complementing other regional efforts that promote 
security dialogue and cooperation. It serves as the main driving force for a 
defence dialogue and cooperation within the Southeast Asian region, which 
includes officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Ministry of 
Defence officials.46 The ADMM inaugural meeting was convened in Kuala Lumpur, 
2006 as the newest sectorial ministerial body for ASEAN.47 This meeting was a 
new step signifying ASEAN's shift in focus to embark upon closer military ties.48 In 
this regard, the meeting of Defence Ministers in Southeast Asia would promote 
cooperation amongst the militaries in the region.  
                                            
45  ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, http://www.aseansec.org/16826.htm; 
http://www.aseansec.org/16829.htm: see also, Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN Defence 
Cooperation: Current Trends and Future Development (Bandar Seri Begawan: Southeast 
Asia Security Public Lecture Series III, July 2009), p. 1 
46 Interview with B.G. Cheng, Director of Policy Office, Singapore MINDEF, Singapore, 20 
September 2013  
47 Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers‟ Meeting, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/19893.htm, accessed in July 2013 
48 Lianita Prawindarti, The First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting: An Early Test for the 
ASEAN Security Community? (Singapore: IDSS Commentaries, 2006), p. 1 
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Thus, through the forum of ADMM, ASEAN cooperation introduces a new 
concept of ‘Defence Diplomacy”. In particular, prior to the arrival of ADMM, all 
Defence Ministers and Chief of Staffs of ASEAN member states were involved in 
a variety of security dialogues through participation in the Annual ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting, (ASEAN SOM) and in the meetings of the ARF. Some attempts 
to enhance regional coordination were put into place in the course of the last 
decade, and meetings between ASEAN Chief Defence Forces, Chiefs of Armies, 
Navies and Air Forces started to be held regularly in the form of an ASEAN Chiefs’ 
Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) in 2001. ASEAN Chiefs of Army 
Multilateral Meetings (ACAMM) have been held since 2001, the ASEAN Navy 
Interaction (ANI) since 2001, the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AAFCC) 
since 2004, along with the ASEAN Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM) 
and the ASEAN Armies Rifles Meeting (AARM).49  
To guide the ADMM cooperation, the Three-Year ADMM Work 
Programme (2008-2010) was adopted at the second ADMM in Singapore in 
2007.50 The Work Programme (2008-2010) included measures and activities in 
five areas, namely: 1) promoting regional defence and security cooperation; 2) 
shaping and sharing of norms; 3) conflict prevention; 4) conflict resolution; and 5) 
post-conflict peace-building. In promoting regional defence and security, for 
instance, ASEAN member states used Track-2 such as cooperation between 
defence universities, military academies, staff colleges, think-tanks and similar 
institutions, as well as Track-3 such as other civil institutions to organise various 
seminars on defence and security issues, to enhance mutual understanding of 
                                            
49  Angela Pennisi di Floristella, ASEAN and the Construction of a Regional Security 
Partnership Achievements and Critical Issues to Manage Security Governance in 
Southeast Asia (Università degli Studi di Catania, PhD Thesis, 2011), p. 61; Bhubhindar 
Singh & See Seng Tan, From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of Defence Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS, 2011), p. 29 
50  ADMM Three-Year Work Program, available at http://www.aseansec.org/21214.pdf 
accessed on10 November 2014    
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national and security policy and its development. 51  In this programme, all 
information related to national defence and security, particularly in relation to 
inter-ASEAN problems, will be shared transparently to prevent the situation 
worsening, since every member state has a different approach to solve the 
problems.52  
At the first ADMM meeting, the Defence Ministers of ASEAN member 
states promoted cooperation amongst the militaries of regional countries which 
led to the creation of a peaceful and stable security environment.53  In this 
meeting, the Ministers of Defence introduced the terminology of ‘defence 
diplomacy’ that implied the basic principle of ASEAN–that of non-interference-as 
well as increasing the level of interaction and mutual trust and confidence 
amongst member states of ASEAN.54  
In ADMM’s first meeting, two other important documents were also 
adopted – besides the Three-Year Work Programme. They were the Protocol of 
the Concept paper for the establishment of the ADMM and the concept paper on 
the ADMM-Plus.55 The Protocol of the Concept paper was crucial because of its 
stipulation of a ‘chain of command’ for ASEAN defence cooperation, with the 
ADMM as the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and 
cooperative mechanism.56  The programme of the ADMM shows substantial 
development in the aspect of military and security cooperation in ASEAN 
through practical cooperation. 
                                            
51 Luhulima (2011), Op.cit, pp. 78-81; Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive, ADMM 
Three-Year Work Program 2011-2013 
52 Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, 
Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013 
53  Tomotaka Shoji, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus: A 
Japanese Perspective (NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 14 Dec 2013), p. 7 
54 Prawindarti (2006), Op.cit, p. 1  
55 ADMM, Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Enhancing Regional and 
Stability, available at http://www.asean.org/archive/21135.pdf 
56 Shoji (2013), Op.cit, p. 8 
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Meanwhile, in the field of shaping and sharing norms, ASEAN leaders 
stressed that the Foreign Ministers are looking for new ways to improve security 
and establish modalities for the establishment of the ASEAN Community. In this 
context, Foreign Ministers still play an important role, although since 2006, 
Defence Ministers have played a role in practical defence cooperation,57 i.e. 
contributing actively to the implementation of a Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea. The success of Indonesia’s Foreign Minister 
'shuttle diplomacy' to overcome the appearance of ASEAN’s disarray during the 
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia in July 2012 to produce a joint communiqué that 
nearly annihilated ASEAN, cannot be separated from the successful 
achievement of an ASEAN common position.58 Determination of the norm is 
intended to achieve a standard of compliance with common adherence to norms 
of good conduct by the member states of the ASEAN Community. Producing the 
ASEAN Charter is a step in the development of these norms.59 These norms are 
formulated by sticking to the principles of non-alignment, development-oriented 
attitudes of peace amongst ASEAN member countries; conflict resolution by 
peaceful means; rejection of the possession of nuclear weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction and avoiding an arms race in Southeast Asia. The inclusion 
of shaping and sharing norms in the Three-Year Work Programme of ADMM to 
support APSC “clearly suggested that it is designed to be more than an 
instrument for practical cooperation, but is also a political project aimed at 
extending regional cooperation from the mere functional to the normative”.60 
                                            
57 Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Op.cit  
58 Interview with I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Director of ASEAN International Cooperation, 
Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 20 March 2013 
59 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive, ADMM Three-Year Work Programme, Building 
the Foundation and Setting the Direction for Defence Dialogue and Cooperation; see also 
Luhulima (2011), Op.cit, pp. 78-79 
60  Mely Caballero-Anthony and Holly Haywood, Defining ASEAN’s Role in Peace 
Operations: Helping to Bring Peacebuilding ‘Upstream’? (Civil-Military Working Papers no. 
3, 2010), p. 7 
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In the activities of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, ADMM 
referred to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the fundamental rules of 
behaviour between member states to promote mutual trust and confidence 
through greater understanding of defence and security issues, to prevent 
disputes between member states and between member states with other 
countries, as well as avoiding the escalation of existing conflicts.61 In this 
context, ASEAN member states developed a coordination mechanism for 
military cooperation in the areas of non-traditional security. Two important 
areas of cooperation in this framework are humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief and peacekeeping.  
There were reasons for ASEAN member states to promote practical 
cooperation in the area of non-traditional threats as ADMM’s primary 
concern. First, cooperation in non-traditional security is more agreeable than 
traditional, and often sensitive, security issues.62 Second, certain ASEAN 
member states experienced large-scale natural disasters such as the 
Sumatran earthquake and tsunami in 2004, and because the slow response 
from other ASEAN member states to provide help had created the 
impression of a paralysed ASEAN. Third, for ASEAN, the importance of 
cooperation in peacekeeping was associated with increasing international 
reputation and status grouping by contributing more peacekeepers to 
international security.63 In regard to any dispute or conflict involving ASEAN 
members, states are encouraged to resolve them peacefully and in the spirit 
of peace, security and stability. The aims and purposes of ASEAN member 
states to contribute more peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6. 
                                            
61 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive, ADMM Three-Year Work Programme, Building 
the Foundation and Setting the Direction of Defence Dialogue and Cooperation 
62 Shoji (2013), Op.cit, p. 8 
63 Ibid 
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Post-conflict peace-building is intended to create the conditions 
necessary to preserve the peace in areas of conflict and prevent a return to 
fighting. This means cooperation and coordination between agencies in 
dealing with a broad spectrum of issues. Post-conflict peace-building 
activities include the development of appropriate mechanisms and the 
mobilisation of resources for making them successful, including 
humanitarian aid, reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this context, ASEAN 
develops human resources and builds capacity for the rehabilitation of post-
conflict areas.64 
3.3. The Mechanism of Defence Diplomacy Within the 
Framework of ADMM-Plus  
At the 2nd ADMM meeting in 2007, the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper 
was adopted.65 Following this, in October 2010, the inaugural ADMM-Plus 
was convened, opening up ASEAN’s now highest level security and defence 
mechanism with eight of its dialogue partners. The scope of ADMM-Plus is 
greater than ADMM’s. It is, in effect, a Defence Ministers’ meeting in the 
East Asia Summit format. It involves the ten ASEAN Defence Ministers, plus 
eight of the Defence Ministers of dialogue partners’ countries, namely, the 
US, China, India, Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and 
Russia. By involving all members of the East Asia Summit, the ADMM-Plus 
strengthens and deepens trust and cooperation on defence and security 
matters throughout the Indo-Pacific.66 It develops a similar mechanism as 
ADMM to discuss security issues in term of conditions and developments, 
                                            
64 Luhulima (2011), Op.cit, pp. 78-79 
65 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper, available at http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf , accessed 
on 12 December 2014  
66 Australia Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Attends Second ADMM-Plus in 
Brunei, http:// www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/08/29/minister-for-defence-minister-for-
defence-attends-second-asean-defence-ministers-meeting-plus-in-brunei/, accessed on 13 
December 2014 
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as well as global and regional security issues that can be handled by 
eighteen countries within the multilateral framework. 67  The purpose of 
ADMM-Plus is to bring expertise, perspectives and resources from extra-
regional countries to bear on shared security challenges and practical 
cooperation through strategic dialogue. At all times, ASEAN member states 
should collectively weigh the benefits of engaging extra-regional countries.68  
In the concept paper for the establishment of an ADMM, it is 
anticipated that the ADMM shall be ‘open, flexible and outward-looking and 
should actively engage ASEAN’s friends and dialogue partners in promoting 
peace and security in the region.69 To reach such goals, the ADMM concept 
paper calls for the establishment of an ADMM-Plus. The ADMM-Plus serves 
as an integral part of the ADMM, bringing together ASEAN and its dialogue 
partners to forge common security viewpoints and to set in place practical 
defence cooperation and collaboration. 70  At the inaugural ADMM-Plus 
meeting, the Defence Ministers agreed on five areas of practical 
cooperation to pursue under this new mechanism: 1) maritime security, 2) 
counter-terrorism, 3) disaster management, 4) peacekeeping operations 
and 5) military medicine, and from 2014, the areas of cooperation were 
increased by another cooperation, that of Humanitarian Mine Action. To 
facilitate cooperation on these areas, five initial Experts' Working Groups 
(EWGs) were established with another added in 2014. By the end of 2011, 
                                            
67 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, the Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence, Jakarta,16 September 2013 
68 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper, available at http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf , accessed 
on 12 December 2014 
69 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper, available at http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf , accessed 
on 12 December 2014; ASEAN, Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting 
70 Holly Haywood, New Institutional Developments in ASEAN: Towards a More Effective 
(Genuine) Security Architecture (NTS Alert), available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/html-
newsletter/alert/nts-alert-sep-1102.html, p. 3 
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all of the EWGs had held their inaugural meetings.71 The Concept Paper of 
the EWG was adopted.72 The EWGs have their own programmes that 
function for a period of three years. The system of forming EWG co-chair 
pairs between an ASEAN country and a ‘plus’ country, for instance, 
Indonesia and the US for the Counter-Terrorism EWG, has worked well.73 
3.4. Working Mechanism of ADMM and ADMM-Plus 
As mentioned above, the ADMM is an annual gathering and dialogue forum 
for Defence Ministers of ASEAN member states, while the ADMM-Plus is a 
triennial meeting forum. Perceiving that the development of the ADMM-Plus was 
very rapid, the members of the ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers were encouraged to 
review the original frequency of the meetings from once every three years to 
become once every two years. Subsequently, after the meeting of ADMM-Plus in 
Brunei, future meetings are calculated every two years, while in terms of the 
working programme of EWGs, these remain in a three-year period. An illustration 
of the scope of defence cooperation to be achieved by the ASEAN Community, 
and which is targeted to be realised in 2015 can be seen from the figure below 
(see Figure 5.1).74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
71 ADMM-Plus: http://www.aseansec.org/18816.htm, accessed on 12 December 2014 
72 ADMM-Plus Experts‟ Working Group Concept Paper available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/documents/18471- L.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2014 
73 Michito Tsuruoka, An Era of the ADMM-Plus? Unique Achievements and Challenges 
(Honolulu, Hawaii: PacNet, no 69, Sep 2013); Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, the Director of 
International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
74 Indonesian Ministry of Defence Archive 
 130 
Figure 5.1 
ASEAN Defence Cooperation Structure 
 
Source: Indonesia Ministry of Defence Archive 
Note: The figure shows ASEAN’s defence cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus that is a form of cooperation to support the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 
2015. In the above structure, defence cooperation mechanisms that are within the dotted red line 
(added by the researcher) are the cooperatives within the scope of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus. 
 
To support and accommodate the agenda of ADMM, the Defence 
Minister agreed to establish an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting 
(ADSOM) for ADMM, and an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus 
(ADSOM-Plus).75 These ADSOMs have working groups (ADSOM WG and 
ADSOM-Plus WG) as the lowest mechanical processes of ADMM or 
ADMM-Plus. All ideas as initial proposals are started at the level of the 
working group. Ideas that are proposed by member states are brought into 
the meeting at the working level. This is where the ideas are filtered, 
discussed, selected and processed, until a common point of view and 
agreement is reached and the accepted idea is forwarded to a higher 
                                            
75 New Straits Times, 10 May 2006 
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level.76 The delegate at the level of working group is an official with the rank 
of Brigadier or Director, or in the second echelon of the Ministry of Defence; 
these officials also act as the head of the delegation. The officials that 
represent their country are permanent members of the working group and 
cannot be replaced by other officials until the idea has been discussed at 
ministerial level. The same mechanism has also been applied in ADMM-
Plus.  
The next step of the mechanism is the level of ASEAN Defence Senior 
Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM), which is led by the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of Defence. At this level, ADSOM receives proposals from working 
groups to discuss the proposed issue or idea. Ten ADSOM leaders discuss 
matters that are proposed by ADSOM WGs or ADSOM-Plus WGs. The result 
of the ADSOM meeting is forwarded as meeting material at ministerial level. 
The final level is the level of Defence Ministers’ meeting which is the peak of 
the proposals that have been discussed at the level of the working group. What 
is interesting about the mechanism at the level of ADSOM is that, since this 
proposal is the result of an agreement of ten ADSOM Working Group leaders, 
usually at the level of ADSOM, such proposals do not change much. As all 
ADSOM leaders have already appointed a member of their staff as a 
representative or even as a leader of a delegation at the WG, at which point the 
ADSOM WG leaders discuss and select the ideas that will be meeting material 
at the level of ADSOM and ADMM or ADMM-Plus.77 However, between these 
three levels, if it seems there is a shortage of time or an agenda is required to 
discuss specific items, the host of the ADMM meeting can invite all Defence 
                                            
76 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation of Indonesian Ministry 
of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013; interview with Yudi Abrimantyo, Jakarta, 13 
March 2013 and 18 September 2013 
77 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation of Indonesian Ministry 
of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
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Ministers from member states to hold an additional ministerial meeting called a 
retreat (ADMM retreat or ADMM-Plus retreat). In the interim, the ASEAN Chiefs 
of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), the ASEAN Navy Interaction (ANI), the 
ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AAFCC), the ASEAN Military Intelligent 
Informal Meeting (AMIIM), and the ASEAN Military Operational Informal 
Meeting (AMOIM) are meeting within the framework of the ASEAN Chiefs’ 
Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM).  
Although ADSOM WG is the lowest level, this level is the most crucial 
stage of all levels in the existing mechanism of the ADMM or the ADMM-Plus. 
At this level, it tends to be highly operational and the actors fully understand the 
day-to-day activities of the results of the meeting from the highest level or 
ministerial level of ADMM or ADMM-Plus. The implementations of decisions 
that have been taken at the ministerial meeting are fully executed by the 
participants at ADSOM WG level, or the operational players become the 
executors of the ministerial level decision. Accordingly, participants at the 
ADSOM WG level know with certainty the constraints they will face if an issue 
is discussed at a higher level and becomes a decision which they will 
implement later. In other words, it will begin with the WG and end with 
implementation by the WG. The WG filters the issue, and then forwards it to the 
next level to be processed, up to the ministerial level for a final decision, and 
again at a later stage at the WG level ministerial level, decisions have to be 
implemented. Analysis of the cycle shows that it is increasingly clear that the 
process of defence diplomacy, which relates to the requirements of inter-
operability of a defence community, has been started. Realising that the region 
needs more concrete defence cooperation, the Defence Minister of ASEAN 
agreed to establish the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC). 
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4. ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) 
 In May 2011, with the aim “to encourage the development of 
industrial and technological strength, and to seek opportunities to promote 
technological sharing” 78 and to reduce annual defence procurement from 
non-ASEAN member states from $25 billion in 2010 to $12.5 billion by 2030, 
the Defence Minister of ASEAN agreed to adopt the concept paper on the 
establishment of ADIC as an integral part of ADMM. The idea of ADIC is to 
reduce the technological disparity amongst its member states. At the same 
time, it also serves to reduce regional dependency of defence equipment 
from outside the region.79 The original motivation to create ADIC was to 
determine how ASEAN member states, that have very high defence 
spending for purchasing equipment, can rotate their money within the 
ASEAN itself,80 and in this way, enable them to regenerate the economic 
sector of every ASEAN member state.  
 The ASEAN leaders realised that ASEAN has countries that are 
strong in the defence industry within the scope of Southeast Asia. For 
example, Indonesia is strong in the aircraft industry, Malaysia in the field of 
maintenance, Thailand in the field of propellers and Singapore in 
Information Technology and so on. Thus, these capabilities are the key 
driving forces for Southeast Asia to adopt the idea of collaboration through 
ADIC. The objectives of ADIC were defined in the framework for the 
implementation of ADIC in the fourth ADMM in 2010 in Vietnam, such as the 
collaboration of ASEAN member states on strategic projects through 
                                            
78 Guy Ben-Ari, Can ASEAN Integration Deliver in Defence Technology? (cogitASIA, CSIS, 
Septermber 2011); interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of 
Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013 
79 Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and 
Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur ,13 August 2013 
80 Interviewed with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesia Ministry 
of Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
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partnership, joint-ventures and co-production, promoting intra-ASEAN trade 
of defence products, increasing ASEAN technology and industrial 
competitiveness in defence and dual-use industry and creating incentives 
that would assist defence industry growth within the ASEAN defence 
industry.81 The abilities possessed by some ASEAN member states can be 
utilised for the sake of Southeast Asian defence capability. 
 For certain countries, such as Brunei, there are no plans to build its 
own defence industry at this time.82 With the growth of the technology world 
so rapid, for small countries, such as Brunei, it is still cost-effective to submit 
their defence industry to the private sector. Therefore, for Brunei, defence 
industry cooperation makes use of equity-opportunity that utilises the 
defence industries that are in Indonesia and Malaysia.83 In point of fact, the 
perspective delivered by Brunei’s Ministry of Defence is in line with the spirit 
and purpose of the initial establishment of ADIC. As cited by the Malaysian 
Ministry of Defence, the Malaysian defence industry aims to share 
technology and weapons technology advances with other ASEAN members 
such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Brunei.84 
 However, there are some constraints that have become a barrier for 
ASEAN defence industry collaboration. The first challenge is the existence 
of conflict in the region, including territorial disputes at borders such as 
between Cambodia and Thailand. Hence, when it comes to the clause of 
buying defence industry products from a neighbouring country within 
ASEAN member states, the disputant tends to look to other countries 
                                            
81 Annex 4 of ADIC framework, Indonesia Ministry of Defence Archive 
82 Interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei Darussalam, 
Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013 
83 Ibid 
84 Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and 
Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 13 August 2013 
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outside ASEAN. The second challenge is governments’ desires for full 
reciprocity in the defence trade, despite the imbalance in national defence 
industrial capabilities, since only Indonesia and Singapore have a significant 
defence industrial base.85 In light of these facts, it is not surprising that the 
countries of Southeast Asia remain heavily dependent on imports of 
defence equipment.86 Indeed, the concept of ADIC is still at an early stage, 
but the concept of this defence industry collaboration can be a very 
significant strategic step in the establishment of the ASEAN Community, 
especially if the various constraints and weaknesses contained in the ADIC 
concept paper can be overcome. If the formation of the ADIC can be 
developed further and firmly institutionalised, then the process of 
standardisation of weaponry amongst ASEAN member states will be 
implemented more easily. Thus, the modernisation of weaponry systems 
and inter-operability amongst ASEAN military will also be reached more 
easily. With the economic growth of ASEAN member states being relatively 
stable since the 1997 financial crisis, an effective ASEAN defence industry 
collaboration is not impossible to achieve.  
 In a special meeting on the development of ADIC which was held in 
conjunction with the ninth ADMM on 15 – 18th April, 2015, the Malaysian 
government proposed to other ASEAN member states the concept and 
process of remanufacturing to enhance ASEAN member states’ capacity in 
upgrading current defence industry products to an advanced technical level 
or standard and to bring products back to their original quality and 
performance.87  This proposal was welcomed by other ASEAN member 
                                            
85 Ben-Ari, Op.cit 
86 Ibid 
87  Malaysian Ministry of Defence Proposal at Langkawi International Maritime and 
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states since the objectives of remanufacturing are in line with the objectives 
of the ADIC to increase ASEAN technology and industrial competitiveness 
to international standards. 
5. The Evolution of Southeast Asian Defence Spending 
 In 2012, military spending in Southeast Asia amounted to US$33.677 
billion.88 This sum represents 11.17% of the East Asian 89 total for the same year, 
or 8.72% of the Asian total.90 In ASEAN itself, there is a striking difference in the 
field of military spending, with the combined spending of the five biggest countries 
- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - covering approximately 
89.18% and the rest being the total of all the other Southeast Asian countries.91 
Amongst Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is the biggest spender for 
equipment reaching a total amount of $9.7 billion or 3.6% of its GDP. Meanwhile, 
Laos is the lowest at 0.2% of its GDP. In terms of nominal expenditure, Laos is 
again the lowest. A huge disparity between the highest and the lowest is a 
concern that has become the focus of other Southeast Asia countries to help 
improve Laos’s weaponry capability, as per the objectives of the ADMM. 
 In the study of the evolution of military expenditure in the period 2000 
- 2012, we see the same trend with the previous data in that there is a very 
wide disparity between countries with high and low GDPs. Actually, it is a 
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 137 
natural situation because a country's military spending is constrained by 
fresh funds, or depends upon what national resources they have. In the 
period between 2002 and 2012, Southeast Asian military spending grew by 
62%, half as much as the growth rate ratio calculated for the period 2000-
2012 (111.71%), and this includes missing data for 2000 and 2001. The rate 
of growth of military-spending countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia and 
Thailand fluctuates between 61% and 131% in the period 2002 and 2012.92  
Similarly, Malaysia and the Philippines, in the same period, increased their 
military spending by 35% and 30%, respectively, in contrast to Laos which 
lowered its spending by 30%. Only two ASEAN member states, Brunei and 
Singapore, keep a stable profile of +17% and +14%, accordingly.  
 If such figures were converted at the current U.S. dollar and inflation 
rates, Cambodia’s military spending was about $136 million in 2002, 
increased to $210 million in 2012; Indonesian military spending was about 
$19.25 billion in 2002, increased to about $79.75 billion in 2012; and 
Thailand was about $32.27 billion in 2002, increased to $54.20 billion in 
2012, respectively. Referring to the data shown in table 5.1 in U.S. dollars, 
Malaysia’s military spending was about $34.52 billion in 2002, increased to 
about $46.64 billion in 2012. The Philippines was about $21.71 billion in 
2002, increased to about $27.39 billion in 2012 (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).93 
 
 
 
 
                                            
92 Hellendorff (2013), Op.cit, p. 10 
93 Ibid 
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Table 5.1 
 Mil i tary Spending Evolution Comparison 2000 and 2012  
in Current $US 
 
 
Sources: SIPRI Year Book 2013  
Note.  This figure explains the comparison of military spending of ASEAN member states at 
the current US dollar and inflation rates, based on the fluctuation of defence expenditure in 
the period 2000 to 2012. 
 
Table 5.2 
Trend of Defence Spending in Southeast Asia 2000-2012  
Based on GDP Percentage 
 
 
 
Sources: SIPRI Year Book 2013 
Note. The graphic shows the trend of defence spending in Southeast Asia in the period 
2000 – 2012, based on the increase of percentage in GDP 
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In the two charts above, in addition to the six countries where the 
research was conducted, other ASEAN member states are deliberately 
included as a comparison, although there are countries that do not list their 
military spending data and trends due to a lack of adequate data. In the 
timespan of 2011-2012, Singapore military spending trends remained stable 
at + 0:34%, along with the Philippines at + 4:22%. Although the rate of 
increase in military spending amounted to + 9:38% in Cambodia, if it is 
compared with Indonesia and Vietnam that raised their military spending by 
23:54% and 36.47%, respectively, the increase is still a concern. However, 
Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand showed a decrease of approximately -3.02%, 
-3.13% and -3.37%, respectively.  
In the period 2009-2012, there was a striking difference in terms of 
the military spending of the countries of Southeast Asia, with almost all 
countries experiencing a slowdown or decline, from 2.9% in Brunei up to 
20:45% in Cambodia. Indonesia is the only ASEAN member states which 
had a drastic increase of approximately +62.55%, while other countries 
such as Vietnam increased theirs by approximately +31.62%, and the 
Philippines by +11.18%, or in other words, by no more than 50% from the 
previous budget. 94 The growth in military spending of each ASEAN member 
state could be a significant contributor to the escalation of military spending 
trends in Southeast Asia.  
The above explanation shows that the ASEAN member states in the 
period 2000-2010 in general increased their defence spending to acquire a 
wide range of sophisticated weapons technology for major weaponry 
systems, so that the target of own-weapons production amongst ASEAN 
countries can be realised as an objective of ADIC. The faster the ASEAN 
                                            
94 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Op.cit 
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member states master a high-tech weapons system, the quicker is the 
reduction in technology disparity amongst ASEAN member states. For this 
reason, similarities in defence technology by strengthening relationships 
with the defence and security industry will be achieved since the member 
states will have the same standard of weaponry systems.95 
6. The Reasons for Mil i tary Modernisation in Southeast Asia 
The reasons behind modernisation of ASEAN member states major 
weaponry system seems driven by the concept of ADIC to reduce 
technology disparity in term of standardization of weaponry system, and the 
growing political pressure due to the growing threats that are shaping and 
the type of military duty in Southeast Asia. 96 There is concern that an 
increase in military spending will ultimately encourage an 'arms race' that 
can ruin the planned establishment of the ASEAN Community. However, as 
Bitzinger states, “these acquisitions do not fit the pattern of an ‘arms race’ 
as laid out in prevailing theory such as, mutually adversarial relationships, 
explicit tit-for-tat arms acquisitions, the intention of seeking dominance over 
one’s rivals through arming intimidation”.97 
One factor that deserves serious concern is the t extent to which the 
clausal Transfer of Technology in the MoU, which is one of the conditions of 
purchasing military equipment, can run and, significantly, what happens if 
the end-user or buyer is able to master the technology and becomes able to 
produce their own equipment when needed. The technology transfer 
                                            
95  Inter-operability: Connecting NATO Forces, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/topics_84112.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 12 April 2015 
96 Suara Karya Newspaper, 22 August 2011, DPR Desak Peningkatan Anggaran 
Kementerian Pertahana/The Parliament Urges Government to Increase Defence Budget  
97 Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military 
Acquisitions (Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs, vol. 32, no. 1, Apr 2010), p. 50 
 141 
process is fairly well developed amongst ASEAN member states; for 
example, Indonesia through its state weapons manufacturer, PT. PINDAD, 
has been able to produce world-class military equipment. Adopting the 
technology and science of Europe and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation), this defence company has produced dozens of types of light 
to heavy equipment, from hand guns to Armoured Personnel Carriers,98 
They have been producing the assault rifle SS-2 type assault rifles since 
2006. Its reliability levels are even better than the original prototype of the 
Belgian-made FNC or Russian-made AK-47. Moreover, a country like 
Singapore is represented on the list of top 100 global defence countries, 
having developed its defence technology based on the Transfer of 
Technology clause, as well as military equipment with their own technology. 
Below are some major weaponry systems that are already owned and which 
will be acquired by selected ASEAN member states,  as follows: 
6.1.   BRUNEI 
 The fact that Brunei, which is by far the smallest of the ASEAN states 
in terms of population, has outspent its ASEAN partners (except Singapore) 
in term of military expenditure per capita. In 2011, for instance, Brunei 
military expenditure per capita was at US$ 1015, while the figures for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam were at US$ 23, 
US$ 164, US$ 1721, US$ 82, and US$ 29, respectively.99 The sultanate 
country, which is rich in oil, has long defence ties with the British.100 Under 
the agreement of September 1983, the British Ghurkha battalion under 
                                            
98  PINDAD Eyes Commercial Success, The Jakarta Globe, 4 July 2014. 
www.thejakartaglobe.com; The Future of the National Defence Industry, The Jakarta Post, 
28 January 2013, www.thejakartapost.com 
99 The Military Balance 2013, pp. 284-382 
100  Michael Leifer, Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei 
(International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1, April 1978), p. 244 
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British command still remain in Brunei, way beyond its independence. The 
agreement is open-ended, although the situation is reviewed every five 
years if either party so desires.101  
Brunei’s modernisation in terms of procuring the latest equipment 
concentrated on surveillance equipment, humanitarian capability, air 
defence capability, integration of mobility and logistics support.102 Brunei’s 
Armed Forces, despite being well-trained but with constraints in term of its 
size, could offer little resistance to determined aggressors. Its land forces 
purchased French-made Renault VAB wheeled armoured personnel carriers 
for mechanised infantry. Well before this procurement, the Royal Brunei 
Armed Forces had purchased a light tank, the Scorpion Combat Vehicle 
Reconnaissance from the UK which has a 76mm gun mounted on it. 
Meanwhile, the Brunei Air Force has also purchased an Indonesian-made 
squadron of maritime patrol aircraft, the CN-235. Currently, the air force has 
received the initial batch of Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk utility helicopters 
for the army support role to replace the current utility helicopter fleet which 
consist of Bell 212s and 214 (SAR Transport). The Brunei Air Force has 
been strengthened by the 100-series of two-seat advanced trainers and the 
200-series single-seat radar from British Aerospace which has strengthened 
Brunei’s air force which is equipped with light fighters.103 
With an average of 2.5% GDP per year, Brunei really does not have 
any budget constraint for its military modernisation. The total amount of 
defence budget was US$ 415 million in 2011 and slightly decreased to 
                                            
101 According to Tim Huxley, the precise details of the agreement contained in private 
letters exchanged between the British and Brunei governments have not been made public. 
See Tim Huxley, Brunei: Defending a Mini-State, in Chin Kin Wah (ed.), Defence Spending 
in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), pp. 224-251 
102 Brunei Defence White Paper 2011, pp. 19-20 
103 The Military Balance 2013, p. 285 
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US$ 411 million in 2012. Brunei modernised its Navy with various version of 
corvette and missile-armed unit ‘Waspada” class 206t fast attack craft. 
“Each ship was equipped with two MM 38 Exocet surface-to-surface 
missiles for long range anti-ship engagement, twin 30mm GCM 01 guns and 
two 7.62mm machine guns”.104 Furthermore, there is a fleet of 95m Offshore 
Patrol Vessels for coastal naval units that are able to patrol and defend the 
Brunei’s Exclusive Economic Zone.  
6.2. INDONESIA 
Over the past 20 years, Indonesia’s conventional defence capability 
has remained modest. Defence spending as a percentage of GDP declined 
from 1.5% to 0.78% after the financial crisis in 1997. The official defence 
total in Indonesia is unlikely to capture the true extent of defence 
expenditure as it fails to include pensions and benefits for retired military 
personnel and overseas procurement.105 Around 60% of the defence budget 
is allocated to personnel for salaries and the regular provision of military 
logistics. Following his victory in the July 2009 general elections, President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced an increase of the defence budget 
of 21% more than the previous fiscal year. In August, 2012, the President 
again reinforced his commitment to develop armed forces by injecting more 
into the defence budget. In 2011, the defence budget amounted to US$ 5.7 
billion, and increased to US$ 6.8 billion in 2012.  
The navy has two fleets, West in Jakarta and East in Surabaya. 
Since 2011, Indonesia has planned to develop a third fleet command which 
will cover all Indonesian territory that stretches from Weh Island (Aceh 
Province) in the West to Rote Island (Nusa Tenggara Timur) in the Central 
                                            
104 Mohd Radzi, Brunei’s Defence Modernization, 15 July 2010 
105 The Military Balance 2010, p. 391 
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and to the Arafuru Sea (Papua Province) in the East.106 Indonesia needs to 
boost its navy capability and capacity to face increasing pirate activities in 
its sea jurisdiction. The current fleets’ main combatants are equipped with 
submarines and the fleets are in varying states of seaworthiness that are 
insufficient to secure Indonesia’s territory from violation at sea. Indonesia’s 
navy has signed an agreement with the Netherlands to build 20 Sigma 
Class frigates that will be assembled in Surabaya, Indonesia, and there is 
the possibility of buying German Type 209 Submarines with South Korea.107 
Currently, PT. PAL, the Indonesian shipbuilder, has continued to build small 
vessels with stealth technology.108 One squadron of F-16s (10 aircraft) has 
been crippled since the U.S. military embargo which paralysed many 
Indonesian fighters. For the F-16s, Indonesia has operated Block 15 since 
the 1960s and, in 2011, in line with the lifting of the military embargo from 
the U.S., Indonesia obtained a grant from the U.S. for 24-unit F-16 C and D 
Block 25 that will be upgraded to Block 52. These 24-unit F-16s were 
expected to fly over Indonesian skies in 2014. .109 In addition, 12 SU-30MK 
that are currently owned have been equipped with the R-77 Rudal. With this 
air-to-air Rudal, Indonesia’s Sukhoi has a Beyond Visual Range capability, 
something that has already been held by other ASEAN states such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
 
 
                                            
106 Interview with Marsetio, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Jakarta, 1 April 2013 
107 Document of Indonesian Navy, accessed 27 March 2013 
108 Interview with Marsetio, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Jakarta, 1 April 2013 
109 Discussions with senior Indonesian Air Force officers, Jakarta, March 2013, See also 
Tim Huxley, ASEAN Defence Policies and Expenditures in Richard Solkolsky, Angel 
Rabasa and C. Richard Neu (ed.), The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward 
China (RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 52  
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6.3. MALAYSIA 
Since the 1980s, the Malaysian Armed Forces has been transitioning 
from a counter-insurgency force to a more conventional one. Its force is 
structured to protect maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea 
and the protection of Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs).110 According to 
SIPRI, the Malaysian defence budget more than doubled between 2000 and 
2008, from US$ 2.4 billion to US$ 5 billion (constant US dollar), and reached 
a stable amount of around US$ 4.7 billion in 2011 and 2012. Malaysia has 
acquired 18 Russian-made, MiG-29Ns, 25 BAe Hawk fighter/bombers, 13 F-
5Es and 8 F/A-18Ds and, in 2003, Malaysia ordered 18 SU-30MKM 
Flankers from Russia.111 Bitzinger states that the MIG-29s and F-5s are 
scheduled to be deactivated in a few years.  
The flurry of big-ticket procurement that characterised the Malaysian 
force modernisation is part of the Versatile Malaysian Armed Forces of the 
21st Century (VMAF21) which included buying submarines, main battle 
tanks, multi-launch rockets, Armour Personnel Carriers and multirole fighter 
aircraft112 under the Eight Plan (2000-05) and Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-
10), which had an emphasis on ground forces with a procurement wish list 
worth US$ 1.8 billion. Malaysia also added 48 PT-91M main battle tanks 
from Poland worth US$ 1.4 billion, along with 15 support vehicles and major 
enhancement in the acquisition of 211 Savunna Sistmeleri from Turkey. 
The Malaysian navy still operates 40 1980s-made frigates, patrol 
craft and coastal vessels armed with Seawolf surface-to-surface missiles 
and Exocet anti-ship missiles. Under their submarine programme, the navy 
                                            
110 Bitzinger (2010), Op.cit, pp. 50-69 
111 Andrew Tan, Force Modernization in Southeast Asia (Singapore; IDSS Working Paper 
59, Jan 2004), p.11 
112 See Robert Karniol, Country Briefing: Malaysia-The Big Push (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
vol. 42, no. 48, 24 Nov 2005) 
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will obtain two Scorpene class boats, and introduce the “capability and the 
launch of a major offshore patrol vessel (OPV) programme”.113 Finally, as in 
the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the OPV programme will be strengthened with six 
German- designed MEKO A100 and 21 more expected in a follow up to 
supplement the two Lekiu-class ships constructed in the UK.  
6.4. SINGAPORE 
Despite Singapore being small in term of size and population, its 
economic importance and military capability rank it amongst Southeast 
Asia’s middle powers. 114  During the 1997 financial crisis, Singapore 
continued its force modernisation. The crisis did not seem to affect it 
significantly. Since the early 1970s, “Singapore has allocated an average of 
6% of its GDP to defence expenditure, which has enabled it to acquire, for a 
state of Singapore’s size, a very capable, modern and well-trained ground, 
air and naval forces”.115 Accordingly, the defence budget increased from 
S$6.1 billion to S$7.3 billion in 1998. Planned defence expenditures also 
increased, in U.S. dollars, from $4.1 billion to $4.3 billion over the same 
period.116  
Singapore’s procurement would have initially indicated a significant 
investment. However, in the Air Force, procurement did not introduce any 
new generation of fighter aircraft until the current year. The Republic of 
Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is the most advanced in Southeast Asia with its 
24 F15SG fighters. Over the past decade, the RSAF has operated 74 F-16s 
Block 52/52+ (the latest type of F-16). It has nearly 200 modern aircraft in its 
inventory. Additionally, the RSAF has a squadron of aircraft tankers            
                                            
113 Karniol (2005), Op.cit   
114 Tan (2004), Op.cit, p. 5 
115 Huxley (2001), Op.cit, p. 48 
116 Ibid; see also The Military Balance 1998/99, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 195 
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(9 aircraft) for the purpose of supporting F-5Es in-flight refuelling capability 
with the capability of extending their range and patrol capability well into the 
South China Sea.117 Furthermore, the RSAF possesses a wide variety of 
sophisticated air-carried ammunition, including the AIM-9X Sidewinder, 
Israeli Phyton IV and U.S. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles 
(AMRAAM).118  
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), has six missile gunboats, 
and six formidable class frigates. Besides these frigates, the RSN has also 
acquired four Type-A12 submarines from Sweden.119 “In 2009, Singapore 
took delivery of two more Swedish Västergötland-class submarines. These 
submarines have been retrofitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP) that 
permits it to remain submerged for much longer periods of time than 
conventional battery-powered diesel-electric submarines”. 120  In short, 
despite recent modernisation efforts, Singaporean armed forces recognise 
the critical importance of technology for effective and modern armed forces.  
6.5. THAILAND 
Thailand’s military expenditure was significantly affected by economic 
instability for a period of time. The Thai defence budget fell more than 30% 
after the 1997 economic crisis, however, military expenditures began to 
rebound to US$3.1 billion in 2000.121 The Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Sinawatra, had approved a modernisation plan totalling US$ 6.6 billion 
                                            
117 Sheldon W. Simon, The Regionalization of Defence in Southeast Asia (Pacific Review, 
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between 2005 and 2015, along with adding approximately US$ 700 million 
per year to the defence budget. 122  The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 
capability has improved significantly with the acquisition of 12 Gripen JAS 
39C/D fighters, two Saab S100B Argus Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 
aircraft with Erieye radar and two Saab 340s. 123  New equipment also 
includes transport helicopters, main battle tanks, Armour Personnel Carriers, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Frigates, Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) 
and SAR aircraft. Thailand upgraded its Lockheed Martin F-16A/B Block 15 
fleet via the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) mechanism in 2010. 
The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has considered developing its capability 
into more of a blue-water force to include the protection of offshore oil and 
gas reserves, and EEZ maritime security. The RTN has expressed interest 
in acquiring submarines but current budget constraints have made this 
unlikely in the near future.  
6.6. VIETNAM 
Within a one-year span, between 2011 and 2012, Vietnam raised its 
military spending by 26.47%. Its defence budget in 2012 was roughly 
US$ 3.3 billion, around 2.4% of Vietnam’s GDP. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Vietnam lost its major arms supplier and soon 
afterwards, its military equipment deteriorated; most of this equipment is 
remained  in serious disrepair due to lack of funds for spare parts. After a 
long period of neglect in defence modernisation, since the 1990s, the 
country has begun to rearm itself. The Vietnamese continue to view China 
as a long-term adversary, thus the country needs a credible naval capability, 
particularly in balancing China’s naval capability. To protect its EEZ 
                                            
122 Bitzinger (2010), Op.cit, p. 58 
123 Asian Military Review, Thailand Defence: Defence and Modernization (5 November 
2013), available at www.asianmilitaryreview.com, accessed on 12 March 2014 
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resources and to enforce its territorial claims in the disputed area of Spratly 
Islands, Vietnam has acquired the first of three Airbus Military C-212 light 
transport aircraft. 124  Vietnam’s navy is currently acquiring three new 
corvettes outfitted with German engines, and British and American radar.125  
In 2009, Vietnam revealed that it would procure six conventional 
diesel powered Kilo-class submarines from Russia at a cost of US$2 billion. 
These submarines would be integrated into the navy since this country 
currently operates only two mini-submarines acquired from North Korea 
over a decade ago.126 Prior to those modernisations, in 2003 the Vietnam 
People’s Air Force (VPAF) had bought 12 Su-27s and 12 Su-30 MKKs to 
modernise its arsenal. In 2011, Vietnam reportedly stepped up its naval 
modernisation programme when it took delivery of four additional Su-30MK2 
multi-role jet fighters. These are expected to be equipped with the Kh-59MK 
anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam currently has on 
order sixteen more Su-30MK2 jet fighters.127  
6.7. Total Strength of Certain ASEAN Member States’ Major 
Weaponry System  
From the detailed account above, it is shown that ASEAN member 
states purchased similar weaponry systems and with an equal capability as 
a bridge for inter-operability. Soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide 
spectrum of roles,128 and it is through standards of equipment, in terms of 
new and modern weapons, that such requirements can be achieved. 
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Standards of equipment amongst national armed forces do not vary greatly. 
The aim is that various national equipment share common facilities and 
communication procedures.129 As has been stated before, many experts 
have said that with current military modernisation, it is feared that it could 
trigger an arms race in Southeast Asia. However, Colin Gray has developed 
a definition of an arms race, which must meet four basic conditions; 1) there 
must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism; 2) they must 
structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of 
the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race 
participants; 3) they must compete in terms of quantity and quality; and 4) 
there must be rapid increases in quantity or improvement in quality. Gray 
also clarified that, ‘there must be a measure of action-reaction, or there 
would be no arms race at all”.130 In fact, the modernisation of ASEAN 
member states’ military does not show any such conditions described by 
Bitzinger or Gray. The modernisation in major military weaponry systems is 
aimed at gaining a sophisticated technology that can be applied within 
ASEAN member states’ military industry to achieve the goal of the ADIC. 
Briefly, the armed forces of selected countries of ASEAN member states as 
described above have the following defence figures (see Table 5.3).131 
 
 
 
 
                                            
129 Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Nicasia Picciano, Effectiveness within NATO Multicultural 
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131 The data was compiled from various sources such as Indonesian National Defence 
Forces Document, SIPRI Year Book and Military Balance as of 2012 
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Table 5.3 
 Defence Figure of Selected ASEAN Member States 
 
Sources: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces, SIPRI Year Book and   Military 
Balance as of 2012 
7. The Elements of a Defence Community in Southeast Asian 
Defence Cooperation Under the Auspices of ADMM  
Although the notion of inter-operability has been discussed in brief in 
Chapter 4, it is necessary to add at this point another discussion that can 
reinforce the importance of conducting inter-operability smoothly to prove 
the existence of the elements of a defence community in ASEAN’s defence 
cooperation.132 As has been stated earlier, current defence cooperation or 
defence diplomacy amongst ASEAN member states contains the elements 
or characteristic of defence community. Explanations of forms of a defence 
community usually refers to NATO as a role model. NATO has been 
developing inter-operability since the alliance was founded in 1949. Tresch 
and Picciano define the objective of inter-operability as “the capability of 
different military organisations to conduct joint operations. It allows forces, 
units or systems to operate together, to share common doctrine and 
                                            
132 In various document of ASEAN’s defence cooperation, either in the form of joint exercise 
or combined training amongst ASEAN member states; it is always stated that the aim of 
those cooperation is to achieved inter-operability as the main requirement of the existence 
of Defence Community elements 
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procedures and to be able to communicate with one another”.133 Inter-
operability reduces duplication within the alliance, allows the pooling of 
resources and does not necessarily require common military equipment. It is 
important for this equipment to be housed in common facilities and to be 
inter-operable with other equipment.134 Otherwise, inter-operability is difficult 
to achieve. 
 “NATO militaries have achieved inter-operability through joint 
planning, training and exercises within NATO-led operations that could 
include disaster relief, humanitarian relief, search and rescue, and peace 
support operations”. 135  Moreover, inter-operability requires the 
establishment of necessary levels of compatibility, interchangeability or 
commonality in operational, procedural, material, technical and 
administrative fields. In addition, NATO standardisation agreements, known 
as STANAGs, establish processes, procedures, terms and conditions for 
common military or technical procedures or equipment shared by NATO 
member nations. 136  Whereas, in defence cooperation amongst ASEAN 
member states, standardisation of weaponry systems is still in the process 
of being established as stated in the concept of the ADIC. Up to now, the 
document of foreign defence cooperation intra-ASEAN stated the aim and 
purpose of the use of joint military assets.137 
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Since the inauguration of ADMM in 2006, defence cooperation 
amongst ASEAN member states has been conducted on bilateral and 
trilateral bases, mainly under the auspices of this institution. 138  At the 
bilateral level, cooperation is based on a series of bilateral understandings 
or arrangements between two ASEAN states. Bilateral border and maritime 
security arrangements have become common practices since the 1970s. 
For instance, bilateral border security cooperation existed between 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and between Malaysia and Thailand, and normally 
involved a combined task force headquarters, as well as the combined and 
unilateral operations.139  
The scope of bilateral cooperation also includes joint military 
exercises, training and cooperation on the standardisation of weaponry 
systems. At the multilateral level, cooperation usually involves two ASEAN 
members and an external power, with multilateral cooperation between 
ASEAN member states. One multilateral cooperation currently in effect, for 
example, is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which relates to 
the defence of Malaysia and Singapore with Great Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand. 140  
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The common desire of ASEAN member states is to maintain regional 
security; it is within such a context that ASEAN member states strengthen 
their defence diplomacy. Regional security issues, multilateral as well as 
bilateral, have never been absent from ASEAN meetings on regional 
security.  “The bilateral security linkages that have developed amongst 
ASEAN states fall into two distinct categories. The first includes measures 
geared to counter internal threats to the members, as well as sharing of 
intelligence about subversive elements. The second form of cooperation 
addresses the external threats to regional security, as well as measures to 
enhance the long-term self-reliance of the members in security and defence. 
These measures include joint exercises, training, cooperation in arms 
manufacturing and the exchange of senior level personnel for familiarization 
with each other’s military establishments”.141 The table below indicates the 
various levels of defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states (see 
Table 5.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
141  Amitav Acharya, Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A 
Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Journal of Peace 
Research Replication Data, vol. 29, no. 1, 1992, SAGE), p. 13 
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Table 5.4 142 
Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Mil i tary Exercise 
Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, 9 May 2011; Military exercise as 
revealed by the table are excluded by six members of ASEAN only. There was no data 
confirming the involvement of CMLV countries in the military cooperation between 
themselves. 
 
 
Indonesia and the Philippines’ joint naval exercise in 1972 were 
noted as the first bilateral defence cooperation between two ASEAN states, 
followed by a series of bilateral cooperation events between ASEAN states 
                                            
142 Data compilation from Indonesian National Defence Forces HQ; See also See Seng 
Tan, ‘Talking Their Walk?’ The Evolution of Defence Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Asian 
Security, vol. 8, no. 3, Oct 2012), p. 235 
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such as joint naval exercises between Singapore and Indonesia in 1974, air 
force exercises in 1980 and land forces in 1989. A MoU signed in March 
1989 “made provision for Singapore troops to train in Indonesia. Following 
their successful joint development of the Siabu Air Weapons Range (in 
eastern Sumatra), Singapore and Indonesia proceeded, in 1991, to develop 
an electronic Air Combat Manoeuvre Range (ACMR) at Pekan Baru, near 
Siabu”.143 The ACMR was completed in 1995 and the process of updating 
the new MoU on military cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore in 
an agreement called the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was 
terminated.144  
At the same time, Malaysia and Indonesia began the process of 
confidence-building through border security cooperation and joint exercises 
soon after ASEAN was established. Their series of joint exercises now 
comprise Exercise Kekar Malindo (Army), Exercise Malindo Jaya (Navy), 
Exercise Elang Malindo (Air Force), and Exercise Malindo Darsasa (Armed 
Forces). Singapore-Malaysia defence cooperation outside the Five-Power 
Defence Arrangements (FPDA) rubric took some time to gather momentum 
but has also advanced.145 For example, the Singapore-Malaysia Defence 
Cooperation Forum, jointly chaired by the two Defence Ministers, has been 
set up to focus on joint training and defence industry projects.146  
 
                                            
143 Khoo How San, The Role of Defence/Military in Regional Security Cooperation: An 
Interpretation of the ASEAN Practice (Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, vol. 26, no. 
3 Jul – Sep 2000) 
144 The MoU between Indonesia and Singapore on Defence Cooperation Agreement for 
Military Training Area had been terminated on 11 March 2009; see also Document of 
Indonesian National Defence Force, accessed on 22 August 2013; Berita Sore, RI – 
Singapore DCA Terminated; Minister, www.beritasore.com, had been accessed in 
September 2010 
145 San (2000), Op.cit  
146 Ibid 
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Before the financial crisis in 1997, bilateral defence cooperation 
between ASEAN member states took place more regularly. The quality of 
cooperation and activities amongst defence ministry officials and senior 
officers from ASEAN states was incredibly high. Amongst the founding 
fathers of ASEAN were close security partners, although at the same time 
those countries engaged in security cooperation with external powers, albeit 
to varying degrees. Thailand, for instance, has had long-established border 
security cooperation with Malaysia, and also conducts bilateral military 
exercises with Malaysia and Singapore. In recent years, “Brunei and the 
Philippines have, since the end of the Cold War, become more involved in 
this web of security cooperation”.147  
Another defence cooperation between ASEAN member states was 
the cooperation along their common land and sea borders for several years 
on a bilateral and trilateral basis. “There have been four bilateral border 
security arrangements within ASEAN: between Thailand and Malaysia, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and Malaysia and 
the Philippines. The most important arrangements related to communist 
insurgency are the ones between Malaysia and Thailand, and Malaysia and 
Indonesia”.148 The most successful example of such cooperation has been 
the 1976 Thai-Malaysian Border Agreement, which is considered as ‘the 
most extensive institutionalization of joint military action between two 
ASEAN states”.149  
The Malaysia-Thailand arrangements constitute the earliest and most 
comprehensive form of such cooperation within ASEAN. Soon after the new 
                                            
147 Ibid 
148 Acharya (1992), Op.cit, p. 14 
149 Sheldon W. Simon (1982), The ASEAN States and Regional Security (Hoover Institute 
Press, Stanford University, 1982), p. 88 
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agreement was signed, the two states launched a major military operation 
(a force of 5,000 men) against an estimated 200 insurgents in the area. The 
operation continued throughout 1977 and 1978, thus making the combined 
efforts the most extensive bilateral collaboration amongst the ASEAN 
states.150 The Thai-Malaysian border agreements were used as a basis for 
establishing similar types of cooperation amongst other ASEAN member 
states with respect to border insurgency control.151  
The Indonesia-Malaysia border cooperation has been much more 
smooth and effective. Malaysia and Indonesia have long coordinated 
military actions to suppress the Communist insurgents along their Sarawak-
Kalimantan border in Borneo.152 These operations were largely responsible 
for a dramatic fall in the number of insurgents. The border committee shifted 
its attention to military threats from the South China Sea and devised a 
series of military exercises. In 1984, the twelve-year old Malaysian-
Indonesian agreement was revised. The new agreement extends an 
existing pattern of military cooperation to all borders, including maritime 
borders as well as the combined use of naval and air forces.153 The table 
below indicates intra-ASEAN bilateral defence cooperation (see Table 5.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
150 Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States’ Obstacle to Security Cooperation (Orbis, vol. 
22, no. 2, Summer 1978), pp. 420-425 
151 John McBecth and K. Das, A Frontier of Fears and Factions (FEER, 20 January 1980), 
pp. 16-22 
152 Simon (1978), Op.cit, p. 420-425 
153 Acharya (1990), Op.cit, pp. 1-2 
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Table 5.5 
Bilateral Defence Cooperation intra-ASEAN 
Source: Indonesian National Defence Force Archive and Researcher’s compilation data  
 
  ASEAN defence cooperation is particularly aimed not only at managing 
commonly perceived regional threats and challenges, but also as an instrument to 
build cooperation beyond confidence-building measures. It was clearly stated by 
CCB A !C # BBD .CBBD
+B ! "AAA !C "AABBD
"!A!"!
"  D!BC
!BDA!C
!C!*!B
"!C CA+*AB
 CA+"#AC"!BC"
!!BDA!C!
 AC AB#CA"
+B -##!B "AAA !C "AABBD"EA

"C "EA
E!D!AC!C+
"DCCA !C
"!C CA+*AB
! CA+!"A C"!
*!B
!"!B -##! "AAA !C "AABBD
"!A!
-A"*AB"
!E+!!E#CA"C"
B D!#A+
!B# !C"
A B
!#"A -##! A!!
CB
A !C
""#AC"!"!A

"ACA!!
CB!
-##!

!#"A ! A!!
CB
A !C
""#AC"!"!
A +CA!!
CB!!

!#"A AD! A!!
CB
A !C
""#AC"!"!
A +CA!!
CB!AD!

!#"A !"!B A!!
CB
A !C
"!CAF#"!
CBC!A!!
!"A*AB
A
,E*AB!"!C
!E+#CA"!
BCAC
+B !"!B "AAA !C "AABBD
"!A!"EA
 !C! 
AF!

!C!*!B
"!C CA+*AB
 CA+"#AC"!BC"
"D!CA!BDA!C!
*#!C" AC 
BDAC+BBDB
+B !#"A CA+	*AB CA+!!D
*AB
	*#!C"!CAC
A!+BC 
 
 160 
the then Chief of Malaysia’s Defence Force, General Hashim Mohammed Ali, that 
“the main aims of ASEAN defence and security cooperation is to reduce conflict 
and to facilitate confidence building measures”.154 Repetition in military exercise 
has also opened an opportunity for all personnel to gain skills and understanding 
in achieving inter-operability and integration amongst armed forces, and in turn 
this will naturally develop defence links within ASEAN. The above activities serve 
as a defence diplomacy effort within ASEAN, in that the development of intra-
ASEAN defence ties will increase familiarity and understanding amongst the 
ASEAN member states. Such conditions could generate ASEAN credibility and 
ensure its increasing capability to guarantee its own security. 
Over the past few years, several ASEAN member states have developed a 
network of informal bilateral defence ties that are often described as an “ASEAN 
defence spider web”.155 Underpinning this form of cooperation is a “widespread 
conviction on the part of ASEAN leaders that bilateral cooperation offers 
advantages over other forms of multilateral military cooperation”.156 In the words 
of the former chief of the Malaysian armed forces: 
“Bilateral defence cooperation is flexible and provides wide-ranging 
options. It allows any ASEAN partner to decide the type, time, and scale 
of aid it requires and can provide. The question of national independence 
and sovereignty is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of 
an alliance where members can evoke the terms of the treaty and 
interfere in the affairs of another partner”.157 
 
Within ASEAN, “mutual use of facilities has increased and there has been 
a significant increase in joint military exercises, with a focus on air and naval 
operations in maritime scenarios”,158 as has been explained in detail, such as the 
                                            
154 Bandoro (2000), Op.cit, p. 193 
155 Huxley (2001), Op.cit, p. 43 
156 Ibid 
157 As quoted in Acharya (1992), Op.cit, p. 13 
158 Huxley (2001), Op.cit, p. 44 
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Malaysian-Thai joint air exercises which have been extended to patrol maritime 
areas, cooperation agreements that provide “for regular joint military exercises, 
military information exchanges and the possible use of each other’s military 
facilities for maintenance and repair”.159 Furthermore, the Thai and Singapore air 
forces train together in the Philippines, and Singapore has also had access to 
excellent training facilities in Brunei. 160  Meanwhile, Singapore has cultivated 
defence ties with Indonesia and has reached agreements that allow Singapore to 
conduct naval exercises in Indonesian waters. 
In explaining the requirements of inter-operability and integration between 
armed forces,  we can analyse from the diagram below, a structural organisation 
of bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia that shows the 
similarity of elements to handle the exercise, which in turn paves the way for the 
purposes of bridging  the gap of inter-operability between ASEAN states’ armed 
forces (see Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2161 
Indonesia–Malaysia Border Security Cooperation Diagram  
 
Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces 
Note. This diagram is the General Border Committee structure between Indonesia – Malaysia: in 
this committee, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the respective country occupies 
the highest level of the committee  
                                            
159 Ibid 
160 Ibid 
161 Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, 9 May 2011 
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The legal basis of such cooperation is an arrangement on the border 
between the government of Indonesia and the government of Malaysia, 
signed on 3 December, 1984 in Yogyakarta. Indonesia was represented by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General LB Moerdani, while 
the Malaysian side was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Malaysia, Dato’ Mas Bin Hitam. The cooperation between both Armed 
Forces was programmed in the forum of the General Border Committee 
Malaysia-Indonesia (GBC Malindo) and the agencies under it, with the 
scope of cooperation in the form of joint training, joint operations, exchange 
of students, exchange of reciprocal visiting officers and military officials.162  
The General Border Committee calls a meeting once every two years, 
in which the Indonesian side is led by the Defence Minister of the Republic 
of Indonesia, and the Malaysian side is led by the Minister of Defence for 
Malaysia. Meanwhile, the High-Level Committee Malaysia-Indonesia (HLC) 
conducts a meeting once a year alternately, in which the Indonesian side is 
led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the Malaysian 
side is also led by its Chief of Armed Forces. The agencies under the HLC 
were coordinated by Assistants to the Commander-in-Chief for Operations 
from both sides. Agencies supervised by the HLC include a steering team 
for intelligence, communication, SAR, socio-economy, joint police 
operations, and a steering team for land, naval and air force operations. 
These steering teams have a schedule to conduct a meeting once a year 
alternately in Indonesia or Malaysia.163 
Another example is the structural organisation of bilateral security 
cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore (see Figure 5.3). 
                                            
162 Document of Indonesian National Defence Force in relation with Defence Cooperation of 
Indonesia with other ASEAN member states. 10 May 2011 
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Figure 5.3 
Indonesia-Singapore Security Cooperation Diagram 
 
Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces 
Note. This diagram is the Indonesia–Singapore Combined Annual Report Meeting 
between the two countries which involves all military services in joint training 
 
A similar organisation has also been formed between Singapore and 
Indonesia. The cooperation was begun with an Army joint exercise with the 
code name, ‘Safkar Indopura’, a Navy joint exercise with the code name, 
‘Eagle Indopura’ and an Air Force joint exercise with the code name, ‘Elang 
Indopura’. In addition, for the purpose of border security cooperation, both 
countries have programmed a forum as a Combined Annual Report Meeting 
(CARM). This forum has scheduled a meeting once a year alternately in 
Indonesia or Singapore in which the Chief of Defence Force/CDF 
(Commander in Chief) has led the meeting. 164  
The agencies under CARM are the TSASM (TNI-SAF Annual Staff 
Meeting), which conducts a meeting once a year in rotation. In this agency, 
both countries are led by the Chief of General Staff for Indonesia and the 
Chief of Staff-Joint Staff for Singapore, positions equal to a three-star 
general. Other committees under CARM are the Joint Coordinating 
Committee, Joint Training Committee, Joint Logistic Committee and Joint 
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Air Force Training Working Group. All these committees are led by two-star 
generals or their equivalent, in order that such high-ranking personnel can 
make any crucial decision when it is needed with immediate effect.165 
Intelligence sharing cooperation between the Indonesia Armed 
Forces Intelligence Staff-Joint Intelligence Directorate SAF based on the 
Arrangements for the Exchange of Intelligence between the Indonesian 
Armed Forces Intelligence Staff and JID SAF was signed on 1 March, 2001 
in Singapore. The signatories were the Assistant to the Indonesian Armed 
Forces C-in-C for Intelligence and the Director of JID SAF. Technical 
cooperation between the two armed forces included the use of a training 
area in Baturaja for the Indonesian Army and the Singapore Army, the use 
of a training area in Kayu Ara for the Indonesian Navy and the Singapore 
Navy and the use of the Military Training Area (MTA-1 & 2) for Singapore 
Armed Forces. These training areas are located in Indonesian territory. 
Singapore is the main beneficiary of this form of cooperation with its 
constraint of small air and land space for training. A series of other 
cooperative events are Over Flying Training Area (OFTA) in Pekanbaru, 
cooperation for Air Weapon Range (AWR) in Siabu and cooperation for Air 
Combat Manoeuvre Range (ACMR) at the Indonesian Air Force Base, 
Pekanbaru.  
Furthermore, the form of multilateral security or defence cooperation 
can be analysed from this diagram of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia-
Thailand (see Figure 5.4). 
 
 
                                            
165 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry 
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Figure 5.4 
Malaysia–Singapore–Indonesia–Thailand  
Security Cooperation Diagram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Document of Indonesian National Defence Forces 
Note. This diagram is the Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand Multilateral 
Security Cooperation structure on the Malacca Strait Patrol 
 
At a multilateral level is the cooperation between Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand for the security of the Malacca Straits. At 
an early phase, this cooperation was undertaken first by three countries: 
Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO). However, in its development 
since the signing of the MoU, Thailand became the fourth country to join this 
organisation. The MoU was signed by the Assistant to the Commander–in-
Chief of Armed Forces for Operations, INDF (Indonesia); the Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Defence Operations and Training, MAF (Malaysia); the Head of 
Naval Operations, RSN (Singapore); and the Chief of Staff, 3rd Naval Area 
Command, RTN (Thailand). Finally, the Terms of Reference for the Malacca 
Straits Patrol (MSP) was also signed by four countries, namely, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the INDF (Indonesia); the Chief of Defence Force, 
MAF (Malaysia); the Chief of Defence Force, SAF (Singapore) and the 
Supreme Commander of RTAF (Thailand) on September 18th, 2008 in 
Bangkok.  
This cooperation covers security cooperation in the Straits of 
Malacca, called the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP). Two kinds of security 
MSP JCC 
  
 MSSP 
JWG  IEG 
EiS 
JWG 
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cooperation are implemented, namely: 1) in the sea area, called the 
Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), which executes an activity of 
coordinated sea patrols in their respective territories; and 2) in the airspace, 
implementing a joint air maritime patrol called Eyes in the Sky (EiS). This 
patrol uses aircraft from one of the signatory countries alternately, and in 
this aircraft there are crew as Liaison Officers from signatory countries 
called the CMPT (Combined Mission Patrol Team). The Patrol aims to 
support the implementation of the marine patrols.  
To evaluate these two patrols, a joint committee was formed with the 
Malacca Straits Patrol Joint Coordinating Committee (MSP JCC) led by four 
Operational Assistants to Chiefs of Defence Forces of the signatory countries; 
to evaluate the implementation of the marine patrol itself was the Malacca 
Straits Sea Patrol Joint Working Group (MSSP JWG), whereas the Eyes in the 
Sky Joint Working Group (EiS JWG) was formed for air patrols. 
From these structures, personnel composition and the integration of 
military force in conducting sea patrol, we can analyse that, for high level and 
operational structures, matters are always handled by the Chief of Defence 
Forces or staff (flag officers) under his direct command. This indicates that in 
every bilateral or multilateral cooperation, ASEAN member states have the 
intention to conduct a joint effort and to bridge the gap of; 1) the development 
of a common doctrine and language; 2) the standardisation of equipment; and 
3) the development of common logistic facilities. It is believed that, with the 
same structures and the continuance of joint exercises, the above gaps will be 
reduced and all personnel will reach the same standard. Moreover, through 
this training or cooperation, the forces can reach the target of being able to 
work as a unit or system that operates together and, most notably, the forces 
are able to communicate with one another in wider terms. 
 167 
The cooperation effort of these countries either in border security 
cooperation or in the, also includes the intelligence staff which subsequently 
develop the information system in every exercise to improve coordination 
and situational awareness amongst the participating countries. Cooperation 
implies that regional cooperation amongst ASEAN militaries is much more 
the use enhancing mutual trust and confidence building measures, as it is a 
nascent experiment in preventive diplomacy.166 Exchange of military training 
represents another aspect of ASEAN defence diplomacy. Firm and strong 
bilateral relations between ASEAN members are a sufficient foundation for 
multilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, military cooperation within ASEAN is 
valuable because it advances non-military goals, such as transparency and 
confidence building.167 This cooperation as the implementation of defence 
diplomacy reflects, is indeed a growing trend towards military “cooperative 
arrangements to work for the common security of countries”.168 Therefore, it 
is no surprise that ASEAN members try to strengthen their intra-mural 
partnership, habits of cooperation and conflict avoidance, 169 and will 
ultimately strengthen the unity as a community. 
8.  ADMM and ADMM-Plus Impacts Regional Security Architecture. 
ADMM plays an important role in the internal structures of the ASEAN 
member states and has a positive impact on regional security and stability, 
especially on peace and maritime security operations.  Cooperation in the 
ASEAN defence sector has grown steadily since its inception in 2006. Work in 
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humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), in particular, has been 
progressing at a significant pace. Similarly, cooperation in the area of 
peacekeeping operations and the defence industry has moved steadily with the 
adoption of the Concept Papers on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping 
Centres Network and on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration by the 5th 
ADMM in 2011. Initiatives on establishing the ASEAN Defence Interaction 
Programme and an ADMM Logistics Support Framework were also adopted by 
the 7th ADMM in 2013. Implementation of these initiatives is currently underway. 
Another important new ADMM initiative is the establishment of a Direct 
Communications Link, which was adopted by the 8th ADMM in 2014. The Link, 
when established, will be a practical confidence and security-building measure 
that aims to promote quick response cooperation in emergency situations, in 
particular relating to maritime security.170 
 ADMM activities that are aimed at encouraging humanitarian operations 
for the purpose of peace and maritime security operations in response to the 
threat in the region have a real impact on the ASEAN countries in the region. 
With reference to regional security architecture, the ADMM has had a number of 
achievements since its establishment. Cooperation with humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) has been expanded through the ADMM, 
with the adoption of the concept paper on the use of ASEAN military assets and 
capacities for HADR at the 3rd ADMM in 2009.  Eight workshops on cooperation 
between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations on non-
traditional security issues have been conducted.171    
                                            
170  Stated in the document of ADMM Website available at 
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At present, in step-by-step implementation, the ASEAN Coordinating 
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) 
receives an annual contribution of US$30,000 from ASEAN member states 
totalling US$300,000 for operating costs. As a result, direct contributions do not 
cover the current level of coordination activities, which in actuality, needs further 
development. While the AHA Centre was able to go beyond the region and 
receive donations from dialogue partners as part of its first Work Programme, 
the continuation and reliance on external funding sources for its operations is 
unsustainable.172 
 With the contribution of above funds, disaster management has 
become very significant for the ASEAN region as a humanitarian mission 
which is very important for the political stability in the region. 
 In addition, major achievements during this period include the 
establishment of the National Points of Contact (POCs), the common 
framework for information sharing, and the inventory of medical support 
capabilities. Standard Operating Procedures for Joint and Combined 
Medical Operations (SOPs-MM) were also developed to enhance the 
effectiveness of disaster medical assistance. Moreover, joint table-top 
exercises (scenario-based) were conducted. Such collective efforts led to a 
successful launch of the joint HADR/Military Medicine exercise in Brunei 
Darussalam in June 2013, which involved about 3,200 personnel, seven 
ships, and 15 helicopters from 18 ADMM-Plus nations. In October 2013, 
Singapore and Japan handed over Co-Chairmanship to Thailand and 
Russia at the Third EWG meeting on military medicine in Singapore.173 
                                            
172 Roundtable On The Future of The ADMM/ADMM-Plus and Defence Diplomacy in The 
Asia Pacific, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/PR160223_Future-of-the-ADMM.pdf , accessed on 21 November 
2016, p. 39. 
173 Ibid. 
 170 
From these facts, one realises that the existence of ADMM has been 
a real achievement. Integration between ASEAN countries can be seen by 
the contribution of each country in both the policy and operational level in 
the field. This has huge implications for security in the region. 
In addition, the management of security in the region also reflects the 
positive impact of the ADMM. The ADMM has made significant progress in 
dealing with real and current security issues. ASEAN centrality in the 
emerging multilateral and multilayered regional security institutions is the 
key to managing the power rivalry amongst the big countries so that peace 
and stability can be assured.174 
Another issue that is often discussed and which is an area of concern 
is maritime security in Southeast Asia. Many ASEAN economies are 
critically dependent on the maritime trade that flows through sea lanes such 
as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South China Sea. ASEAN 
also shares other security interests in areas such as counter-proliferation 
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As they go forward, 
enhanced practical cooperation amongst ASEAN and other major security 
partners will be crucial in tackling these transnational security challenges 
and enhancing regional peace and stability.175 
Comprehensively, the role of the ADMM in regional security, found in 
the successive establishment of ARF, ADMM and other relevant multilateral 
mechanisms in recent years, has further emboldened this trend, stemming 
from changes across four key variables:176 
                                            
174 ASEAN Security Outlook, 2015, p. 28 
175 Ibid., p. 64. 
176 From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Evolution and Prospect of ASEAN Defense 
Cooperation, available on http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-03/10/content_7733810.htm, 
accessed on 21 November 2016 
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8.1. Perception of Security Challenges 
ASEAN countries have generally perceived their security challenges 
in three different dimensions. First, they see increasing external challenges. 
The withdrawal of United States troops from the Philippines left a security 
vacuum in Southeast Asia, alerting ASEAN states to the possibility that 
regional powers would step in to fill it. The rise of China and remilitarization 
of Japan, in particular, provided external pressure on ASEAN to foster a 
collective security concept and to strengthen multilateral coordination. 
Second, there has been an increase in intra-regional uncertainty. Territorial 
disputes between some ASEAN members that were concealed during the 
Cold War resurfaced in the 1990s, for example, the controversies over Batu 
Puteh, Sipadan and Ligitan, as well as various fishing areas.177 This trend 
has been exacerbated by the arms race in Southeast Asia, pushing ASEAN 
policymakers to develop confidence-building measures to avoid multilateral 
conflict. Third, there has been a rise in transnational/non-traditional security 
threats. Non-traditional threats, such as piracy, terrorism and natural 
disasters often extend beyond the boundaries of individual states, requiring 
joint efforts from the armed forces of all regional countries. 
8.2. Defence Gaps Between Member States 
Operational and technical barriers, including the lack of 
standardization and differences in doctrines, are not insurmountable, even 
though they remain significant.178 First, the doctrinal and language gap has 
been slowly bridged through bilateral cooperation, such as joint training 
exercises. Second, the capacity gap has been reduced by military build-up 
and modernization. In recent years, most ASEAN armed forces have shifted 
                                            
177 http://www.csis.org.cn/layout.xsit 
178 ibid 
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their focuses from anti-insurgency to conventional warfare, providing both 
conditions and motivations for broader and more pragmatic cooperation. 
8.3. Level of Regional Integration 
According to a report conducted by ADSOM in 2008, the latest 
developments in ASEAN will help provide guidance to all ASEAN sectoral 
bodies, including the defence sector.179 The second Bali Concord (2003), 
the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN community Blueprint and other related 
documents set common goals and a norms-based framework for ASEAN 
defence cooperation. 
8.4. External Factors 
One of the most prominent trends since the end of the Cold War has 
been the rise of multilateralism worldwide, illustrated by intersecting 
multilateral mechanisms in Asia – EAS, APEC, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and more relevantly, WPNS and the Shangri-La Dialogue.180 
This has fostered a regional climate conducive to ASEAN multilateral 
cooperation. Furthermore, the previous reluctance of the United States 
towards defence multilateralism has seen some changes. While still relying 
on bilateral alliances, the United States has started playing a much more 
positive role in advancing multilateral defence networks both in Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia. 
With the participation of countries outside ASEAN or ADMM Plus, the 
expansion of security involving major countries outside the ASEAN region 
has made a space for political maneuvering on behalf of the region. ASEAN 
will gain more bargaining power over China on maritime issues, which may 
introduce complexity into bilateral relations and regional stability. It should 
                                            
179 Ibid 
180 http://www.csis.org.cn/layout.xsit 
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be noted, however, that even with closer defense ties, ASEAN still does not 
have the willingness and capacity to confront China. On the contrary, 
multilateral defense communications can promote mutual trust and help 
foster the habit of cooperation amongst militaries. With more pragmatic 
cooperation, such as joint exercises and sharing of military assets, ASEAN 
and other regional countries will be in a better position to combat complex 
security challenges. 
More importantly, this cooperation will strengthen ‘ASEAN Centrality’ 
by enhancing ASEAN awareness and capacity, which helps ASEAN play a 
bigger role in regional security cooperation, and will inject new vitality into 
current multilateral mechanisms such as the ADMM–Plus and ARF. The 
enhanced defense networking amongst ASEAN states will help facilitate, 
not destabilize, regional peace and multi-polarity. China always welcomes 
and supports ‘ASEAN Centrality’ in regional cooperation. In addition to 
bilateral exchanges, more attention must be paid to multilateral defense 
cooperation with ASEAN in future. As Chinese defense minister Chang 
Wanquan stated: “China is ready to take concerted efforts with all ASEAN 
parties to actively utilize the existing security mechanisms, strengthen 
communication and synergy and jointly promote the building of new regional 
security cooperation architecture with Asian characteristics.”181 
9. Summary 
The discussion in this chapter reveals that ASEAN has, since the 
early seventies, been conducting a series of defence cooperative events 
between its members and between ASEAN and external powers, for 
example, in the form of defence dialogue, regional defence meetings and 
joint military exercises. Such defence cooperation serves as the basis for 
                                            
181 Ibid. 
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ASEAN to build a much stronger foundation to promote trust and regional 
security. It is through intensive defence cooperation that one can see the 
operationalisation of defence diplomacy to tackle the security issues in 
Southeast Asia. Currently, the most important form of defence cooperation 
in ASEAN is a series of bilateral and multilateral military exercises involving 
land, air and naval forces.  
In examining whether the elements of a defence community in 
Southeast Asia exist or not, this chapter shows the presence of a common 
vision amongst ASEAN leaders that, to address security issues in the region, 
the area of defence cooperation should be strengthened and 
institutionalised. Defence diplomacy has been conducted under the 
auspices of the ADMM, in which this institution adopted the concept of the 
ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) as a concrete medium to 
obtain the standardisation of major weaponry systems. Such cooperation, it 
is believed, will enhance the capacity of the ASEAN member states’ Armed 
Forces. The increase of the defence budget for modernisation is an attempt 
to acquire sophisticated technology in major weaponry systems which would 
then be developed within the mechanism of the ADIC. The mastery of high-
tech major weaponry systems will improve the ability and capacity of the 
ASEAN member states’ military, which in turn will support the inter-
operability amongst the military in the region when the integration of military 
forces  is required.  
All the requirements that demonstrate the existence of a defence 
community are present in the ASEAN member states’ defence cooperation. 
Despite this, ASEAN is not a military alliance but the concept that was 
developed by ASEAN in its defence diplomacy practice envisaged the 
synchronisation attempts of forces, as required by inter-operability, 
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containing the elements of a defence community. In short, ASEAN’s 
defence diplomacy in the form of practical cooperation will certainly 
contribute to the building up of the ASEAN defence community, which will 
be discussed more in the next chapter as a case study. 
 
Chapter Six 
THE ROAD TO A DEFENCE COMMUNITY? 
 
1. Introduction 
 This chapter attempts to further analyse the phenomenon of ASEAN 
military cooperation that has been implemented so far. Non-traditional 
challenges faced by ASEAN urged ASEAN leaders to evaluate defence 
cooperatives that have already been implemented,, as well as finding new 
ways to overcome the challenges. Regional and multilateral cooperation has 
been developed to meet these challenges. In this chapter, two practical 
defence cooperatives were selected, namely: peacekeeping operations in the 
form of a peacekeeping centre network and maritime security. To better identify 
the presence of elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia, the role 
and function of defence diplomacy conducted in ASEAN is elaborated further.  
 This chapter commences with a forum of ASEAN’s top officials who tried 
to find solutions for the security problems that evolved in Southeast Asia. 
Based on an insight into the topics on the agenda of regional dialogue 
mechanisms from 2000, it appears that transnational cooperation in the region 
extends to non-traditional issues, one of which focuses on natural disaster 
management cooperation. Behind these natural disasters are opportunities for 
ASEAN member states to gather momentum in their efforts to establish an 
ASEAN Community. ASEAN leaders agreed to intensify further cooperation in 
tackling the disaster. In 2011, ASEAN militaries conducted their first multilateral 
tabletop exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises,1 a 
symbolically important step as a community. 
                                            
1 Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed.), From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The Rise of 
Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no 21, 2011), p. 9 
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 In the next section, the efforts of ASEAN member states in the field of 
peacekeeping operations and maritime security, two areas of practical 
cooperation deliberately chosen, will be elaborated in order to analyse the 
existence of the elements of a defence community in Southeast Asia, as 
these two practical cooperation examples are contained with the 
improvement of inter-operability capability activities and the unification of 
military forces. With the formation of the ADMM, there appears to be a 
sense of shared amongst ASEAN leaders, who see it as a key (and for a 
long time, a missing) piece of the architectural puzzle without which the 
regional organisation cannot become a single community. ASEAN member 
states realise that no one member state can act alone to counter a myriad of 
security and defence issues, hence, cooperation at ASEAN level or regional 
level is needed. 
 The 2007 ADMM agreed on a concept paper that set out the 
modalities and principles in the event that a wider meeting with ASEAN’s 
dialogue partners might be created. Based on the concept paper of a 
previous ADMM, which involved the participation of extra regional powers, 
the region of concern is effectively Southeast Asia. The outcome from that 
defence ministers’ meeting included the adoption of papers on the 
deployment of ASEAN military asset capabilities for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). 2  The principles of cooperation 
between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations on 
non-traditional security challenges and the development of a mechanism for 
regional defence industry collaboration, can be said to be the indicators of a 
                                            
2 See Special ASEAN Leaders Summit on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, 
Annex D, The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (Concept Paper), Jakarta, 6 January 2005; See also The ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) 26 July 2005, 
available at www.asean.org, accessed on 12 April 2015 
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defence community mechanism in ASEAN. Through such practical defence 
diplomacy, ASEAN leaders support the vision of an ASEAN Community. 
This included the promotion of regional peace and stability through defence 
and security cooperation. 
2. The Process of Mil i tary Involvement in Handling Non-
Tradit ional Threats 
The tsunami in late December 2004 that hit some countries in the 
Indian Ocean Rim such as India, Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka has 
encouraged ASEAN member states to reorganise and strengthen 
cooperation in the field of disaster management. Commitment of ASEAN 
member states to help each other at the time of disasters were contained in 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord on 24th February, 1976. 3  The 
declaration states that, "Natural disasters and other major calamities can 
retard the pace of development of member status, therefore they shall 
extend, within reviews of their capabilities, assistance for the relief of 
member states in distress”.4 ASEAN leaders agreed to make the issue of 
disaster management one of the important factors in the objectives of 
ASEAN cooperation. 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Bali on 7th October, 2003, 
reaffirms the importance of intensifying cooperation in the area of disaster 
management.5 To be able to optimise cooperation, the ASEAN member 
states agreed to form the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management 
                                            
3 Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed on 24th February, 1976 in Bali, Indonesia by 
ASEAN member Heads of State/Government, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
and the Philippines in the pursuit of political stability in the region. It produced the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
4 Dirjen Kerjasama ASEAN, Deplu RI, ASEAN Selayang Pandang (Jakarta: 2005) 
5 ASEAN Concord II also known as the Bali Concord II was the 9th ASEAN Summit, a 
meeting on 7th October, 2003 in Bali, Indonesia. ASEAN leaders signed a declaration to 
pursue closer economic integration by 2020 
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(ACDM). 6  This committee was given the mandate to manage disaster 
management cooperation, including preparing the work programme and its 
priority activities. This cooperation is considered important by ASEAN 
leaders, in relation to the trend of increasing numbers of disasters in the 
Southeast Asia region. This was triggered because the ASEAN member 
countries are located in disaster-prone areas, subject to earthquakes, 
landslides, tsunamis, floods, droughts, fire and smoke. As an example of the 
importance of cooperation, the tsunami in 2004 shows that ASEAN still has 
weaknesses in handling large-scale natural disasters. The effect  from this 
disaster where a joint regional emergency response could not be 
immediately deployed on the ground because there was no agency in 
ASEAN specifically coordinating disaster management caused great 
concern. The experience encouraged the Government of Indonesia to take 
the initiative to organise the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on 
Earthquakes and Tsunamis (Tsunami Summit) in Jakarta on 6th January, 
2005. The Tsunami Summit, amongst others, produced a joint statement 
known as the Jakarta Declaration, the “Declaration on Action to Strengthen 
Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the 
Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26th December, 2004 ".7 
In addition to the above, there are several other important points of 
the Jakarta Declaration in association with ASEAN’s programme such as;8 
1) the utilisation of civil and military assets in disaster relief operations; 2) 
the formation of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre); 
                                            
6 The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003. It 
consists of heads of national agencies responsible for disaster management of ASEAN 
member states. The ACDM “assumes overall responsibility for coordinating and 
implementing the regional activities” in pursuing a region of disaster-resilience and a safer 
community; see http://www.un-spider.org/sites/default/files/ASEAN.pdf 
7 Special ASEAN Leaders Summit on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, Jakarta, 
6th January, 2005, http/www.aseansec.org/17066.htm 
8 Ibid 
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and 3) the formation of the Joint Use of Network Information and 
Communication in ASEAN to Disaster. As a follow-up of the agreements 
that had been reached at the Tsunami Summit, in June 2005, ASEAN 
successfully completed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response (AADMER). This agreement was signed by ten 
ASEAN member states’ Foreign Ministers at the 38th ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, on 26th July, 2005.9  
The AADMER agreement entered into force on 24th December, 2009 
after all ten ASEAN member states ratified the agreement.10 To accelerate 
the implementation of AADMER in the area of disaster mitigation and rapid 
response, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting agreed the establishment 
of a Standby Force for disaster management.11 In this case, each ASEAN 
member is expected to form a standby force so that in the case of major 
disasters in member states, the standby force units can be deployed 
immediately to the affected areas. As a follow-up of disaster management, 
ASEAN member states organise joint training which is called the ASEAN 
Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX).12 
ARDEX is conducted on an annual basis, based on the vulnerability of 
ASEAN countries against disasters.  
                                            
9  Joint Communiqué of the 38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, available at 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/. Accessed on 
12 April 2015 
10 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) 
Work Programme 2010-2015, available at www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-
publications/item/. Accessed on 12 April 2015 
11 Ibid 
12 Coordinated by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster 
management (AHA Centre), the ARDEX was conducted firstly in September 2005, in 
Selangor Malaysia, as part of AADMER implementation. The ARDEX aims to practice, 
assess and review disaster emergency response mechanisms under the ASEAN Standby 
Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP). Available at 
www.ahacentre.org/disaster-exercise 
 181 
 On 7th December, 2010 in Vietnam, the ADMM-Plus through the 
ADSOM-Plus working group discussed the practical cooperation of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response co-chaired by Vietnam and 
China; maritime security was co-chaired by Malaysia and Australia; counter-
terrorism was co-chaired by Indonesia and the U.S.; the peacekeeping 
operation was co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand; and military 
medicine was co-chaired by Singapore and Japan. 13  The meetings 
pioneered the establishment of joint operations other than war to tackle 
disaster relief. The rapid reaction unit of disaster management consists of 
the elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force.14 This force was formed to 
carry out the initial actions in the event of a natural disaster. In this case, the 
importance of joint operations, other than in war, became a shared 
commitment amongst ASEAN countries. 
In the discourse of the ASEAN Community, the occurrence of natural 
disasters has shown that the ASEAN Community has sympathy and a 
sense of kinship. Both are very important components to building a sense of 
community. This was proved in the event of the earthquake and tsunami in 
Aceh. Even ASEAN member states that were themselves affected by the 
natural disaster participated by sending humanitarian aid to Aceh. Rescue 
teams and emergency assistance from ASEAN countries were amongst the 
first to arrive in the field to distribute emergency aid to disaster victims in 
Aceh, despite the fact that the delay in the arrival of assistance illustrated 
the region’s lack of response capacity.15  
                                            
13 Raymund Jose. G. Quilop, The ADMM-Plus: Yet Another Layer in the Region’s Dense 
Security Architecture? A Perspective from the Philippines (25th Asia Pacific Roundtable, 
Plenary Session Seven, 2011) 
14 Document of Indonesian National Defence Force, accessed on 9 May 2011 
15 See Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN’s New Challenges (Pacific Affairs, vol. 70, No. 4, Winter 
1997-1998) ; Rizal Sukma, Southeast Asian Security: An Overview in N.S Sisodia and 
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The involvement and role of the military becomes very significant in 
implementing the ASEAN disaster relief programme. Cooperation amongst 
ASEAN member states in the use of military assets and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief are evidence of a military role. The first 
Workshop on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, which took place on 7th and 8th 
October, 2009 in Jakarta,16 was attended by a delegation of the Armed Forces 
of each ASEAN member country, as well as by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. This ASEAN Working Group is the manifestation of an idea proposed 
by Indonesia at the third ADMM 2009, in Pattaya, Thailand, regarding the use 
of military assets and capacities of ASEAN member states in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. At the workshop, the creation of standard 
operating procedures or operational guidelines in disaster management in the 
ASEAN forum was discussed. 17  In this context, military personnel can 
contribute to the disaster relief operations internationally and regionally, 
although there are still some constraints due to different bureaucracies, policies 
and regulations as well as the costs involved and other domestic limitations of 
each ASEAN member state.  
On 17th June, 2013 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, under the 
mechanism of the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN conducted the first-ever 
Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Joint 
Exercise (ADMM-Plus HADR/MM). This joint exercise was attended by 
2200 military personnel from 18 member countries of the ADMM-Plus, 
                                                                                                                          
Sreedha Datta (ed), Changing Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: IDSA 
Magnum Books Pvt Ltd 2008)  
16 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Past Meetings and Events 2006 – 2014, available at 
https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/past-meetings-and-events.html; accessed on 12 
April 2015 
17 The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) provides the guidelines and templates to 
initiate the establishment of the ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and 
Emergency response and most notably the procedures for the utilisation of military assets 
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which was also equipped with the support of warships, aircraft and other 
equipment. 18  Through the exercise the participants could consult and 
develop operating procedures that are mutually recognised, including the 
filing of applications for assistance by the affected country, confirmation of 
assistance by other countries as well as practising a single chain of 
command after the troops arrive in the countries affected.19 Thus, disaster 
management and mission effectiveness can be done in time and the 
number of casualties and material loss can be reduced. 
The presence of foreign military troops who become an integral part 
of the disaster relief mission in ASEAN is noteworthy as a collective learning 
process in the ASEAN community.20 The formation of an ASEAN standby 
force unit for disaster management and joint operations other than war 
showed the participation of all components in the ASEAN community, both 
civilian and military. The policy to establish a standby force is part of a 
national defence policy, particularly in countries prone to disasters and 
facing a high level of external threats. In this case, civil-military cooperation 
in the formulation of a defence policy is an inevitable necessity.21  
 
 
 
 
                                            
18 Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi DPR RI, 2009, www.dpr.go.id 
19 Ibid 
20 Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, Politik BBM (Jakarta: LIPI, 2005), p. 48 
21 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, Breaking the Past? Civil – Military 
Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia (Honolulu: Hawaii, East West Center, 
Policy Studies no. 63, 2012), p. 6 
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3. Defence Diplomacy as an Important Tool for States’ 
Foreign and Security Policy  
Since the first meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, followed 
by the ADDM in 2006, “the use of military means for diplomatic purposes 
has been an established practice” in Southeast Asia.22 Defence diplomacy 
has now become an important part in the implementation of foreign policy, 
and the existence of the ADMM-Plus since 2010 facilitates this. ADMM-Plus 
has become an important part of the security architecture of the region, 
especially with the involvement of the military, including troops from major 
countries. As explained in the first chapter, in the post-Cold War period, due 
to the changing of threats, the military was used for peace efforts, 
preventing conflict, disaster relief and promoting good and accountable 
governance, such as in Indonesia where the military has been willing to 
accept its subordination to civil power.23   
The cooperation between countries in the region is necessary in 
order to handle the threat collectively to create a more secure and stable 
region. The notion of a more secure and stable region definitely refers to the 
existence of security matters and atmosphere, which traditionally are the 
result of defence activities. Meanwhile, diplomacy is an official effort of the 
state, which is traditionally used for practicing foreign policy through political, 
economic, cultural and military techniques.24 Indeed, political effort is the 
                                            
22  Anton du Plessis, Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with 
Specific Reference to South Africa (Pretoria: 2008 p. 87 
23  Aurel Croissant (et.al), Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), p. 6 
24  See Said Abdul Azis, Charles O. Lerche Jr and Chales O. Lerche III, Concepts of 
International Politics in Global Perspective, 4th Edition (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice Hall, 
1995), pp. 68-83; see also Anton Du Plessis, Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy, in 
Patrick J. McGowan and Philip Nel (ed.), Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International 
Relations Textbook for Africa, 2nd Edition (Lansdowne; UCT Press, 2002), pp. 118-119 
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first option of diplomacy regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
However, the practical situation and the evolving threat in the region is 
becoming more complex, from a traditional to a non-traditional one, and 
various diplomacy efforts or techniques are combined and used 
simultaneously, depending on the situation and the interest of the various 
states. In the context of ASEAN, the current security conditions have forced 
the states in the region to adjust their approach from a sequence of 
traditional diplomacy techniques towards greater priority in the use of 
defence techniques to overcome the  threats or challenges. For instance, 
the prominence of the military role in handling non-traditional issues, as 
discussed in the previous section.  
Countries struggle to improve their strength or power to create 
security and to increase their strength in the face any threat. To achieve its 
national interest, states act rationally with emphasis on strength, especially 
the increase in the strength of their defence. Southeast Asian defence 
diplomacy, after the financial crisis of 1997, engaged in the modernisation of 
their militaries and, at the same time, faced a situation of a very low level of 
trust between regional states, making diplomatic efforts necessary to 
improve matters. Thus, military involvement in maintaining security is very 
crucial, as well as engaging external powers via diplomacy.25   
Defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the incorporation of national 
and regional interests.26 Indeed, each single country in ASEAN has its own 
interests, but ASEAN also has regional interests. ASEAN as an entity 
bridges the interests of each country on the basis of the TAC, in which all 
                                            
25 Evan A. Laksmana, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The View from Jakarta in 
RSIS Conference Report, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS, 30 Nov 
2010), p. 8 
26 Regional interest had been explained in the first chapter, see footnote no-4, p. 2 of the 
first chapter 
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countries are bound in agreed norms and ethics. All the national interests of 
each country are placed within regional interest, with the spirit of maintaining 
peace and stability for the prosperity of the nations in Southeast Asia.27 
There is the realisation that defence diplomacy arises from a specific 
issue that for a period of time burdens relationships between countries in 
the region. Defence forums are used as an arena to discuss differences 
between countries. Conflicts of interest in terms of security matters are 
discussed to reach a common ground. ASEAN drives all parties to create 
peace, stability and prosperity in the region; all countries have to avoid the 
use of force and promote effort through dialogues. Defence is a tangible 
domain; each country has its own instrument (the Armed Forces) to conduct 
defence diplomacy. It is said that an on-table discussion can be transferred 
into concrete activities through military cooperation. Furthermore, defence 
diplomacy in ASEAN contains the elements of mutual trust, mutual respect 
and transparency to reduce tension amongst ASEAN member states. 
Nevertheless, “ASEAN-related events, though largely informal in 
nature, have been considered a step forward in improving regional 
confidence-building measures. According to Indonesia’s former Minister of 
Defence, Juwono Soedarsono, ASEAN’s multilateralism and regional 
community building have allowed the creation of a “strategic space” needed 
to boost domestic economic and political development while 
accommodating the interests of extra-regional powers”.28 
 
                                            
27 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relation, Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
28 Evan A. Laksmana, Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Trends, Prospects and 
Challenges in  Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan (ed), From ‘Boots’ to ‘Brogues’: The 
Rise of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Monograph no,. 21, 2011), 
pp. 81-82; The same statement also had been mentioned by Juwono Sudarsono during an 
interview with the researcher, Jakarta, 19 March 2013 
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ASEAN states have developed military-security ties through officer 
exchanges and the provision of field training facilities. It is fairly 
commonplace for middle-level officers from one ASEAN state to attend 
command and staff courses offered by military institutions of another state.29 
A major benefit of such exchanges, as with joint exercises, is confidence-
building through familiarisation with each other’s military doctrines and 
capabilities. In terms of practical value to military preparedness, provision of 
field training facilities by one ASEAN state to another assumes greater 
importance.  
4. The Imperative for Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia  
There are several reasons that could be given as the original reason for 
implementing ASEAN’s defence diplomacy, meaning that ASEAN member states 
had to redefine the role of their military.30 Demands for a more prominent military 
role to address the increasingly complex security challenges which coincided with 
the financial crisis in 1997,31 as well as the need for personnel to have a better 
understanding on human rights in order to remove the stigma as a violator of 
human rights, is expected to grow "Strategic Trust" both from the major countries 
and amongst fellow Southeast Asian nations. Strategic trust can be interpreted as 
the sense of cooperation and confidence that permits countries in the region, either 
with the external major power or intra-ASEAN member states to work together, 
                                            
29  Yearly exchange program of Indonesian National Defence Forces in relation with 
increasing personnel capacities programme. Indonesia has a defence exchange 
programme with the U.S. called USIBDD (U.S. – Indonesia Bilateral Defence Dialogue), 
and IADSD (Indonesia – Australia Defence Strategic Dialogue) with Australia. Other 
exchange programme between Indonesia and other ASEAN member states has also been 
conducted with yearly basis 
30 Laksmana (2011), Op.cit, p. 73 
31 Riefqi Muna, Regional Formats of Military and Security Cooperation (Berlin: 5th Berlin 
Conference on Asian Security, 2010), pp. 8-9; see also Laksmana (2011), pp. 73-74 
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initially on issues of common interest.32 The change in the form of today's security 
challenges is the main reason for an encouraging shift in the military role in many 
areas, especially in Southeast Asia.: 
First, there has been the rise various conflicts in other parts of the 
world. Conflicts in this context are conflicts in a country that require the 
intervention of the United Nations organisation to resolve them. UN 
intervention encourages many countries to change the orientation of the 
development of military capabilities of their countries, as well as providing 
opportunities for Southeast Asia’s military personnel to experience 
international duties. Needless to say, opportunities for sending military 
personnel on a UN mission can also bring significant foreign exchange for 
the Troops Contributing Country (TCC).  
Second, relating to natural disaster, experienced military personnel 
are always most likely to be the first to arrive at the location of a disaster. It 
is not surprising that military personnel are the first institution to reach a 
disaster area and being able to respond quickly, because military personnel 
already have quick response methods in addressing the issues. The military 
in general are institutions that have the equipment and trained personnel 
that are ready to be assigned at any time and in any emergency situation. 
Certain ASEAN member states, for instance, Indonesia, have issued a 
special law or national security bill for its military to be directly involved in 
disaster relief.33 The task of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and multilateral 
peacekeeping are amongst the main tasks for the military in the post-Cold 
                                            
32 Bantarto Bandoro, Will Good Intentions in Indonesia’s Blueprint for Asia-Pacific Security 
Collide with Harsh Realities? (Singapore; ISEAS Perspective, 3 Oct 2013), p. 6 
33  Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia no 34 tahun 2004, tentang Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia. National Bills of the Republic of Indonesian no 34, 2004. See Chapter VII in its 
law for further explanation about the role Indonesian National Defence Forces 
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War era,34 especially Southeast Asian countries.35 As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, humanitarian assistance is a form of non-traditional security  
within the domain of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia. 
The choice to upgrade military capacity as mentioned above cannot be 
separated from government policy and is a logical choice in the international 
arena. In the context of the ASEAN countries, the fact that  the form of threats 
has changed from traditional threats to non-traditional threats, encourages 
ASEAN member states to conduct defence diplomacy. All opportunities that 
ASEAN member states obtain through defence diplomacy are believed to 
improve the capability and fluency in the process of inter-operability, which is 
indispensable in the context of a defence community. Intense interaction 
between personnel of each ASEAN military in various tasks or education will be 
of benefit in the field of assignment, which will then facilitate coordination and 
develop mutual trust smoothly.36 Such kind of interaction is a diplomatic element 
of ASEAN military defence cooperation, partly through the development of 
personal and professional relationships between their defence communities.37 
For example, every year ASEAN member states send middle-ranking officers to 
attend a ten-month Command and Staff College as part of an exchange 
education program. The duration of the course is long enough to create very 
close personal relationships amongst fellow students; they became close and 
very familiar with each other, so that when active cooperation in the field is 
required, they are able to demonstrate effective performance and can work 
better than other personnel who had not met previously. 
                                            
34 Croissant, Kuehn and Lorenz (2012), Op.cit. p. 6 
35 Chapter VII of National Bills of the Republic of Indonesian no 34, 2004 
36 Researchers experience during the tsunami emergency response in Aceh shows that 
close cooperation and mutual trust that has existed at the time of the Command and Staff 
College was helpful in the field assignment 
37  Ho Shu Huang, Singapore’s Defence Policy: Deterrence, Diplomacy and Soldier-
Diplomat (Singapore: RSIS Commentaries, no. 95, 29 September 2009), p. 2 
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So defence diplomacy activities through jointly organised military 
exercises, education, “conferences, workshops and visits, allow officials at 
different levels to interact with each other on a professional and social 
level”.38 Personnel exchanges between military units, defence ministries 
and military and civilian schools allows “more substantial, and therefore 
deeper, contact between personnel from different countries”,39 significantly 
enhancing confidence-building measures and a sense of inter-operability. 
Therefore, the frequency of joint training, joint activities and intensive 
interaction of ASEAN military personnel can improve the inter-operability 
required in a defence community. Participants become familiar with 
ASEAN’s designed training or exercise analysis and its procedures.40  
In the ADMM-Plus concept paper, there are six kinds of practical 
cooperation covering counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, maritime 
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, and 
humanitarian mine action. In the next section, some of these will be 
discussed individually to prove the inter-operability that has been built by the 
ASEAN military and other partner countries. Two practical cooperation 
activities in the form of peacekeeping operations in the framework of the 
Peacekeeping Centre Network and Maritime Security Cooperation have 
been selected, because within these two practical forms of cooperation the 
existence of defence community elements in ASEAN member states 
defence cooperation can be seen. 
 
                                            
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Internal evaluation report of Indonesian National Defence Force on joint and combined 
exercise of SAFKAR Indopura 2011 between Indonesia Armed Forces and Singapore 
Armed Forces, and KEKAR Malindo 2011 between Indonesian Army and Malaysian Army 
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5. Peacekeeping Operations in the Framework of ADMM  
ASEAN moved toward the formation of an ASEAN Community by 
2015,41 which would merge the ASEAN member states into an entity with a 
common vision, mission and identity. This is meant that ASEAN would 
become a zone like the European Union, where people can travel 
throughout the region without charge, easing economic relations and, most 
importantly, being committed to making all security issues in the ASEAN a 
shared problem.42 As one of the efforts to resolve the security problems in 
the region, Indonesia has proposed the creation of an ASEAN 
peacekeeping force. After the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was 
frequently employed to prevent the spread of conflicts around the world. 
Countries need the military to ensure security, and regions require 
peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and security. 
In 2004 at a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials, “Indonesia proposed the 
creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force that could be deployed to assist in the 
settlement of internal disputes”.43 Although others have expressed reservations, 
citing potential sensitivities, such thinking is a considerable step forward for the 
group. Nonetheless, in 2009 at an international workshop on peacekeeping and 
civilian protection jointly sponsored by Global Action to Prevent War, the Centre 
for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Indonesia reiterated the proposal of developing a Peacekeeping Centre 
                                            
41 Although, through researcher’s various interviews, a more pessimistic tone often appears 
and doubts the readiness of ASEAN member states to achieve the target of establishing 
the ASEAN Community in 2015; interview with Ngurah Swajaya, Indonesia Ambassador to 
ASEAN, Jakarta, 28 March 2013: interview with Dato’ Paduka Mustappa, Deputy Defence 
Minister of Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 17 July 2013  
42 ASEAN Political-Security Community, available at ASEAN Website: www.asean.org, 
accessed in June 2013; see also Luhulima (2011), Op.cit, p. 68  
43  Simon S.C. Tay and Aaron Choo, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and Preventive 
Diplomacy in Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya (ed.), Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan 
Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia (Japan: 
JCIE, 2013), pp. 228-229 
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Network to bridge the gaps in inter-operability between ASEAN member states’ 
respective militaries with competent personnel, adequate facilities and equipment 
at the Peacekeeping Centre and effective civilian-military coordination.44 Such 
shortcomings, in terms of inter-operability, were much less pronounced and 
evident at the time of the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia in December 2004. 
Although, the military personnel from ASEAN member states provided quick 
relief during the tsunami, however, in general, it highlighted the region’s lack of 
coherent response capacity,, whereby ASEAN member states were resistant to 
conducting ASEAN-wide exercises.45 
Shortly afterwards, in February 2011, Indonesia's proposal was followed 
by one from ADMM with a concept paper on the establishment of the ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Centre Network and included a provision on networking in its 
second Three-Year Work Programme (2011-2013). At the fifth ADMM meeting 
held in May 2011 in Jakarta, this concept paper was adopted and followed by the 
first meeting of the Peacekeeping Centre Network in Kuala Lumpur in September 
2012. It is noteworthy that all ASEAN member states’ peacekeeping centres, as 
well as military representatives from Laos and Myanmar, participated at the 
second meeting of the Peacekeeping Centre Network in September 2013 in 
Bogor, Indonesia.46 
                                            
44  A speech delivered by Rodon Pedrason Head of Sub-Directorate for Analysis and 
Evaluation, Directorate of Operation, Indonesian Peacekeeping Center during that international 
workshop due to his evaluation that certain ASEAN countries need support to escalate their 
capacities to join a proposed regional peacekeeping service: see Peacekeeping and Civilian 
Protection: Asia Pacific Perspectives, 11 Juni 2009, www.globalactionpw.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/jakarta-full-reportv6.pdf: accessed in July 2014 
45 The argument of Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Chairman for Social Science and Humanities, 
Indonesian Science Institute; see Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection: Asia Pacific 
Perspectives, 11 Juni 2009, www.globalactionpw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/jakarta-full-
reportv6.pdf: accessed in July 2014 
46 Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEAN and UN Peacekeeping: ASEAN will Slowly Develop and 
Evolve Regional Peacekeeping Coordination Capacity (The Diplomat, 25 April 2014); 
thediplomat.com/2014/04/asean-and-un-peacekeeping/, accessed on 26 April 2014 
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The idea to propose the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping 
Centres Network originated from the fact that “ASEAN member states have 
consistently participated in peacekeeping missions worldwide under the 
United Nations. Having noted that five ASEAN member states, including 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have already 
established their own peacekeeping centres.” 47  The objectives of the 
Peacekeeping Centre Network include “to conduct joint planning and 
training as well as sharing of experiences with a view to establishing an 
ASEAN arrangement for maintaining peace and stability.” 48 Indeed, with 
these objectives, the Peacekeeping Centre Network will enable the 
identification   of “gaps and priorities in the development of ASEAN 
peacekeeping capacities and capabilities.”49 
Several ASEAN member states already make significant 
contributions of military and police personnel to peacekeeping duties at 
international and regional levels. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines actively contribute the troops. “At the end of December 2010, of 
115 countries contributing uniformed military and police personnel to UN 
peacekeeping operations, Indonesia represented the 16th largest 
contributor, with 1,795 personnel. Malaysia was ranked 21st with 1,163 and 
the Philippines ranked 27th with 926 military and police personnel compared 
with other countries.” 50 The figure of ASEAN member states contribution to 
                                            
47 Annex 9, ADMM, Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre 
Network, 2011 
48 Ibid ; see also Annex 10, Report of the ADSOM-Plus Working Grup on 29 April 2011, 
ADMM-Plus Work Plan of the Experts’ Working Group on Peacekeeping Operation: Archive 
of the Directorate of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of Defence 
49 Annex 9, ADMM, Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre 
Network, 2011 
50  Mely Caballero-Anthony and Holly Haywood, Defining ASEAN’s Role in Peace 
Operations: Helping to Bring Peacebuilding ‘Upstream’? (Australian Government, Asia 
Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Civ-Mil Working Papers, no. 3, 2010), p. 4; see 
 194 
the UN has changed as of 31 March, 2015. (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1 
Southeast Asian Member States Contribution to the UN 
States	 PKC	Establishment	 Police	
UN	
Military	
Expert	
Troops	 Total	Peacekeepers	
Rank	in	
UN	
Brunei	 Not	having	Yet	
	 	
30	 30	 88	
Cambodia	 2010	
	
13	 854	 867	 35	
Indonesia	 2007	 170	 29	 2479	 2678	 11	
Laos	 Not	having	Yet	
	 	 	 	 	
Malaysia	 2006	
	
27	 846	 873	 34	
Myanmar	 Not	having	Yet	
	 	 	 	 	
Philippines	 2002	 15	 4	 159	 178	 60	
Singapore	 Not	having	Yet	
	 	 	 	 	
Thailand	 No	Specific	Date	 1	 9	 11	 21	 91	
Vietnam	 Not	having	Yet	
	
2	
	
2	 117	
 
Source: www.un.org data as of 31 March 2015  
 
 
There are already peacekeeping centres in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. Malaysia founded a peacekeeping training centre 
in 2006, and more recently, a peacekeeping centre in Cambodia has been 
announced. Indonesia’s Peacekeeping Mission Education and Training 
Facility was founded in 2010 at the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre 
(IPSC) in Sentul West Java, Indonesia, becoming a host for conferences, 
exercises and training. In this 480-hectare area, Indonesia has set up 
Seven-in-One institutions, which include Peacekeeping Centre; Standby 
Force; National Board on Counter-Terrorism; and National Board on 
Counter-Disaster. Similar facilities are owned also by NATO and the African 
Union with its Standby Force.  
                                                                                                                          
also, Jiseon Audrey Kim, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus: Counter Terrorism and 
Peacekeeping Operations (UTMUN Specialized Committee, 2014), pp.5-6 
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In the spirit of regional interests and for the readiness of inter-
operability, Indonesia invited other ASEAN member countries to use the 
facilities in IPSC for the preparation of their peacekeepers.51 In fact, IPSC is 
the largest international and training facility for UN peacekeeping forces in 
Asia Pacific. In June 2013, the centre was further upgraded with the addition 
of barracks and a training facility, with the support of U.S. funding.52 It even 
has the notable object of preparing peacekeeping personnel for deployment 
in UN operations. Thus, ASEAN member states are receptive to UN 
peacekeeping operations for the sake of international peace and security,53 
and ready to develop their potential as an alliance in accordance with the 
requirements and the necessary supporting facilities. 
5.1. The Formation of a Peacekeeping Force  
Data shows that as many as 40% of hot spots for armed conflicts in 
the world occur in Asia, yet only 10% of the peacekeeping operations are 
ever undertaken in the region.54 This means the international community 
has neglected the rest of the conflicts in the region, including Southeast 
Asia. In the long term, this negligence may lead to the escalation of conflicts 
in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the problems in the security sector will 
inevitably have implications for the stability of other sectors, such as 
economics and politics. Thus, ASEAN needs a new mechanism in terms of 
collective operations of military elements to address the issues of security, 
and the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force could certainly be 
the answer. 
                                            
51 Inteview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Relations, Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence on September 2013, 16 September 2013 
52  Natalie Sambhi, Indonesia’s push for Peacekeeping Operations, derived from 
www.aspistrategist.org.au, 17 September 2013 
53 Kim (2014), Op.cit, p. 6 
54 Belinda Helmke, The Absence of ASEAN: Peacekeeping in Southeast Asia (Pacific New, 
no. 31, 2009), p. 4 
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Although the idea raises a concern that this would violate the 
principle of non-interference which has been applied to ASEAN over the 
years, the ASEAN Charter, a legally-binding document signed in 2007 
calling for an ASEAN Community and the inaugural ADMM in 2006, along 
with eight other dialogue partners (ADMM-Plus) in October 2010, has 
provided a foundation for a bolder form of security cooperation amongst 
ASEAN member states. The concerns were simply too much, because the 
APSC plan of action literally states backing peacekeeping cooperation. It 
says: “(the establishment of) a network amongst existing ASEAN member 
states’ peacekeeping centres to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing 
of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the 
maintenance of peace and stability, in accordance with the ADMM 3-Year 
Work Programme”.55 
There are at least two reasons why an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force can 
be a relevant solution to address security issues in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the 
idea of integration of the efforts to overcome the issue of security in Southeast 
Asia is clearly a reflection of the desire of ASEAN countries to reshape the 
security architecture in Southeast Asia to become cooperative.56 The ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Force will drive all ASEAN member states to participate and care 
for all security issues in Southeast Asia. For example, in conflicts over the 
disputed territory of Sabah by the Philippines and Malaysia, that developed into 
political tensions between the two countries which could lead to armed conflict. 
Indonesia, which has usually been the state mediator in resolving conflict in 
Southeast Asia cannot do anything because it has areas that are fairly close to 
                                            
55 Annex-9, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Concept Paper on the Establishment of 
ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, available at www.asean.org/archive/documents/ 
1847-j.pdf 
56 Gema R. Bastari, Pembentukan Regional Peacekeeping Operation untuk Mengatasi Isu 
Keamanan di ASEAN, available at https://penelitimudaindonesia.wordpress.com/ 
hubungan-internasional/; accessed on 11 December 2014 
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the Sabah region, so the concern is not considered neutral. With the security 
architecture of non-interference in Southeast Asia leading to a dead-end situation, 
the conflict continues and potentially could escalate into conflicts between 
countries, since none of the other Southeast Asian countries can mediate the 
conflict.57 
Secondly, if the idea of forming an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force agrees 
with the principle of neutrality and impartiality as the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines states,58 ASEAN can send 
a joint peacekeeping force from countries such as Thailand, Singapore and 
Vietnam to carry out a mission of peace in the region of Sabah, so that open 
conflict can be stopped. In this way, the negotiations between the governments 
of Malaysia and the Philippines (Sultanate Sulu) can be carried out very well. 
Through the principle of impartiality, there will be the confidence of all parties 
towards the peace mission so that they will stop fighting without worrying about 
whether the other party took advantage of the situation. Such involvement of 
regional states would not be considered interference in domestic affairs, but 
merely a regional collaboration to push for further progress in member states’ 
conflict. The benefits of an ASEAN peacekeeping force would go beyond the 
resolution of the Malaysia-Philippines or the Thai-Cambodian conflicts. One more 
benefit that may result from the presence of an ASEAN peacekeeping force is 
the development of military cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia 
in terms of inter-operability, because they would carry out an integrated peace 
mission. ASEAN, through a regional peacekeeping force, can contribute more to 
ensure regional stability and can take care of itself in times of crises.59 
                                            
57 Ibid 
58 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: 2008), p. 33 
59  Bantarto Bandoro, Undesirable Consequences on ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, 
available at. http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=130 
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5.2. Inter-Operabil i ty in Peacekeeping  
Integrated missions require personnel from diverse backgrounds to 
work together with people with whom they may be unfamiliar. In such 
conditions, cultural differences can present challenges or opportunities. 
Therefore, to bridge the differences that exist and to build harmonisation 
amongst personnel, various forms of exercise in the framework of 
peacekeeping missions have been organised at the bilateral, multilateral 
and regional levels. With the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, any 
programme of defence cooperation contained in practical cooperation is 
always within the auspices of ADMM or the ADMM-Plus. In this context, in 
the Southeast Asian region there are three peacekeeping training 
programmes undertaken through the peacekeeping centre network, 
facilitated by the United States Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM), through 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) such as Cobra Gold in 
Thailand, Cambodia Sentinel in Cambodia and Garuda Shields in 
Indonesia. 60   These exercises aim to strengthen the relationship and 
cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia Pacific 
in the framework of peacekeeping missions. These exercises are attended 
by ASEAN member states’ military personnel and Asia Pacific countries. 
 These exercises are sponsored by U.S. PACOM, or are held within 
the peacekeeping network centre mechanism which has identical training 
material based on UN standards or UN training modules for peace-keeping 
operations. The method applied is the Command Post Exercise (CPX) 
which is intended to improve cooperation amongst staff, and the Field 
Training Exercise (FTX) to improve the inter-operability of troops in the field. 
These activities are integrated exercises in the preparatory phase before the 
                                            
60 Archive of Indonesian Peacekeeping Centre 
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implementation of inter-operability applications. A class session is held that 
contains the provision of knowledge, tactics and military techniques of 
peacekeeping operations, so that any personnel involved in these exercises 
has the same knowledge and all future peacekeepers uphold the principles 
of peacekeeping operations. 
 In these exercises, an assumed conflict scenario at the brigade level 
is created within an area that is similar to the Southeast Asian region. 
Training materials are held, namely:61 Command and Control; Deliberate 
Operations; Intelligence/Information; and Media/Public Information for the 
Command Post Exercise. At the same time, there field training exercises 
which included amongst others Checkpoint Operations; Patrolling; Secure 
Distribution Sites; Convoy Operations; Cordon and Search; and 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In short, the 
exercises cover the full range of military operations, from combat to 
humanitarian relief, as it is important to validate the concepts, procedures, 
system and tactics that enable all personnel to practise working together.62 
Peacekeeping operations are a specific mission, therefore, dexterous 
operational and tactical military skills are required. Beside technical and 
tactical techniques, all actions triggering peace must be carried out by all 
peacekeepers.63 Peacekeeping operations are different from regular combat 
operations which need fighting techniques and tactics as well as soldier 
fighting spirit. In addition, peacekeeping operations require peacekeeper 
behaviour which prefers a peaceful solution to resolve conflict in their 
mission. Use of any weapon is actually the last option and can only be 
                                            
61 Archive of Indonesian Peacekeeping Centre; UN Standard Generic Training Module and 
Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials 
62 NATO Exercises program, aims and objectives. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/topics_49285.htm? Accessed on 11 December 2014 
63 UN Standard Generic Training Modules on Pre-Deployment Training  
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performed in self-defence.64   This is something that is in line with the 
principle of ASEAN in resolving conflict. Moreover, the objectives of those 
training is to improve multilateral readiness and cooperation amongst 
ASEAN member states military personnel, enhancing inter-operablity 
amongst personnel, to integrate operating systems and functional 
capabilities, and to leverage technological capabilities between states. 
Certainly, to date, several ASEAN member states such as Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, are receptive to UN 
peacekeeping operations as an important element in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.65 Although there is still a degree of hesitation 
or conditionality on ASEAN states’ provision of peacekeeping forces within the 
region, at the same time there is an increasing willingness on the part of many 
ASEAN states to become more active in contributing to peace operations.66 In 
order to achieve the ASEAN Community, ASEAN outlines a number of specific 
activities, including 1) to carry out technical cooperation with the UN and 
relevant regional organisations to exchange expertise and experiences; 2) to 
identify national focal points, with a view to promoting regional cooperation in 
maintaining peace and security; and 3) to establish a network amongst 
existing ASEAN states’ peacekeeping centres to conduct joint planning, 
training and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN 
arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability.67 
 
                                            
64 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: 2008), 
pp. 34-35 
65 On 18 March 2015 Malaysia has proposed the setting up an ASEAN Peacekeeping 
Force to deal with security issues in the region; see Martin Carvalho, Malaysia has 
Proposed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force for Regional Stability. Retrieved on 2 May 2015 
from http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2015/04/23/Hisham-Asean-Peacekeeping/  
66 Caballero-Anthony (2010), Op.cit, p. 5 
67  Annex-E Asean Defence Minister’s Meeting Three-Year Work Program 2011-2013,        
27 April 2011 
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By promoting cooperation in a peacekeeping centre network, just 
recently, Malaysia has proposed the formation of an ASEAN joint peacekeeping 
force,68 as the ASEAN member states measure its peace and stability as a 
united entity. In general, these measures clearly demonstrate the desire of 
ASEAN member states to develop a greater capacity to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. There seems to be a shift in the understanding of the 
principle of non-interference in the resolution of regional security issues, which 
encourages both a state and non-state players response to regional problems.69 
Actually, the notion of ‘establishing an ASEAN arrangement' has an open 
interpretation and can be elaborated in accordance with ASEAN member states 
interest in maintaining the security and stability of the region. Openness to 
multiple interpretations in the future or even currently nothing legally prohibits 
ASEAN preparation to becoming a defence community. Therefore, it would be 
legitimate, if the member countries of ASEAN develop the concept of inter-
operability in a variety of defence cooperation events amongst ASEAN countries, 
which is a requirement for the formation of an alliance, although to date, ASEAN 
leaders70 have explicitly rejected the possibility that regional organisations are 
changed into a defence alliance. 
We can make a specific activities table of the variety of venues that are 
used by ASEAN to achieve the establishment of the ASEAN Community 
through strategic trusts in the form of promoting regional defence and security 
cooperation, norm shaping and sharing, conflict prevention, conflict resolution 
and post-conflict peacebuilding as follows: (see Table 6.2). 
                                            
68 Martin Carvalho, Malaysia has Proposed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force for Regional 
Stability. Retrieved on 2 May 2015 from http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2015/ 
04/23/Hisham-Asean-Peacekeeping/ 
69 Caballero-Anthony (2010), Op.cit, pp. 5-6 
70 This is a view from some interviewees such as Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral 
Marsetio, also the expression of Deputy Defence Minister of Brunei, Dato’ Paduka 
Mustappa, and Director of Policy Office, Singapore BG. Cheng 
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Table 6.2 
Venues that are used as the Road to an ASEAN 
Community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
    
         Source: Researcher’s own table 
 
6. Marit ime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
Other practical cooperation events under the auspices of the ADMM or 
the ADMM-Plus that can be used as an example of increasing human resources 
development and capacity-building programmes include cooperation in the 
maritime field, which indicates that the level of inter-operability is going well in 
Purposes( ASEAN(
Activities(( Status(
Promoting)Regional)
Defence)and)Security)
Cooperation)
SLD) ✔ 
ADMM) ✔ 
ADMM:Plus) ✔ 
JIDD) ✔ 
Norm)Shaping)and)Sharing)
SLD) ✔ 
ADMM) ✔ 
ADMM:Plus) ✔ 
JIDD) ✔ 
Conflict)Prevention)
SLD) ✔ 
ADMM) ✔ 
ADMM:Plus) ✔ 
JIDD) ✔ 
Conflict)Resolution)
SLD) ✔ 
ADMM) ✔ 
ADMM:Plus) ✔ 
JIDD) ✔ 
Post)Conflict:Peace)Building)
SLD) ✔ 
ADMM) ✔ 
ADMM:Plus) ✔ 
JIDD) ✔ 
 
 203 
addressing the security problems that exist in the waters of Southeast Asia. 
Maritime security was deliberately chosen in this thesis, as this issue is not only 
related to the problem of piracy but also armed robbery, attacks and even acts 
of terrorism. While the frequency of events is considerably high, this is 
encouraging ASEAN member states to cooperate in tackling the challenges. 
Southeast Asia has vast and complex coastlines, encompassing both 
the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, with islands totalling over 
20,000 in number.71 It has provided a fertile area for the growth of piracy as 
well. “As the sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering roughly 80 percent of 
its area, the economic and political affairs of the region have been 
dominated by maritime security concerns”. 72  Today’s globalised “economy 
is intricately interconnected and is heavily dependent on maritime trade in 
order to sustain the movement of energy, raw materials and industrial 
products”.73 Trade traffic by sea in the Pacific region is largely through 
Southeast Asian waterways, particularly the Straits of Malacca. “A waterway 
located in South East Asia between the Malay Peninsula and the island of 
Sumatra”,74 carries about a third of the world’s trade and half is transiting 
through the Straits of Malacca and Straits of Singapore alone.  
Major economic countries such as the U.S., China, Japan and India 
continue their strong economic growth, and maritime trade through regional 
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), particularly the Straits of Malacca 
                                            
71 Catherine Z. Raymond, Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses 
(Singapore: IDSS, Working Paper no 89, Oct 2005), p. 3 
72 Wachiraporn Wongnakornsawang, Maritime Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Challenges 
and Prospects (Thai Navy, Working Paper, 2013); see also John F. Bradford, The Growing 
Prospect for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Naval War College Review, 
vol. 58, no. 3, Summer 2005), p. 63 
73 Ibid; see also Victor Huang, Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not 
Welcome? (Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 1, Winter 2008)  
74 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005), 
p.15, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html 
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and Singapore, and this is expected to increase accordingly. These 
countries all have interests in ensuring the safe passage of shipping through 
the region. Any disruption to shipping through such passages could have 
disastrous consequences. The littoral states of Southeast Asia are perhaps 
the most concerned of all. Despite the success of the sea trade routes, 
security in the region cannot be handled “by any littoral state in the region 
alone because they are transnational in nature”. 75 It needs some kind of 
cooperation between member states of ASEAN and its dialogue partners 
with a sound mechanism. 
6.1. Marit ime Security Issues  
In reality, the most problematic maritime regions in terms of maritime 
boundary is the “disputed territory in the South China Sea where Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan claim 
sovereignty to some parts of the sea and island territories”.76 However, as 
this section discusses maritime security cooperation related to inter-
operability, and in order to prove the existence of defence community 
elements in maritime security cooperation, this section specifically 
discusses the ASEAN military cooperation in securing the Straits of Malacca. 
More specifically, this section seeks to understand “why multilateral 
cooperation between the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore has become reality and what has led to the increased levels of 
cooperation between these states on a multilateral basis”. 77   
 
 
                                            
75 Wongnakornsawang  (2013), Op.cit; The National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005), Ibid 
76 Ibid 
77 Anthony S. Massey, Maritime Security Cooperation in the Strait of Malacca (Monterey, 
California: NPS, Thesis, 2008), pp. 1-2 
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The Straits of Malacca are  considered geographical important in 
determining the increased levels of cooperation. It lies between “the littoral 
states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore just north of the Indonesian 
island of Sumatra and south of Malaysia. It is 600 miles in length and is the 
main corridor of passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China 
Sea,” 78  for ocean-moving commercial, private and military vessels. 
“Approximately 60,000 ships traverse the strait each year, transporting more 
than 80 percent of Northeast Asia’s oil.”79 Currently, if compared to the 
number of ships using the Panama and Suez Canals, “the number of ships 
that pass through the Malacca Straits is nearly three times greater.”80 (see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 
Posit ion of Malacca Strait 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
78 Ibid, p. 2; see also Joshua Ho, The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia (Asian 
Survey, vol. 46, no. 4, July/August 2006), p. 559 
79 Ibid, p. 560 
80 Gesta F. Nurbiansyah, The Pattern of Piracy in the Straits of Malacca 2000-2011: The 
Declining and Cooperation amongst Littoral Countries (Article, June 2012), p. 4 
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Figure 6. 2 
The Corridor of Passage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Sea Lines of Communication Security  
According to data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, there are many problems in the international sea-
lanes through Southeast Asia, especially the problem of piracy at sea or 
other kinds of robbery, which have occurred in certain areas. In the busy 
waterways of the Malacca Straits, pirates have attacked all kinds of 
commercial vessels. There are several different types of piracy. These 
include robbery of vessels at sea, the hijacking of different vessels, such as 
conventional cargo carriers, container vessels, bulk carriers, tankers, as well 
as kidnap-for-ransom attacks. Another common type of piracy takes place 
against vessels berthed in harbours or at anchor.81 The attacks have been 
reported on a daily basis, and as a matter of fact, the great majority of 
attacks take place in the hours of darkness, since navigation at night is very 
tricky due to the ever-present danger of collision between vessels. “Under 
                                            
81 Adi Brasmasto, Security Management in the Straits of Malacca: Cooperation and the 
Centrality of Littoral States (Article, 2012), pp. 6-7. www.academia.edu, accessed in        
Dec 2014 
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such circumstances, it is virtually impossible for the respective marine 
authorities of littoral states to make pre-emptive checks on potential 
pirates”.82 
Moreover, the robbery of a vessel by pirates usually takes place while 
the ship is underway. The pirates mostly use small, fast wooden boats and 
operate in groups. First, they approach the targeted ships from the stern in 
the shadow of the radar beam so as to remain undetected.83 The pirates 
board the ships using ropes and grappling hooks. Using guns and knives, 
they threaten the crew, then take any cash and valuables from the ship and 
crew, including high-tech navigation equipment or whatever else they can 
seize quickly.  
The piracies in the area of the Malacca Straits have occurred for 
decades and continue to take place. “The annual number of reported pirate 
attacks in the strait has gone from virtually zero in 1997 to reach a peak of 
seventy-five in 2000”.84 From 2002-2007, the International Maritime Bureau 
has recorded 258 pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits and surrounding 
waters, including more than 200 sailors held hostage and eight killed.85 
Although in 2001 and 2002, there was a declining in the number of attack 
with 17 and 16 cases, but in 2003 this increased to about 28 cases of piracy 
and armed robbery (see Table 6.3). 
 
 
                                            
82 Nurbiansyah (2012), Op.cit, p. 4 
83 Ibid, p. 5 
84 Catherine Z. Raymond, Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem 
Solved? (Naval War College Review,vol, 62, no. 3, Summer 2009 ), p.32; see also 
International Maritime Bureau Annual Report, 1st January – 31 December 2002, p. 5, 
available at www.icc-ccs.org/  
85 Peter Gwin, Dangerous Straits (National Geographic, Oct 2007), http://ngm. 
Nationalgeographic.com/2007/10/ malacca-strait- pirates-text.html, Accessed December 
2014 
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Table 6.3 
Comparison of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
 in Littoral States Waters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (Annual 
Report and Quarterly Reports, Various Issues, 1995-2012). Figures include actual and 
attempted attacks.  
 
If we look at the above table, the number of pirate attacks and armed 
robbery experienced in the Malacca Straits shows an impressive reduction 
since 2006. Only six attacks and two attempted attacks were reported in the 
Malacca Straits, up to l September 2006, and reached a total of 11 attacks 
in that year. “The reduction in the number of piracy cases is due to effective 
security mechanisms that were put in place at the height of piracy incidents 
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in the Straits in 2006.”86 The positive trend of reducing attacks continued in 
consecutive years with the total number of 11 and, impressively, become 
just two attacks per year up to 2012, with the exception of just one attack in 
2011. 
The report from IMB, strengthened by the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre in Singapore, showed that in 2007 
“there were only three successful and four attempted attacks by pirates on 
shipping in the Malacca Straits”.87 The same numbers also occurred in the 
next year, with ReCAAP’s half yearly report “listing only one successful 
attack on a vessel in the Malacca Straits and three attempted ones.” 88 
Though the number of vessels transiting the straits each year is large, the 
proportion of ships being attacked is significantly small. The consistently 
declining trend in piracy attacks may partially be explained by a MoU signed 
between the government of Indonesia and the rebel group GAM (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) in August 2005 in Helsinki. 89  
The three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have 
been complimented by the international world, for their serious efforts in 
maintaining and securing the safety of the strategic trade route in the 
Malacca Straits. 90  The reduction in the number of attacks should be 
examined, however, in the context of effective enhanced cooperative efforts 
                                            
86 Nurbiansyah (2012), Op.cit. p. 4 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid 
89  Ralf Emmers, Maritime Security in Southeast Asia in Sumit Ganguly (et.al), The 
Routledge Handbook of Asia Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 247, Emmers 
assumes that GAM (Free Aceh Movement) conducted piracy in the Malacca Straits to 
finance its activities; See Richard Scott, New Wave of Piracy Plagues Indonesian Waters 
(Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 November 2003).  
90 Ibid, p. 247; see also Ian Storey, Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in 
Progress (Asia Policy, no. 6, July 2008), p. 103  
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at bilateral and multilateral levels. It is not surprising because the three 
littoral states have the largest interests in safeguarding security in the 
Malacca Straits as it constitutes an integral part of their territory, where 
threats in the strait could directly affect the national security of the country.91 
However, each of the littoral states has different interests and perspectives 
in assessing the importance of security of shipping in the Malacca Straits. 
For Indonesia and Malaysia that have a lengthy coastline and coastal 
communities and who make their living from fishing as a natural result of the 
strait, they are more concerned about keeping the marine environments and 
natural resources of the strait. In contrast to Singapore, although it does not 
have a lengthy coastline compared to the two other countries, the strait is 
the direct link to the world’s largest seaport, so the security of shipping in 
the Malacca Strait is vital for the sustainability of the city-state's economy.  
Maritime predations in the Malacca Strait thus remain a source of 
concern. Security analysts have developed a worst-case scenario for piracy 
in the waterway. The most feared scenario is a conspiracy between 
terrorists and hijackers, or if the hijackers adopt terrorist tactics to commit a 
crime. “In one scenario, terrorists scuttle a hijacked ship in the Malacca-
Singapore Strait with the intention of disrupting maritime traffic or blocking 
the strait altogether. In another scenario, terrorists hijack a tanker carrying 
either crude oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) and detonate the vessel as a 
floating bomb in a major regional port such as Singapore.”92 Although these 
two scenarios are very unlikely to happen, given that the narrowest area of 
the strait’s waterway width is approximately nine miles, it is impossible to 
block the area through the terrorism alone. Nevertheless, if this scenario 
occurs, then Singapore would be very badly affected. Being the owner of 
                                            
91 Brasmasto (2012), Op.cit, p. 10 
92 Storey (2008), Op.cit, p. 103  
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the busiest sea-port in the world will be in vain, since the energy carrier 
vessels will move through Indonesian waters without necessarily docking in 
the Singaporean sea-port any more.93 
6.3. National Response to Piracy in the Malacca Strait 
Responses by individual countries to maritime threats differ from 
country to country, specifically those littoral states of the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore. 94  Indonesia takes security measures in securing the 
Malacca Straits by expanding its police operations on land to deter and 
arrest pirates. Beyond security and law enforcement measures, Indonesia 
also implements socio-economic policies in an effort to develop coastal 
areas and its communities.95 Indonesia also combines all the functions of 
military power in the form of unilateral measures, such as establishing a 
Naval Command Control for Armed Robbery against ships, conducting 
intelligence operations, anti-smuggling operations, inland political and 
security measures, and integrated maritime surveillance systems.96  
In 2000, Malaysia sent a feasibility study team to India to gain 
insights on the reorganisation of its maritime enforcement at policy level, 
and developed its naval capacity to ensure maritime security in its territorial 
waters. As a result of the study, the government of Malaysia has established 
                                            
93 Ibid 
94 Abd. Rahman Hussin, Maritime Security Issues and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 
N.S. Sisodia and Sreedatha Datta (ed.), Changing Security Dynamic in Southeast Asia 
(New Delhi: Magnum Books Pvt Ltd, 2008), p. 149 
95 Emmers (2010), Op.cit, p. 247 
96  See Further Arif Havas Oegroseno, Threats to Maritime Security and Responses 
Thereto: A Focus on Armed Robbery against Ships at Sea in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore Indonesian Experience (Presentation in the UN Informal Consultative Process 
on Ocean and the Law of the Sea, 9th Meeting, 23-27 June 2008); see also Mabes TNI AL, 
Pengamanan dan Pengawasan Selat Malaka in Steven Y. Pallah, Pengelolaan Isu-Isu 
Keamanan di Selat Malaka (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 2008), www.lontar.ui.ac.id/ 
file?file=digital/118818, accessed December 2013 
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the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).97 At the same time, 
the Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) increased its patrol against 
piracy and the risk of maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait. These units 
were supported by the immediate acquisition of 20 fast strike craft and four 
rigid hull inflatable boats. 98  The special task force is accompanied by 
Malaysia’s Special Action Forces and 69 Commando Unit and is deployed 
in the Straits of Malacca.99  
Singapore has been concerned for its economic survival and 
strategic value, since this city-state is dependent on its economy to trade 
traffic and services.100 Singapore is eager to cooperate and would like to 
see the safety of navigation ensured in the Malacca Straits. Such 
enthusiasm to secure the strait, in return, will benefit the island both 
economically and strategically. The Singapore Police Coast Guard (PCG), 
which has been going through an upgrading programme since the early 
1990s, is directly involved in preventing piracy acts in its territorial waters.101 
Singapore has been said to be the most organised and technologically 
advanced of the three littoral states. It has established the interagency 
Maritime and Port Security Working Group, which involves three nautical 
agencies–the coast guard, the navy and the port authority-to improve 
detection methods and to keep an eye on vessel traffic as well as ships’ 
movements near the seaports.102 
 
 
                                            
97 Hussin (2008), Op.cit, p. 149 
98 Joshua Ho, The Security of Regional Sea Lanes (Singapore: IDSS Commentaries, 2005), p. 11 
99 Ibid 
100 Brasmasto (2012), Op.cit, p. 4 
101 Emmers (2010), Op.cit, p. 247 
102 Sheldon W. Simon, Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limit of Collaboration 
(Asian Security, vol. 7, no. 1, 2011), pp. 27-43 
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6.4. Defence Cooperation of Littoral States in Response to 
Piracy in the Malacca Strait 
The littoral states have agreed upon several principles and measures 
related to security cooperation of the Malacca-Singapore Straits. As early as 
1992, both Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish the Indonesia-
Singapore Coordinated Patrols in the Singapore Strait. This coordinated 
patrol involving the setting up of direct communication links between their 
navies and the organisation of coordinated patrols every three months.103 
The same pattern has also been reached between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
in the same year, to establish the Maritime Operation Planning Team to 
coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca. The Indonesia-Malaysia 
Coordinated Patrol is conducted twice a year.104 
In 2004, the three littoral states rejected U.S. proposals for sending 
the U.S. Marines to lead a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to 
improve security in the Strait of Malacca. The reason for the littoral states’ 
rejection was due to the claim that such a proposal was a threat to their 
national sovereignty. 105  The Indonesian government asserted that the 
waters of the “Straits of Malacca are part of the territorial waters of the 
coastal states over which they have sovereignty, and the security of the 
Strait is the responsibility of the coastal states.”106 At the same time, the 
Malaysian government stated that such a proposal is not welcome and both 
countries have the capability to ensure the Strait’s security.107 
 
                                            
103 Emmers (2010), Op.cit, p. 248; Document of Indonesian National Defence Force HQ 
104 Document of Indonesian National Defence Force HQ 
105 Tammy M.Sittnick, State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: 
Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait (Pacific 
Rim Law & Policy Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, 2005), p. 755 
106 Ibid 
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Soon after the rejection, the three littoral states-Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore-introduced a trilateral coordinated naval and air patrol within 
the areas of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The trilateral patrols or 
Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) with the code name MALSINDO, have been 
underway since July 2004 to increase maritime safety and security in the 
respective territorial waters.108 In an effort to increase the coverage and 
effectiveness of MALSINDO, Malaysia proposed adding maritime air patrols 
and the EiS initiative was launched on 13 September, 2005.109 Furthermore, 
in 2006 the MSP expanded its network element with the Malacca Straits 
Sea Patrols (MSSP) and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). 110 
Therefore, since 2006, the MSP has been comprised of three elements: 
MSSP, EiS and IEG, which brought together a standard operating 
procedure (SOP). A joint coordinating committee made up of officials from 
the three littoral states meets twice a year and a number of working groups 
have been established to augment the committee’s work.111  It is worth 
noting that Thailand expressed interest early on in cooperating with other 
littoral states in Malacca Strait surveillance. Thailand eventually became the 
fourth state to join the MSP in September 2008.112 
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6.5. Inter-operabil i ty in Marit ime Security Cooperation 
The concept of inter-operability, as a prerequisite in conducting joint 
operations, is the capability of different military organisations to operate 
together, to share common doctrines and procedures and to be able to 
communicate with one another. In the context of ASEAN, the littoral states 
have maintained the spirit of cooperation from joint statements to concrete 
forms of cooperation to safeguard the security of the Malacca Strait. Joint 
and combined exercises, which is practically a joint military exercise 
amongst the littoral states, was supported seriously by military elements 
who assigned high-ranking officials in charge of the joint exercise. Such 
steps could enhance transparency and confidence building, 113  and will 
increase the diplomatic role of ASEAN military officials.  
The Terms of Reference and SOP in MSP cooperation could be real 
steps towards formulating a joint doctrine. The doctrines of joint naval 
operations act as guidelines in implementing operations and cooperation 
within the framework of naval inter-operability amongst ASEAN member 
countries, especially in the case of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It 
ranges from a basic doctrine, the main doctrine, concluding with the 
implementation doctrine, which is formulated in the doctrine of defence and 
security of each country to create the joint doctrine to fit with the concept of 
inter-operability.  
The existence of the IEG and EiS within MSP has accelerated the 
exchange of information and data related to developments in the field 
acquired from marine surveys, mapping and patrols, and coordinated 
patrols which are a sustainable periodical patrol cooperation.114 With the 
                                            
113 Bandoro (2000), Op.cit, p. 192 
114  Brasmasto (2012), Op.cit, p. 11; see also Mabes TNI AL, Pengamanan dan 
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coordinated patrol amongst the littoral states and with Thailand added later, 
it has improved the abilities of naval personnel of each country. The 
effectiveness in increasing the abilities of naval personnel in line with the 
increasing effectiveness of inter-operability, in return has contributed 
significantly to the decline in the number of sea piracy events in the 
Malacca-Singapore Straits,  with 38 in 2004 down to just two piracy and 
armed robbery events in 2012.  
In carrying out coordinated patrols, each country deployed both 
warships and aircraft improved by implementing modernisation and 
technology transfer in order to create harmony to achieve inter-operability. 
The signatory countries of coordinated patrols in the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits have implemented an integrated command, control, 
communications, computer, information, surveillance and reconnaissance 
policy (C4ISR) as one of the main requirements to support the joint 
operation in order to improve the ability of naval inter-operability. 
7. Counter Terrorism and Mil i tary Medicine Policies 
This section describes the policy regarding defense diplomacy steps 
on the issue of threats, namely terrorism, by issuing a counter terrorism 
policy, and the policy of military medicine. 
In the policy measures on military medicine, the objective of the 
discussion is to share ideas and help develop guidelines to establish the 
ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre. The meeting touched on the 
experiences of MM in HADR of ADMM-Plus countries and the need for 
accurate medical information, such as POC, geography, legal system, from 
                                                                                                                          
Selat Malaka (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 2008), www.lontar.ui.ac.id/file?file= 
digital/118818, accessed December 2013 
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affected countries and assisting countries. It also discussed the objectives 
to establish the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre, cost sharing, 
the rotation of commander and staff officers, staff functions, capabilities, 
functionality, mechanisms and structures of the ASEAN Military Medicine 
Coordination Centre. Finally, the meeting agreed to change the name from 
the ASEAN Military Medicine Coordination Centre to the ASEAN Centre for 
Military Medicine (ACMM). The result of this meeting will be developed into 
the draft concept paper on the ACMM mechanism and structure which will 
be proposed to ADMM-Plus for adoption in Malaysia.115  The ACMM will be 
established at the Royal Thai Army Military Medical Department in Bangkok, 
Thailand by 2015. The ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine’s function and 
mechanism will be tested by ADMM-Plus’s EWG on MM and by the EWG 
on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Field Training 
Exercise (FTX) in 2016, Thailand. Moreover, it will fully operate its duties for 
example gathering, analyzing and sharing information, cooperating with 
other related agencies, by training, doing research, holding the workshop, 
making and circulating relevant documents in 2017.116 
Even comprehensively, the objectives of the ACMM came in 
generalised stages and evolved into specific steps to ensure that military 
medicine become part of defense diplomacy, namely: 
7.1. General Objectives 
a. To play a unique role in demonstrating regional solidarity by 
integrating capacities to respond to the common challenges;   
 
                                            
115 ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine Senior Medical Planners' 
Workshop, available at https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news/7-news/346-admm-
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b. To coordinate and cooperate with the military medical services of 
the ADMM-Plus countries, related agencies, and international 
organisations to provide; 
1) Military medical services capabilities improvement and 
standardisation;   
2) Harmonisation of unique capabilities;        
3) Improvement of capabilities of the ACMM to world class 
standards;   
4) Sustainability development; and  
 
c. To support other areas of collaboration under the ADMM-Plus 
framework. 
 
7.2. Specific Objectives  
a. To develop joint medical response plans;  
b. To assess medical needs in crisis situations; and  
c. To conduct proper training courses and research in the area of 
emergency medical services 
 
The ACMM will serve as a vital organ and a workable mechanism to 
overcome national barriers and to play an essential role in enhancing the 
security and stability of the region. It will also actively engage, interact, and 
strengthen cooperation amongst the ASEAN Member States and Plus 
countries in support of regional integration and community building. 
In agreement, the ninth and most recent ADMM was held in 
Langkawi, Malaysia in March 2015. It adopted concept papers on the 
ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR and on the establishment of the 
ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (an initiative proposed by Thailand). The 
Defence Ministers agreed to cooperate to counter the “imminent threat” of 
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terrorist or extremist organisations  and radical groups—the threat posed by 
the Islamic State (IS) being very much the focus at the meeting—through 
information sharing, surveillance and promoting public awareness.117 
 In the development of a new operation, a number of key 
developments took place in 2013. The Second ADMM-Plus met in Bandar 
Seri Begawan in August. Earlier in June, the militaries of all 18 ADMM-Plus 
member countries participated in a massive HADR/ military medicine 
exercise, which involved 3,200 personnel, seven ships, 15 helicopters as 
well as military medical, engineering, search and rescue teams, and assets. 
This was followed by a counter-terrorism exercise in Sentul, Indonesia in 
September and a maritime security field training exercise in Sydney, 
Australia from September to October. The EWG on Peacekeeping 
Operations held a table-top exercise in Manila in February 2014.118 
 An interesting point that arose in the discussion on military medicine, 
was that a counter terrorism policy be included as part of the 
implementation of military operations medicine. They  are linked to each 
other given that the threat of terrorism is also on the agenda of regional 
security within the framework of the ADMM. 
Terrorism is a regional and global transnational threat. Defence 
forces play a significant role in combating such a threat. In this regard, 
regional and international defence cooperation is fundamentally important. 
The EWG on Counter-terrorism aims to enhance cooperation within the 
framework of the ADMM-Plus. Cooperation builds closer ties, trust, 
                                            
117 Roundtable on  The Future of the ADMM/ADMM Plus and Defence Diplomacy in the 
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transparency, and understanding. Focusing on strengthening the regional 
capability for countering terrorism threats will further draw ASEAN members 
states closer together and the benefit of enhancing counter-terrorism 
capacity will serve in other areas of mutual security concerns. It is important 
to address the challenges of low-level competency and capability by 
agreeing on what the critical gaps occur with our partners, finding 
consensus on what to develop, when, and how much, and to codify regional 
standards in employing capability to address the risks. This will enhance 
situational awareness, establish close working relationships between 
partner defence and security forces and civil authorities, and result in a 
safer and more secure region. 119  As Malaysian Defence Minister, 
Hishammuddin Hussein said, even before the Lebanon and Paris attacks, 
the “IS militant threat is real and, if not handled properly, has the potential of 
turning this region into the biggest catastrophe the world has ever seen.” 
Hyperboles aside, terrorism is a natural and appropriate focus for the 
ADMM-Plus defence ministers’ discussions.120 
 The discussion on the ADMM awareness in military medicine and 
counter terrorism policies is on the agenda, which has also received 
attention in the defense diplomacy member countries of ASEAN. As stated 
in the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM Plus, integration and mutual 
trust can be built through the operation of military medicine at the same time 
as regional security through counter terrorism policies. 
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8. Summary  
This chapter explored defence diplomacy activities undertaken by 
ASEAN member states in addressing security issues in the region, by taking 
the example of defence cooperation in the field of peacekeeping and 
maritime security. This chapter discloses the evidence of the existence of 
the elements or characteristics of a defence community which are contained 
in defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states. In the discussion 
conducted above, we can see that defence diplomacy aims to establish 
solid and integrated cooperation between militaries in ASEAN member 
states. The involvement of the military in handling non-traditional threats 
originated from the consciousness of ASEAN leaders that the tsunami 
disaster management mechanisms, as a form of non-traditional threats, 
showed the unpreparedness of ASEAN member states to cooperate in a 
unified and integrated response, that humanitarian assistance appeared to 
arrive very late, even though the militaries of ASEAN member states were 
amongst the very first to provide disaster relief. 
Since the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, defence 
cooperation of ASEAN member countries has been under the auspices of 
the two organisations. Various defence cooperatives (either joint exercises 
or exchange of personnel), such as sharing the utilisation of peacekeeping 
training facilities and the building networks of peacekeeping centres is 
directed towards establishing synchronisation, can certainly increase 
confidence-building amongst ASEAN countries and will be geared towards 
preparedness for emergency situations in Southeast Asia. Through such 
practical defence diplomacy, inter-operability as a major element of military 
cooperation, as well as being the main prerequisite for a defence community, 
will be indirectly formed in the presence of joint planning and training, as 
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well as the sharing of experiences. The merging of military power, 
understanding the doctrine, tactics and procedures with the objective to 
increase inter-operability in the defence cooperation of ASEAN member 
states are traits of defence community elements. Joint exercises and joint 
military operations of ASEAN member states, with a view to establishing an 
ASEAN arrangement for maintaining peace and stability, will enable the 
formation of a defence community in Southeast Asia. This is starting has 
proven to be true with Malaysia's proposal to form an ASEAN joint 
peacekeeping force in March 2015. 
 
Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Observation 
The security challenges facing the countries of Southeast Asia today 
lie in creating a stable environment. The debate over the concept of security 
has broadened a discourse on regional security cooperation, which has 
driven states to engage more deeply in multilateral diplomacy in order to 
better defend  and promote their national interests, and particularly in 
handling problems in maintaining a stable peace in the region. There is the 
realisation by ASEAN member states leader that new security threats to 
regional security have evolved from traditional to non-traditional  which 
requires cooperation amongst countries in the region, as well as the 
military's role to tackle the security issues through a greater participation in 
defence diplomacy.  
This thesis was developed to answer two main questions. The first 
question focused on the development of forms of threats found in Southeast 
Asia today which encourage ASEAN member states to conduct defence 
diplomacy. Although the security problems already existed before the 
establishment of ASEAN, the institutions that deal with security threats were 
never specifically set up to deal with security issues, but concentrated on 
other issues such as economic and political problems. However, in line with 
the development of these forms of threat, the ASEAN leaders felt the need 
to establish new institutions such as the ADMM and ADMM-Plus that focus 
on handling security issues through the mechanism of practical cooperation 
and diplomatic protocol. The second question focused on highlighting the 
implementation of defence diplomacy carried out by ASEAN member states, 
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which, according to this study, includes the characteristics of a defence 
community, and even the efforts of a defence community formation, 
although up to the present time, ASEAN leaders and military officials in 
ASEAN member countries have said there is no such defence community in 
Southeast Asia, because a defence community requires the incorporation of 
military force to be officially stated. 
In the previous chapter, this thesis put forward examples of collective 
defence organisations that have historically existed in Southeast Asia which 
have similarities with the characteristics of a defence community. This 
argument arises from the basic theory that analyses the development of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia, stating that geographic proximity should also 
be supported by a history legacy,1 and that the process of the formation of 
the ASEAN Community is a process of regional integration politically.2 This 
is in line with the establishment of ASEAN which allows the addressing of 
regional problems collectively, issues that originate both from within or from 
outside the region. 
Before the establishment of the ADMM, ASEAN defence diplomacy 
in the form of defence cooperation were still under the umbrella of ASEAN’s 
Chief of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), which is informal, and 
a defence mechanism at that time was pure military effort without any 
diplomatic mechanism. The defence field is not just the responsibility of 
military means alone, in contrast to the establishment of the ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus which combines all civilian and military players in the forum of 
defence diplomacy, although the issue is handled in relation to defence 
cooperation. In this case, the concept paper at the inaugural ADMM, 
                                            
1  Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, Theorizing the Rise of Regionness (London: 
Routledge. 2002), p. 39 
2 Jason D. Lewis, The Integration of Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Role in the Creation of a 
Security Community (PhD Thesis, 1999), pp. 18-32 
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established that this forum was the main driving force for a defence dialogue 
and cooperation within the Southeast Asian region, which included officials 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Ministry of Defence officials.3 
Because the logic of defence dialogue, that came about in defence 
cooperation, is the main principle in defence diplomacy, this emphasizes 
that mutual trust needs to be developed to achieve common security, from 
which a defence community can be created in and outside of the region. 
The emergence of ADMM and ADMM-Plus in the relations between 
countries in Southeast Asia was triggered by the awareness of ASEAN 
leaders that security threats are evolving and that the region requires a 
special forum that specifically addresses the issue of security. Starting from 
the Ministers of Defence meeting, when the terminology of defence 
diplomacy was first mooted, security issues have become a common topic 
to be discussed in the ASEAN environment. For the military, the presence of 
the ADMM and ADMM-Plus forums forms a defence cooperation 
programme which has been implemented since the beginning of the 
establishment of ASEAN as an official medium and structured organisation.  
ASEAN’s defence diplomacy through practical defence cooperation to date 
has been conducted within the scope of bilateral and multilateral levels, 
including joint operations, joint military exercises, training and cooperation 
on the standardisation of weaponry systems. To maintain peace and 
stability in the region, ASEAN member states carry out defence diplomacy 
through three kinds of simultaneous mechanisms that are related to defence 
cooperation, namely: 1) political effort, through regional dialogue 
mechanisms such as forums like ADMM and ADMM-Plus and activity within 
sections of those institutions; 2) the establishment of formal institutions that 
                                            
3 Interview with B.G. Cheng, Director of Policy Office, Singapore MINDEF, Singapore, 20 
September 2013  
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are structurally organised as defence cooperatives between countries, such 
as the Peacekeeping Centre Network, through six practical cooperation 
events that each has as a working group within the mechanism of the 
ADMM and ADMM-Plus; and 3) the establishment of institutions that are 
required to demonstrate the existence of a defence community through the 
development of an infrastructure that is integrated in one location, such as 
that initiated by Indonesia and which can be empowered by all ASEAN 
member states, as well as other Asia Pacific countries. 
Based on the above facts, this thesis assessed a hypothesis about the 
connection between defence diplomacy and the existence of defence 
community elements in Southeast Asia. In addition, based on the arguments 
and evidence previously discussed, this thesis examines some of the 
requirements needed to prove that the activities of defence cooperation, which 
form the implementation of defence diplomacy under the auspices of ADMM 
and ADMM-Plus, contain the characteristics of a defence community. First, the 
existing defence cooperation amongst the countries of Southeast Asia must 
contain incorporation efforts of military force; second, in the incorporation of 
military force in the region there should be various efforts to achieve inter-
operability; third, there are efforts amongst ASEAN member countries to build 
facilities and institutions that have similar objectives or are equal to the 
requirements of a defence community; fourth, in addressing security issues in 
the region there is a common perception amongst the ASEAN leaders that the 
threat which is currently evolving in the region is a common threat to the whole 
region. In the following section, this thesis presents the research results and 
draws the conclusion that the practice of defence cooperation in Southeast 
Asia contains the elements of a defence community. Finally, this chapter is 
concluded with the explanation that even though this study had limitations, it 
also opened up  opportunities for further research. 
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2. The Elements of a Defence Community in ASEAN’s 
Defence Diplomacy 
This section summarises the empirical chapters as case study 
chapters in this thesis, which are conducted in Chapters 4 to 6. Overall, this 
thesis found that ADMM and ADMM-Plus, with their practical cooperation 
and venues for defence dialogue used by the defence leaders of ASEAN to 
discuss security issues, demonstrated ASEAN’s defence regionalism. 
Therefore, there is relevance in saying that indicators of multilateral defence 
diplomacy of ASEAN, in which the military plays its role as a tool for foreign 
policy, contain the elements of a defence community which could lead to the 
establishment of an ASEAN defence community. From a historical 
background, it proves that an ASEAN defence alliance was formed through 
the establishment of SEATO and other regional organisations thereafter, 
such as ASA and MAPHILINDO; for the same reasons that the formation of 
NATO was to contain the Communist empire in the Baltic, SEATO was 
created to block further Communist expansion in Asia.4 
In point of fact, the factual existence of SEATO and other regional 
organisations before ASEAN has no relationship at all in terms of the 
analysis of the existence of elements of a defence community in Southeast 
Asia, but looking back at the history of the regional organisation in 
Southeast Asia proves that a historic collective defence organisation in the 
region has characteristics similar to a defence community. Hence, the 
existence of such an organisation in the future is not unthinkable at all.  This 
thesis tried to explore all indications, or at least the elements of the defence 
community, contained in the defence cooperation network in Southeast Asia 
today. Although ASEAN is not a defence organisation, in fact, practical 
                                            
4 Louis J, Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 338 
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defence cooperation of ASEAN member states within the auspices of 
ADMM and ADMM-Plus, whether intentionally or not by the leaders of 
ASEAN, contain elements of a defence community. 
If we follow closely, we can see how far the previously discussed 
case studies support the hypothesis from the figure below (Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 
The Timeline of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
Source: Researcher’s own figure 
Note: The figure shows how the development of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia 
began in the mid-1950s and, since the late-1990s, defence cooperation as a form of 
defence diplomacy also evolved in line with the changing of world politics and security 
challenges 
 
ASEAN, in this context, created ADMM and ADMM-Plus as organisations to 
deal with defence issues. Through the mechanism of both forums, ASEAN 
combined its military strength to overcome the challenges that currently 
exist in the region, but there are still many problems intra-ASEAN itself. 
From the variety of defence diplomacy actions that have been implemented 
in Southeast Asia so far, the dominant form of cooperation is in the field of 
exercises rather than a joint operation as a whole. The existence of ADMM 
is first to create a forum for dialogue between the participants in the defence 
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of Southeast Asia. However, because this forum did talk about defence, in 
the end, discussion regarding the modernisation of weaponry and defence 
spending efficiency was inevitable;5 in effect, this highlighted the fact that 
amongst the ASEAN member states there is indeed much technological 
disparity. Consequently, the concept of ADIC was triggered with the aim to 
release the dependence of ASEAN member countries on producer 
countries. Thus, ASEAN shows its defence diplomacy activities have 
contained the characteristics of a defence community by building an 
organisation whose activities are directed to deal with specific defence 
issues. 
Indeed, ASEAN, through practical cooperation, shows that unification 
efforts have created a cohesive region and that it prioritises the 
establishment of an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and 
stability. At the same time, the military of ASEAN member states has been 
used for peace efforts, preventing conflicts, providing disaster relief and 
“greater engagement in defence diplomacy effort,”6 because not all security 
issues are purely military problems, issues such as humanitarian aid, 
maritime security for civilian shipping, public security from the threat of terror 
and other security issues are also the responsibility of state agencies other 
than military institutions.  
In the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, the ADMM 
and ADMM Plus has made major contributions to the region, particularly in 
the integration of the region and the ASEAN countries to jointly look at 
mutual interests above national interests. This has had a positive impact on 
                                            
5 Interview with Jan Pieter Ate, Director of International Cooperation, Indonesian Ministry of 
Defence, Jakarta, 16 September 2013 
6 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for 
Military Cooperation and Assistance, (Adelphi Paper No. 365; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 1 
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the Southeast Asia region with the ADMM and ADMM Plus contributing to 
the internal stability of the region of Southeast Asia. 
 To answer the research question, this thesis tried to answer it from 
the selection of five practical defence cooperation areas in the ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus, namely: 1) maritime security, 2) counter-terrorism, 3) disaster 
management, 4) peacekeeping operations and 5) military medicine, and 
from 2014, the areas of cooperation has been increased by another 
cooperative, which is Humanitarian Mine Action. These six areas of 
cooperation are forms of non-traditional challenges that have been 
inventoried and which demand an active role from the military. The military 
is a tangible domain that has the necessary equipment as well as the 
readiness to address such security challenges. ASEAN’s defence 
cooperation under the auspices of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus is a form of 
cooperation to support the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. 
In the process of defence cooperation under the umbrella of ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus, the role of the working group of each practical cooperation is 
essential, because this is an early planning level of cooperation as well as 
being the final executor of the plan that has been confirmed  at the level of 
Defence Ministers. Very rarely has an agenda that had been approved at 
the level of the working group suddenly failed to become a decision at the 
ministerial level. 
 All practical cooperation requires concerted effort and mutual trust 
amongst military personnel. The general requirements of such cooperation 
contained in the inter-operability level requires joint exercises, 
understanding of tasks and, especially, standardisation of armaments. With 
the objective to reduce the technological disparity amongst ASEAN member 
states, who spend a combined budget of approximately $25 billion per year, 
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and regional dependency of defence equipment from outside the region,  
the ADIC was created. Obstacles that may hamper defence industry 
cooperation include the presence of conflict amongst ASEAN member 
states that have not been resolved, as this encourages the disputants to 
keep buying high-tech weaponry from other countries outside ASEAN. 
Defence cooperation in the field of the defence industry has been 
implemented so far in the form of bilateral agreement between two ASEAN 
member states. Meanwhile, defence cooperation in the prosecution of 
security threats in the region, especially in the field of maritime security, has 
been implemented in the form of multilateral agreements. 
Indeed, modernisation of defence equipment is a bridge for ASEAN 
member states to develop their own defence industries. In line with the new 
regionalism approach applied in this study, another mechanism necessary to show 
signs of a defence community in ASEAN’s defence diplomacy activities is the 
establishment of the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC). The idea for 
ADIC is to reduce the technological disparity between its member states. At the 
same time, it serves to reduce regional dependency on defence equipment from 
outside the region.7 As indicated in the ADIC concept paper, its establishment is 
geared towards ‘encouraging development of industrial and technological 
sharing’.8 Although the concept of ADIC is still at an early stage, the concept of this 
defence industry collaboration shows a significant element of a defence community 
and demonstrates to the international community the existence of ASEAN as an 
independent entity, ready to perpetuate its role in the ‘driver’s seat’ with ASEAN 
centrality in addressing security issues in Southeast Asia. 
                                            
7 Interview with Mr. Shakieb bin Ahmad Shakir, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy and 
Strategic Planning Division, MoD Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur on 13 August 2013 
8 ASEAN Secretariat, Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening 
Defence Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges 
(Jakarta: 19 May 2011); Furthermore Sneha Raghavan and Guy Ben-Ari, ASEAN Defence 
Industy Collaboration (CSIS, Defence-Industrial Initiatives Group, no. 25, 9 July 2011) 
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Moreover, the findings of this study also suggest that the mechanism 
of defence diplomacy in ADMM and ADMM-Plus has created a sense of 
kinship between ASEAN leaders, since, the nature of a defence community 
should have shared identities, values, meet regularly and develop a sense 
of responsibility towards one another in the long run.9 In the context of 
ASEAN, for example, the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force has 
been suggested as a means to settle conflicts intra-ASEAN. This ultimately 
evolved into the peacekeeping centre network and a concrete cooperation 
in the Malacca Straits Patrol that has shown member states share the same 
concerns for general security threats in the region. 
The development of an integrated seven-in-one facility in one 
location to improve the capacity of personnel through joint training, 
exchanged experiences and improved language skills are part of the 
requirements of inter-operability as the characteristics of the defence 
community that exists in the ASEAN defence cooperation. Such seven-in-
one facilities are utilised and developed together, to cement mutual 
understanding and to create strategic trust amongst military personnel of 
ASEAN member states. Similarly, the modernisation of major weaponry 
systems is an integral element of inter-operability, even though it was feared 
that this would become an arms race in Southeast Asia.   
 Recently, Malaysia's proposal to form a joint peacekeeping ASEAN 
body shows the incorporation effort of military forces, although only in the 
form of peacekeeping operations. Defence cooperation amongst ASEAN 
countries clearly contains the elements of a defence community, such as a 
common perception of threats that occur in Southeast Asia, the ways to deal 
with the threats and the various efforts to achieve the inter-operability 
                                            
9 Jared H. Beck in reviewing Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities 
(United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 29-162 
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contained in a defence cooperative amongst ASEAN member states. 
Although in the South China Sea dispute resolution ASEAN member states 
have split views, in general the ASEAN leaders have a common perception 
that the current growing threat in the region could threaten the stability and 
security of the region. Acceptance of ASEAN countries of peacekeeping 
operations with the incorporation of military force, and the smoothness of 
inter-operability in ASEAN member states defence cooperation can be said 
to constitute a clear sign of the presence of defence community elements in 
Southeast Asia. 
A defence community in the context of ASEAN is not only inward- 
looking, but is combined with outward-looking as well. The character of an 
ASEAN "defence community" exists and is relevant to addressing 
uncertainty and change in politics, the economy and culture, which are very 
closely related to the existence of ASEAN. Indeed, the distinctive 
interlocking pattern of it has been described as an ASEAN "defence spider 
web". 10  In this regard, the concept of a defence community was first 
represented in the Bali Concord II. 11  However, from the beginning the 
ASEAN establishment have consistently rejected a defence alliance and will 
never sanction a defence alliance, although in recent years, the leaders of 
ASEAN states have pledged to transform ‘troubled’ Southeast Asia into a 
‘united’ region. 12  They have come up with the concept or spirit of 
transferring the challenges into a ‘venue of cooperation’ not as a ‘venue of 
conflict’.13 Thus, the very idea of ASEAN’s ‘defence community’ implies the 
                                            
10 Amitav Acharya, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or 
“Defence Community”? (Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no 42, 1991), p. 160 
11 Alexandra Wulan and Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN’s Quest for a Full-Fledged Community 
(Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), p. 94 
12 Ibid 
13  Interview with Yudi Abrimantyo Chief Section of Bilateral Cooperation, Indonesian 
Ministry of Defence, Jakarta  21st March 2013 
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need for some form of trilateral or multilateral military arrangement within 
the group.14 Existing defence cooperation has also met the elements of 
inter-operability and unification of military force which can be identified as 
containing elements or prospects of a defence community within the 
defence cooperation amongst ASEAN member states.  
3. Limitations of the Study  
The theoretical approach to explain the defence cooperation of 
ASEAN member states indicates several things that can be debated. First, 
as has been discussed in the previous chapters, the requirement for the 
formation of a region which is contained in the new regionalism approach is 
not fully met, as evidenced by the persistence of conflicts amongst ASEAN 
member states. Thus, a region that is fully unified and integrated is 
constrained. In this context, the principle of non-interference would be 
violated if ASEAN member states begin to ally themselves with each other 
and combine their military force formally to face the same challenges.15  
Although in this case, the characteristic of a defence community is 
established by the agreement of its members that the community will build 
an organisation in which its activities are directed to deal with defence 
issues, something that cannot be addressed by a single country alone, in 
addition, the formation of a defence community does not have to be under 
an agreement that is legally binding.16  
 
                                            
14 Acharya (1991), Op.cit, p.159 
15 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1968), pp. 17-31); see also Craig A. Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy 
(Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008),p. 228; see also Craig A. Snyder, Regional Security and 
Regional Conflict paper presented to 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association (Chicago, IL: March 2007), pp. 6-7 
16 Interview with Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta, 8 August 2014 
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Second, the existence of disputes between certain ASEAN member 
states with external powers encouraged ASEAN member states to process 
the settlement with an integrated entity; however, with the persistence of 
internal conflict, ASEAN member states adopt the strategy of building 
equilibrium between external powers and themselves, 17 which is frequently 
exploited by certain countries into bandwaggoning in solving intra-state 
problems amongst ASEAN member states. In reality, ASEAN shows its 
defence diplomacy activities have contained the characteristics of a defence 
community by building an organisation whose activities are directed to deal 
with specific defence issues. ASEAN, in this context, created ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus as organisations to deal with defence issues. Through the 
mechanism of both organisations, ASEAN combined its military strength to 
overcome the challenges that currently exist in the region, but there are still 
many problems intra-ASEAN itself. 
Third, from the variety of defence diplomacy actions that have been 
implemented in Southeast Asia to date, the dominant form of cooperation is 
in the field of exercises rather than a joint operation as a whole. Of the six 
practical cooperation events contained in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, those 
in the field of maritime security, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 
can be said to have the elements of a defence community. Meanwhile, other 
practical cooperation still tends to be a mechanism for administrative 
cooperation and training.18 In creating and maintaining regional cooperation, 
defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia successfully demonstrates its 
                                            
17 Muthiah Alagappa, Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: 
Going Beyond ZOPFAN (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/4, 1991), pp. 269-305. See 
also Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003). See also Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the Management of 
Regional Security (Pacific Affairs, vol. 71 no. 2, 1998), pp. 195-214 
18 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper: http://www.aseansec.org/21216.pdf; Ian Storey, China’s 
Bilateral Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Asian Security, vol. 8, no.3, 2012), pp. 289-
290 
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existence by supporting other countries in the area of defence, humanitarian 
relief, inter-state security problems and peace capacities,19 together with 
military medicine and counter terrorism in the region. 
Understanding regional organisation creation in Southeast Asia 
cannot be separated from efforts to trace the influence of the superpowers. 
Through the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), 
SEATO was established on 8 September, 1954, and the influence of the 
U.S. in creating this defence organisation was very pronounced. The design 
of SEATO was similar to that of NATO. 20 However,  only two Southeast 
Asia countries joined the organisation: the Philippines and Thailand, 
whereas other countries were reluctant to join in an organisation known as 
an alliance. Meanwhile, in the case of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus formation, 
the creation of these organisations is not described as a form of collective 
defence organisation, and no such defence treaty has been created yet; 
however, the two organisations in the political field, through its development, 
bring new forms of relationships in Southeast Asia, especially in the field of 
defence.21 There is a fundamental difference in the formation of ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus compared to the establishment of previous regional 
organisations that have existed in Southeast Asia. In the ADMM concept 
paper, the establishment of the ADMM and ADMM-Plus are purely an 
initiative of ASEAN member states. The aims to establish this regional 
organisation is to gain ‘strategic space’ and to reduce ‘technology disparity’ 
of ASEAN member states.22 The notion of gaining ‘strategic space’ and 
reducing ‘technology disparity” is in line with the principles of a defence 
                                            
19 Spain Ministerio De Defensa (2012), Op.cit, p. 18 
20 Halle (1967), Op.cit, p. 338 
21 Available at admm.asean.org, accessed on 2 February 2014 
22  Interviewed with Juwono Sudarsono, former Defence Minister of the Republic of 
Indonesia, on 19 March 2013 
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community, that the partnership for peace will allow the member states of 
ASEAN to share information and to modernise their militaries in line with 
democratic standards.23  
Strategic space, which is created through defence diplomacy, 
encouraged a more dominant role of the military in the region to address the 
increasingly complex security issues in the region. Defence diplomacy is 
believed to increase the understanding of military personnel on human 
rights, in order to foster strategic trust between ASEAN member countries 
and with external powers. Strategic trust can be interpreted as the feeling of 
cooperation and confidence that permits countries in the region, either with 
an external major power or intra-ASEAN member states, to work together, 
initially on issues of common interest.24 
4. The Opportunit ies for Future Research 
Defence cooperation of ASEAN member states within the auspices of 
ADMM and AMM-Plus with their various mechanisms has surprisingly 
attracted very little attention of scientists or researchers in Southeast Asia in  
associating it with the mechanism of a defence community. This may be 
caused by a variety of previous studies and statements of military officials in 
Southeast Asia that not all forms of defence cooperation of ASEAN 
countries are an attempt to establish a defence community, whereas in fact, 
the degree of inter-operability that has been achieved amongst the military 
of ASEAN member states, as a result of joint exercises make the readiness 
of ASEAN member states military, which can encourage the political 
                                            
23 A short history of NATO, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html, accessed on 17 
December 2014 
24 Bantarto Bandoro, Will Good Intentions in Indonesia’s Blueprint for Asia-Pacific Security 
Collide with Harsh Realities? (Singapore; ISEAS Perspective, 3 Oct 2013), p. 6 
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decision of ASEAN leaders to conduct military operations collectively in 
coping with the threats.25  
The ASEAN member states’ big plan to establish the ASEAN 
Community in 2015 left a lot of work to be completed directly. The role of 
military cooperation in supporting the achievement of an ASEAN community 
can encourage the immediate establishment of an integrated ASEAN, with 
one condition that military cooperation of ASEAN member states really 
intends to make a stable and peaceful region, and to avoid an arms race. 
The notion of an arms race can be investigated further with a variety of 
parameters that have been built by other experts. In the definition of a 
defence community that has been developed in this study, the need for 
military modernisation, if it is not in line with the spirit of ASEAN integration, 
could turn into an arms race arena. 
Indeed, the differences in the perception of threat, regarding certain 
security issues, is still ongoing in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the structure of 
military cooperation and security arrangements that exist today refer to the 
understanding of the threat. This is despite the fact that the elements of a 
defence community are already contained in the ASEAN’s defence 
diplomacy, which is conducted through defence cooperation and dialogue in 
the field of defence. Moreover, the history of Southeast Asian countries’ 
rejection of joining an organisation in the form of defence alliance appears 
to be under consideration by personal ruling regimes. However, this time, 
with the development of international relations formed by inter-dependence 
between countries, it means that no single country or region can stand 
alone without opening communication with other countries. Consequently, 
based on the arguments that have been built, there are opportunities for 
                                            
25 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 151  
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subsequent researchers to prove that ASEAN can one day evolve into a 
defence pact or military alliance in accordance with the policies of the 
governments of the ASEAN member states. 
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Appendix-2: Interview Guides  
 
 
Term of Reference 
 
ASEAN’s Defence Diplomacy: 
The Road to Southeast Asia’s Defence Community? 
 
1. Background  
Although for a long time ago, defence and diplomacy cannot be put 
together in the same phrase, nowadays defence and diplomacy are used to 
achieve government’s goals. Defence diplomacy has becomed an 
important tool of states’ foreign and security policy. This is a result of 
three important developments. “ First, the understanding of the nature of 
security challenges among states has evolved. No longer are states 
preoccupied in addressing the traditional (military) challenges, but also 
non-traditional ones. Second, defence diplomacy involves cooperation 
between militaries over a range of issues which call the military to perform 
their traditional duties, such as counter-balancing efforts against rivals, and 
new roles that are outside of the traditional duties, such as peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, promoting good governance, responding to natural and 
humanitarian disasters, protecting human rights and, at least in the Western 
context, supporting liberal democracy. Third, in contrast to the past efforts, 
defence diplomacy of today involves military-to-military cooperation between 
not only allies and partners but even potential rivals” (Singh and Tan 2011).  
Defence diplomacy is described by Cottey and Foster (2004); as 
“peace time cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure 
(primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”. 
Meanwhile Anton Du Plessis (2008) defined, that defence diplomacy as “the 
use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained 
expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad”. 
There are at least three characteristics of defence diplomacy that can be 
identified. The first characteristic is “it involves the cooperative activities 
undertaken by the militaries and its related infrastructure during the 
peacetime” (Singh and Tan 2011). Following the first characteristic is a 
broader range of military involvement through a range of issues which 
outside of its traditional task. Such tasks could be promoting democracy and 
good governance and a broader scope of civic mission. The third 
characteristic is the defence diplomacy is a kind of military cooperation with 
allies and the possibilities to work closely with potential rivals. 
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Nowadays, ASEAN’s defence diplomacy manifested through series 
of bilateral and multilateral relations. The emergence of defence diplomacy 
in ASEAN is marked by various security cooperation activities. Furthermore, 
defence diplomacy in ASEAN has many layers, it could be Track 1 (leaders, 
ministers and chiefs of defence forces), Track 2 (defence colleges, defence 
ministry-related think tanks/research institutions) and increasingly, Track 3 
(civil society and non- governmental organisations).  Foresaid defence 
diplomacy effort is ranging from formal ones within the auspice of ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
Plus (ADMM-Plus), to informal ones such as Shangri La Dialogue and 
Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD). Meanwhile, in the military 
area ASEAN has developed many cooperation which include, but not limited 
to (a) series of peacekeeping training, (b) intelligence exercise, (c) military 
attaché visit program, (d) combined military exercise (e) arms rifles meeting 
and (f) military sport competition”. These are just some of the ASEAN 
defence diplomacy activities which reflect coordination and cooperation 
among ASEAN militaries, aimed at developing common understanding and 
confidence building as how to address regional security issues collectively.  
Since the past ten years or so, we have seen series of regional 
activities in which ASEAN member countries have used the first and second 
layers of defence diplomacy to promote their security as well as their foreign 
policy. The promotion of their security and foreign policy was clearly 
reflected in the ASEAN-initiated defence forum, such as ADMM and other 
military senior official meetings.  
This research will explore the first and second track to identify the 
existence of Defence Community in Southeast Asia. This research aims to 
analyse ASEAN’s defence diplomacy as a dialogue and process of 
communication among ASEAN’s military and security officials to help the 
region address fresh and future security challenges. It is through defence 
diplomacy that ASEAN will be able to understand not only the position of 
respective members countries of ASEAN over certain security issues, but 
also grasp the real sense of the meaning of regional cooperative security.  
However, It is important to note in this project that the use of defence 
diplomacy by a single member of ASEAN is not intended to exert influence 
over the other, but to build common perspective on how to address regional 
security problems.   
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2. Hypotheses 
A hypotheses will be assessed to gain a better understanding of this 
study, namely: The practice of defence cooperation for handling security 
challenges in Southeast Asia is the implementation of Defence Diplomacy 
under the auspice of ADMM and ADMM-Plus contain the characteristic of 
Defence Community which could pave the way for the formation of future 
Southeast Asia’s defence community.  
 
3. Methodology 
The methodology of this study is qualitative method. Boldan and 
Biklen (1992: 16) described, qualitative research  as reality is multilayer, 
interactive and social experience shared interpretation by individuals. 
Through the processing of data this study aims to explore the phenomenon 
of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia and its development through 
defence cooperation, which affects its military involvement in other tasks in 
addition to the military’s traditional tasks. In order to find the elements of a 
defence community, which relies on interviews as the primary source. This 
study focuses on ASEAN’s defence cooperation on ADMM and ADMM-Plus 
as its units of analysis and determined six countries in Southeast Asia i.e. 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam as the loci of 
the study. In collecting information on how and why ADMM and ADMM-Plus 
were organised, this study applies a triangulation method by combining 
documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and direct observation 
techniques. 
The focus of this research is from 2000 to 2012. It will collect the data 
primarily from interviews, supplemented by questioners. The respondents 
will be decision makers, politicians, military officials and intellectuals from 
selected countries of ASEAN member states as mentione above. The 
secondary data are books and articles collected from Universität Heidelberg 
Library, KITLV Leiden, RSIS Singapore and CSIS Jakarta. Relevant 
information from Indonesian Armed Forces archives will also be collected. 
 
4. Questions to be explored during the interview 
 
a. How important does the role of military in ASEAN’s defence 
cooperation? and regional security ?  
 
b. Security challenges in ASEAN have evolved from traditional to 
non-traditional. What is the main challenges or threat for 
Southeast Asian defence, and does such threat change the 
pattern of defence cooperation in ASEAN?  
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c. ASEAN never claims itself as a security pact, however the spirit 
of a community to address defence problems exist. Does the 
current state of defence cooperation in Southeast Asia contain 
the element of a defence community?  
 
d. When the military involve in diplomacy, do you see any indication 
that defence community is being processed? Could you identify 
the indicators of defence community, if any?  
 
e. The security challenges faced by ASEAN has forced them to 
respond either through bilateral and multilateral mechanism. 
What kind of venues do you see ASEAN is using to address the 
challenges? What do you think about the role of ADMM and 
ADMM-Plus in meeting the regional defence challenges, and 
does this venue serve as the path towards Southeast Asia 
Defence Community? 
 
f. Do you agree that ADMM is the main forum for defence dialogue 
and cooperation in Southeast Asia?  
 
g. The military play its role in diplomacy through ADMM. It is 
unthinkable  in the past. What do you think about this 
phenomenon; does this role reflect the openness on the part of 
he military to discuss regional security matters, which used to be 
taboo in the past? Do you see other regional  forums where the 
military involvement in diplomacy was intensive ? Why do you 
think the military should now be part  of regional  defence 
diplomacy?  
 
h. The ADMM serve as a “strategic space” for ASEAN to discuss 
wide range of regional strategic issues as well as to reduce a 
“technology disparity”, among ASEAN member states.  Can you 
identify what comes out from ADMM as a strategic space and 
how do you think the ADMM should perform as a forum for 
reducing “technology disparity? 
 
i. When performing defence diplomacy, how does ASEAN 
members states reconcile their regional and national interest? 
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j. Do you believe that in the ASEAN Community lies the spirit for 
developing ASEAN defence community to as always become a 
corridor in intra ASEAN dialogue to solve its member security 
challenges? In case diplomatic rift occurs  between ASEAN 
members state, how would ASEAN address it?.  
 
k. One of the pillars of ASEAN Community is ASEAN’s Political and 
Security Community. To what extent does this pillar support 
regional stability and security? And in that context, do you see 
the process of ASEAN defence diplomacy? 
 
l. In line with the practice of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 
do you think now it’s time for ASEAN to establish a regional 
defence industry? 
 
m. According to you, which countries in ASEAN is assumed to be 
leading in the formation of a structured defence cooperation? 
 
n. What is the rationale behind ASEAN defence regionalism that 
encourages the establishment of ADMM? 
 
o. Based on the reality of the defence practice, do you think ASEAN 
is ready to act as, and be called, a defence community? 
 
p. Has there been evidence of defence cooperation and diplomacy 
in Southeast Asia during the Cold War era? 
 
q. How do you measure that ASEAN is well mature in addressing 
the challenges in the region? 
 
r. How important is security relations with the major powers (U.S., 
China, Russia) for ASEAN? 
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